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I am a Sinto, the son of a Holocaust survivor who lost six 
aunts and uncles in the Holocaust. I know how racism 
feels and I don’t want anyone to endure what my people 
and I have to endure on a daily basis … We not only 
have COVID- 19 in Europe, but a pandemic that is older 
and even more dangerous – RACISM! Are we finally 
prepared to confront this reality and correct this injustice?
Romeo Franz, Member of European Parliament,  
Greens/ EFA, speech before the European  
Parliament in favour of a new and more robust EU  
Romani policy, Brussels, 9 July 2020
A great icy mountain, an iceberg,
Is standing in front of me,
It’s made out of arrogant lords …
All of them speak of something.
All of them know something.
All of them one to another
Are telling foolish stories
about the Roma …
Stop it, gentleman!
Do you all want the truth?
If you want, I’ll show you
Real Gypsydom (Romanipen)
The Roma, gentlemen
Are a people, just a people …
Extract from Iceberg, a poem written  
in 1976 by Leksa Manush (Aleksandr Belugin),  
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These studies and voices from Europe’s Roma lend force to the 
understanding that racism and exclusion are universal evils, to be 
fought and defeated by the common efforts of all. They provide 
insight into the special challenges faced by a community beset 
by ancient prejudice, by neoliberal austerity and now by rising 
ethno- nationalism in parts of Europe. They also show that in 
addition to these deep and dark matters, the issues faced by the 
Roma are not independent of the currents of social change and 
personal liberation sweeping across the planet.
An outsider with no special knowledge or experience can 
perhaps contribute little, except for an expression of solidarity 
and a commendation to readers that they take up these texts, read 
them with care and sympathy, and find in them the information, 
understanding and expression of what may possibly be termed 
‘the Romani cause’. Our task, in short, is to learn, to appreciate 
and to lend a hand as chance and circumstance permit.
So, having said that much, let me stand aside and let these 
voices, from the Romani community and its distinguished and 










Introduction: Romani communities in a 
New Social Europe
Andrew Ryder, Marius Taba and Nidhi Trehan
Cultural erasure, crisis and transformative change
This book seeks to challenge conventional discourses and 
analyses on deeply entrenched Romani exclusion in Europe 
today, which often focus narrowly on poverty and cultural 
identity. In this sense, our book provides new conceptual 
tools for framing social justice for Romani communities across 
Europe through the transformative vehicle of a New Social 
Europe. As the vast majority of Roma experience high levels of 
exclusion from the labour market and from social networks in 
society, the book maps out how the implementation of a ‘Social 
Europe’ can offer innovative solutions to these intransigent 
dilemmas. Finally, our work aims to serve as a policy instrument 
for planning and implementing new socio- economic policies 
on Roma in the European Union (EU).
Roma, Gypsy and Traveller communities form the largest 
minority ethnic group within the EU. According to the 
European Commission, there are an estimated 10– 12 million 
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the definition of the Council of Europe. It encompasses Roma, 
Sinti, Kale, Romanichals, Boyash/ Rudari, Balkan Egyptians, 
Eastern groups (Dom, Lom and Abdal) and groups such as 
Travellers, Yenish and the populations designated under the 
administrative term ‘Gens du voyage’, as well as people who 
identify themselves as Gypsies (FRA, 2018: 5).
The issue of identity is complex and often contentious, 
with some claiming the notion of ‘Romani’ identity presents a 
political agenda that is trying to fuse diverse and disparate groups 
into one identity to help mobilize those labelled ‘Roma’ in a 
political goal- oriented campaign that runs the danger of veering 
into ethnic nationalism and reflects the aspirations of a small 
elite. Others, though, argue that forms of common identity 
can be formed based on shared heritage such as language and 
origins, as well as shared experiences of exclusion, without 
creating some false and stifling cultural uniformity. Notions of 
a common Romani identity have been important in mobilizing 
and galvanizing Romani activists across Europe since the 1970s; 
these activists realized that given the growing prominence of the 
European Economic Community/ EU, transnational activism 
would have value in European- level advocacy. Some, despairing 
at their national governments’ inactivity, hoped to see lobbying 
and campaigning directed at European decision- makers prompt 
and prod their national governments into action to alleviate 
Romani exclusion (Ryder et al, 2014).
In 1993, Václav Havel, then president of the Czech Republic, 
described the situation of the Roma as a litmus test for Europe’s 
civil society; yet, despite over 30  years of pan- European 
initiatives targeting Roma by the EU and other entities, the 
inclusion of European Roma remains one of the most critical 
challenges for European society in view of the poverty and 
discrimination that confronts this minority. Havel made the 
distinction between establishing institutions of procedural 
democracy and a democratic civil society, which he felt was far 
more of a challenge in curbing ‘manifestations of intolerance 
even without a threat of repression’ (Kamm, 1993).
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At a European level, Romani peoples have been the 
focus of cultural erasure and grand state projects throughout 
history. The Hapsburgs reflected Enlightenment ideals by 
categorizing the Roma as a group that was outside of European 
culture and needed to be ‘civilized’ through assimilation and 
sedentarization. For the Nazis, the Roma, along with Jews, 
were classified as ‘subhuman’ and ‘asocials’, a group that needed 
to be eradicated through policies of genocide and the Final 
Solution (Friedlander, 1995). Under the communist regimes, 
Roma were targets of proletarianization in the belief that 
equality could be achieved without cultural citizenship; thus, 
the price to be paid was an assimilation that left little room for 
expressions of Romanipe (Szeman, 2018). Likewise, in Western 
Europe, commercial nomadism was proscribed in an attempt 
to assimilate various groups (Acton, 1974). Are current policies 
of ‘integration’ merely a benign continuation of past efforts 
to assimilate? Within Europe, will we continue to see policies 
of ethnic cleansing directed at the Roma as far- right populist 
politicians mesmerize the electorate with ethno- nationalist 
visions and authoritarian leadership?
There is an ongoing debate in the EU over how to define 
possible new rules and directions, and there are calls for a 
change in direction of EU policy vis- à- vis Roma. What 
direction should Europe take? What direction should be taken 
by institutional power? Should change also apply to Romani 
civil society and communities? Are non- Romani communities 
ready and willing to reflect on how their cultural bias and 
perspectives have often fuelled prejudice towards the Roma? 
Modernity and the rise of industrial production techniques also 
undermined traditional economic niches and associated ways of 
life enjoyed by the Roma, leading to a movement from skilled 
artisanal work to low- skilled, manual employment or long- 
term unemployment, thereby increasing the risk of assimilation 
and poverty. Can ‘progress’ and development be fair?
This Policy Short seeks to contribute to this important 
debate, the outcome of which will determine the political 
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and cultural direction of European society in the early 21st 
century. It is a debate that is taking place in the context of acute 
economic, political and cultural instability in Europe, and at 
the time of writing, the ravages of the COVID- 19 pandemic 
aggressively highlight the nature of Romani exclusion. We, the 
researchers, practitioners and activists involved in this project, 
are seeking to reach beyond an academic audience, and appeal 
to both EU and national policymakers and activists in the field. 
We hope this Policy Short serves as a toolkit for reflection, 
training and mobilization within Romani communities and 
among their allies. We trust our book will find appeal beyond 
a Romani studies readership and be viewed as a case study on 
how marginalized groups can achieve social justice, and will 
be valuable for those with a broad interest in equalities.
This book seeks to promote transformative change in 
society, that is, deep structural and cultural change that creates 
fundamental shifts in discourse and practice based on principles 
of social justice. It fuses personal and social development; 
consequently, transformative change necessitates fundamental 
structural, institutional, cultural and personal change, so that 
even at the individual level, our horizons and actions are 
substantially altered (Williams et al, 2010).
As Mohandas K. Gandhi (1913: 241) noted:
We but mirror the world. All the tendencies present in the 
outer world are to be found in the world of our body. If 
we could change ourselves, the tendencies in the world 
would also change. As a man changes his own nature, 
so does the attitude of the world change towards him. 
This is the divine mystery supreme. A wonderful thing 
it is and the source of our happiness. We need not wait 
to see what others do.
The seeds of transformative change are within us, and it is 
a process that entails change from the bottom up through 
radical/ organic social movements rooted in community 
INTRODUCTION
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organizing. Our contributors believe that new directions in 
activism and knowledge production, as exemplified through a 
new generation of Romani ‘organic intellectuals’ and critical 
thinkers, indicate that an embryonic process of transformative 
change has already begun within the Romani movement. We 
are thus critical scholars and scholar- activists challenging the 
status quo and seeking to fuse knowledge production with 
activism to promote a transformative agenda. This quest for 
social justice is happening in the context of crisis and flux, as 
well as growing intolerance and authoritarianism.
The post- war trilateral balance between the state, market and 
civil society has been unbalanced, with the market emerging 
as dominant (Foucault, 2008). The economist Thomas Piketty 
(2014) has highlighted how an economic elite in many 
advanced capitalist countries, the top ‘1 per cent’, through 
the vehicle of regressive taxation policies, is returning wealth 
distribution backwards to levels witnessed 100  years ago, 
enabling them to amass huge fortunes, while working- class 
incomes remain stagnant. Consequently, a growing section 
of Europe’s population is experiencing increasing hardship 
and insecurity, and the Roma are prominent within this 
category. This past decade in particular can be characterized 
as one of chaos and instability. What is the root and nature 
of this instability? A key driver is the financial crisis of 2008 
as it prompted the EU and national governments to pursue 
austerity measures across Europe, whereby welfare budgets 
have been slashed and unemployment has remained high in 
some regions of Europe. Already at the periphery, the Roma 
have been among the populations suffering the greatest loss.
After the 2008 financial crisis, reports by the EU Fundamental 
Rights Agency (FRA) revealed the catastrophic extent of 
Romani exclusion. In one of the most extensive surveys on 
European Roma, which covered 11 EU member states, the 
FRA found that about 90 per cent surveyed had an income 
below the national poverty threshold and only about a third 
of those surveyed had paid work, which was often precarious 
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and informal in nature. The FRA (2014a) also noted that 
in EU member states, unemployment rates for Roma were 
three times higher than for the general population. Romani 
youth are one of the most marginalized groups in society, and 
an estimated 63 per cent of Roma aged 16– 24 were ‘not in 
employment, education and training’ (NEET). This compares 
to the 12 per cent EU average on the NEET rate for the same 
age group. Moreover, about 40 per cent of Romani children 
were found to live in households struggling with malnutrition 
or hunger (FRA, 2014a). The FRA (2014a) also found that, 
despite discrimination, most Roma were actively seeking 
work, contrary to the widespread racist trope of indolence. 
Moreover, only 12 per cent of the Roma aged 18 to 24 who 
were surveyed had completed upper- secondary general or 
vocational education, compared with over 70 per cent of the 
majority population (FRA, 2014b). In addition, exclusion has 
an important gender dimension: while 14 per cent of Romani 
men said that they had never been to school, the percentage 
for Romani women was 19 per cent. In its survey, the FRA 
(2014c) found that across EU member states, only 21 per cent 
of Romani women were in paid formal work, compared to 
35 per cent of Romani men.
Progress has been limited in reducing avoidable and 
unnecessary health inequalities endured by Romani people, 
and they continue to die young. Disproportionately burdened 
by chronic but preventable diseases, often omitted from 
prevention programmes and marginalized within healthcare 
systems, their life expectancy and health status remain 
significantly lower than for their non- Romani counterparts in 
all European countries (EPHA, 2018). In the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis, negligible progress has been made in achieving 
social justice for the Roma. A safe water supply and sanitation 
services are available to almost every non- Romani household 
in Europe today; yet, many Romani populations cannot 
access these essential services and lack clean tap water, flushing 
toilets and hot showers. Such exclusion is, in part, not just a 
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product of poverty, but also attributable to spatial exclusion 
and environmental racism that leads to large numbers of Roma 
being consigned to segregated ghetto communities where slum 
housing lacking basic utilities occupies marginal space.
Critically, current socio- economic problems for Roma and 
others at the margins run deeper than the financial crisis. Since 
the collapse of communism, countries in Central- Eastern 
Europe have been propelled on a trajectory of neoliberalism 
as they joined the EU, leading to the promotion of laissez- 
faire economics, which has discouraged and limited state 
intervention and moved away from the original conception of 
the European social model. As state enterprises were privatized 
or closed down, large numbers of Roma working as manual 
or semi- skilled workers were made redundant. In some ‘left 
behind’ communities, Romani families have not had a stable 
and reliable income for three decades. In Western Europe, the 
growing dominance of neoliberal policies, bolstered by the 
EU’s promotion of a single market, has also made the economic 
livelihoods of many more precarious through privatization and 
structural decline, and Roma have borne the brunt of these 
consequences. Despite the huge social costs of neoliberalism, as 
reflected in the case of the Roma, it has bolstered its position 
through forms of divide and rule, most notably, by depicting 
the marginalized and unemployed as lazy and work- shy. Such 
pathologizing through a ‘culture of poverty’ narrative thus 
views exclusion as something that is inherited and to which 
people are socialized into (rather than structurally rooted), and 
has a strong racialized dimension. This interpretation of poverty 
is, at times, coupled with racist narratives, whereby ethnic 
groups such as the Roma, alongside migrants, are demonized 
in the public sphere as prone to criminality and welfarism.
Nationalism is the dominant ideology of the modern 
age, being based on a notion of popular sovereignty that 
sees the people as coterminous with the nation and as a 
bounded and congruent entity (Conversi, 2007). The Roma 
are often viewed as outside the boundary of ‘insiders’, a 
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hostile perception orchestrated against them by the media 
and political class. The impact of nationalism has been 
accentuated by economic crisis and cultural change, making 
national identity appear to be a safe haven and a reassurance 
of ‘traditional’ certainties in an age of acute anxiety. The 
instability of nationalism and ability to morph into extremes 
is evident with the rise of its shrill offshoot: authoritarian 
populism. Authoritarian populism has encouraged a form 
of ‘emergency politics’ where often charismatic and ‘strong’ 
personalities, largely men, offer simplistic analyses and 
solutions to the ills of the world, centred on attacks on 
liberal democracy and multiculturalism, and usually involving 
scapegoating minority groups, who become ‘folk devils’ 
(Cohen, 1972). Such narratives also rely on a reified form of 
national identity that is static, insular and narrow, and defines 
itself through the classification of ‘outsider’ groups, often 
centred on vulnerable minorities like the Roma (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2017). Romani communities, already racialized, 
are now being increasingly securitized, whereby they are 
perceived as a risk and danger to society, with accusations 
of anti- social behaviour, welfare dependency and spatial 
encroachment through nomadism and or migration (van 
Baar et al, 2019). Such accusations are evident in the media 
and authoritarian populist rhetoric, which is increasingly 
‘tabloidized’ and emotive. In a ‘post- truth’ age, scant attention 
is given to balance and accuracy; instead, emotion and 
accusation appears to be at a premium in the public sphere, 
the arena of public debate. The rise of social media has also 
contributed to the demonization of Roma.
Europe appears to be on the verge of a precipice in terms 
of political instability. Robert Fico’s government in Slovakia 
has been linked to the mafia, ties that led to the murder of an 
investigative journalist probing corruption. In Hungary, Viktor 
Orbán revels in challenging the tenets of liberal democracy 
and, alongside the political leadership of Poland, is challenging 
many of the fundamental principles of the EU. In Italy, Matteo 
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Salvini, controversial radical- right politician and former 
interior minister, hopes to return to power. Across Europe, 
radical- right and nationalist parties wait in the wings, hoping 
to attain power, and could seek to emulate Britain’s exit from 
the EU (Brexit), a huge challenge to the EU. Steve Bannon, a 
former adviser to President Donald Trump, established a pan- 
European populist umbrella group, ‘The Movement’, which 
worked for populist gains being made in the EU elections 
in 2019; although this did not materialize, there remains the 
possibility that future economic crises could tip the balance 
in their favour.
The rise of authoritarian populism in Europe has parallels 
with political developments in the US under President Trump. 
This book contains in- depth discussion of authoritarian 
populism in Hungary under Orbán and its impact on Roma, 
believing that it is an outlier for future developments in 
Europe, but also devotes itself to looking at what lessons the 
Romani social movement and wider campaigns for social 
justice in the US and Europe might learn from each other, 
with reference to a counter- narrative of resistance. The rise 
of authoritarian populism could reflect the warnings issued by 
two great thinkers of the 20th century, Karl Polanyi and Ralph 
Dahrendorf, who foresaw that capitalism – when in deep crisis – 
might transform into forms of fascism and authoritarianism 
(Ryder, 2020). These new detours of neoliberalism initially 
appear to be in contradiction with globalization, as reflected 
by sentiments favouring a retreat into the nation- state and 
opposition to free movement of labour, but the fusion of 
neoliberalism and authoritarian nationalist populism seems to 
be a relatively simple form of political merger, facilitating the 
further downsizing and dilution of social protections (Fekete, 
2016). Such a development will have profound implications 
for the Roma.
COVID- 19  – a pandemic coronavirus that has already 
killed large numbers of people across the world – brutally 
exposes the fragility and precarity of life for many at the 
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margins, including the Roma. COVID- 19 has exacerbated 
Romani marginalization, with lockdowns that have left 
Roma, especially those dependent on informal and casual 
work, without an income, bank account or access to savings, 
and with little or no emergency welfare support coming from 
the state. A poor health profile and high levels of diabetes 
and other debilitating pre- existing conditions, together with 
overcrowded substandard living conditions in rural settlements 
and tenement housing, leave many Roma vulnerable to the 
virus. Moral panics and hysteria in countries such as Spain, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia have centred on Romani 
communities, with claims that they are the principal carriers 
of the virus. For instance, in Bulgaria, some politicians and 
media outlets referred to Romani people as ‘a threat to 
public health’ and requested special measures targeting them 
on that basis. Local authorities in several EU member states 
have set up draconian police checkpoints around Romani 
settlements to enforce quarantine measures; in one place, 
a fence was erected around a Romani settlement to better 
control movement (CoE, 2020). Such actions were redolent 
of earlier (often recurring) anti- Romani racist measures in 
Europe generated by moral panics. For example, during 
the time of Romani slavery in Romania, enslaved nomadic 
Roma were forbidden from entering the city of Bucharest 
during outbreaks of the plague. Then, in the 1940s, fears 
that Roma would contaminate the ‘Romanian race’ with 
typhus led to stringent anti- Romani measures (Matache and 
Bhabha, 2020). The COVID- 19 pandemic has triggered a 
major economic collapse that may well last several years, and 
the Roma have been adversely affected by this slump. Thus, 
communities already on the margins will be devastated as 
first the pandemic and then economic precarity take their 
grim toll. Only the resilience of grass- roots organizers and 
the leadership and resourcefulness of authorities (such as 





Shortly after the advent of the financial crisis, in 2011, the 
EU initiated a new policy framework for the Roma, the 
National Roma Integration Strategy (NRIS), which is critically 
assessed in Chapter One; however, as is evident from the FRA 
evaluations cited earlier, its progress has been slow and some 
would say negligible. The European Roma Rights Centre 
(2016: 1) concluded:
Five years on, the EU Framework has hit ‘a mid- life 
crisis’. Nearly one decade after the launch of this 
initiative, it can be said that the EU Framework for 
National Roma Integration Strategies has yet to deliver 
in terms of concrete change to the lives of millions 
of Europe’s Romani citizens; the implementation gap 
is more pronounced than ever; discrimination and 
segregation remain pervasive and human rights abuses 
against Roma are all too frequent.
In the post- war period, development theory was dominant 
and contended that through planning and intervention, 
deprived groups located at the margins of society could be 
assisted in benefitting from forms of mainstream existence 
premised on Western capitalist notions. This was subsequently 
denounced by post- development theorists, who argued that 
development theory implied a form of control through the 
concept of ‘governmentality’, which normalized a neoliberal 
and assimilative policy agenda and ‘responsibilization’, thus 
individualizing the victims rather than addressing the structural 
fault lines on the ground. These traits have been evident 
with reference to programmes focused on the Roma (van 
Baar, 2011). As noted in this book, Romani civil society has 
too often been disconnected from the communities it seeks 
to represent and/ or tied to, as well as restricted by donor- 
led agendas, which have in some cases made civil society 
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organizations service providers and adjuncts of institutional 
power (Trehan, 2001).
One encouraging development within Romani activism 
has been the emergence of forms of transnational activism. In 
1971, for example, the International Romani Union (IRU) 
was formed, creating a global umbrella group for the diverse 
Romani diaspora, which strengthened networks within 
Europe, that is, between the eastern and western halves, as well 
as with Roma in the USSR and the Americas. Regrettably, 
such initiatives are often undermined through factionalism 
as an organizational culture characterized by a traditional/ 
patriarchal leadership often seeks to monopolize power and 
obstruct innovation, most notably, with the voices of Romani 
women and youth going unheard. In some cases, deeply 
nationalistic frames preclude the development of solidarity, 
intersectional alliances, friendship and cooperation, with other 
groups experiencing exclusion (Klimova- Alexander, 2005).
Since the collapse of communist one- party rule in Eastern 
Europe, a number of international Romani non- governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have emerged, largely dependent on 
the Hungarian- American billionaire philanthropist George 
Soros’s Open Society Foundation. Nonetheless, some scholars 
and activists argue that such entities have failed to create a 
dynamic and sustainable social movement with strong links 
to communities at the margins. A new generation of Romani 
leaders – often university- educated and fluent in English – are 
to be found in such NGOs but critics say they are disconnected 
from communities at the grass roots and are often restrained 
by corporate- style management structures within civil society 
(Gheorghe, 2013). Others argue that Romani civil society has 
too often fallen into a narrow ‘liberal civil rights’ frame focused 
on a human rights and liberal multiculturalism discourse that 
neglects the economic dimension of Romani exclusion and 
fails to offer a narrative that challenges the neoliberal order 
(Trehan, 2009). Despite all these criticisms, it is important 
to reflect on where the Roma would be without this work 
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having been done, and some suggest that it has laid invaluable 
foundations for future empowerment, producing a cadre of 
educated leaders able to engage in strategic policy development. 
Another cause of optimism is that a new, critically minded 
cadre of Romani activists are coming to the fore; despite the 
scale of new challenges and crisis, opportunities are presenting 
themselves to advance transformative change.
While identity politics under the banner of Romani activism 
should avoid static and homogenizing conceptions of identity, 
it is a ‘label’ that can assist in the ‘strategic essentialism’ of 
Spivak, namely, mobilizing identity to form communities of 
fraternity and performances of identity to achieve recognition 
and/ or access to resources (Landry and MacLean, 1996).While 
not imposing rigid uniformity, it is a concept that entails 
essentialization of identity but, equally, promotes discussion 
and dialogue around shared ideals that should be reworked 
and updated. Spivak later expressed doubts about the term but 
it has been influential in the development of feminist, queer 
and postcolonial theory. It is a useful concept in describing 
the mobilization of ‘Roma’ since the 1970s, a galvanization 
some fear may, at times, have led to the overt promotion of 
nationalist and culturalist agendas among Romani activists 
(Surdu and Kovats, 2015).
However, we believe the contours of the new Romani EU 
policy and Romani social movement should encompass both 
recognition and redistribution in a meaningful sense. While it is 
true that the EU and Romani civil society have embraced the 
frames of ‘recognition and distribution’ to some degree, the 
EU NRIS framework stresses the importance of social and 
ethnic inclusion. Despite these efforts, recognition has been 
undermined by tokenistic measures and representation, as 
well as the wider societal securitization and demonization of 
Roma, while a shallow form of redistribution has centred on 
a narrow social inclusion agenda centred primarily on training 
and skills development that works in tandem with the tenets 
of neoliberalism (Van Baar and Vermeersch, 2017). We believe 
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the concept of a New Social Europe offers opportunities to 
bring to the fore meaningful conceptions of recognition and 
redistribution, as well as innovative directions in Romani 
advocacy and community organizing.
A New Social Europe
Although rarely discussed today, ‘Social Europe’ was a 
visionary concept in the 1970s and 1980s, promoted by 
social- democratic/ left voices in Western Europe who sought 
to achieve democratic socialism in Europe via the European 
Economic Community (now EU). According to Andry (2017), 
the concept of Social Europe centred on: wealth redistribution; 
social and economic planning; economic democratization; 
improved working and living conditions; regulation and 
control of economic forces; guarantee of the right to work; 
upward harmonization of European social regimes; and 
access to social protection for all. Furthermore, it included 
environmental concerns and sought the democratization of 
the European Community’s institutions, to empower the 
European Community in the social field and greater social 
and economic coordination between member states. For some, 
it was a civilizational project based on Enlightenment values 
promoting forms of solidarity and cosmopolitanism.
The nearest this project came to realization was the EU 
Commission under its President Jacques Delors (1985– 95). 
Under his leadership, the Social Charter was introduced, 
guaranteeing fundamental social and economic rights as a 
counterpart to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which concentrates on civil and political rights. It guarantees a 
broad range of everyday human rights related to employment, 
housing, health, education, social protection and welfare. 
Nonetheless, Delors found his nemesis in British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, who bitterly opposed the Social 
Charter, disparaging it as ‘socialism through the back door’, 




neoliberal deregulatory form of government she had pioneered 
(Turner, 2000).
It was the ascendancy of neoliberalism that constrained 
and undermined the impetus for a Social Europe, and the 
European Commission increasingly reflected the aspirations 
and political mores of Europe’s conservative centre, according 
greater priority to the economic agenda of strengthening the 
single market and free trade, rather than the social dimension 
of the EU. Simultaneously, the mainstream Left in Europe 
lost its confidence and resolve in the face of the neoliberal 
paradigm shift, and developed what became known as the 
‘Third Way’, a diluted form of left politics that embraced the 
tenets of neoliberalism within a framework of limited and 
modest social policy, best exemplified by New Labour (Levitas, 
2005). As such, the European Left lost its will and inclination to 
radically reform and reorient the European project on the basis 
of socialist principles. Now, of course, the European project 
itself has come under attack from forms of authoritarianism/ 
national populism (discussed earlier) and the more aggressive 
forms of neoliberalism espoused by the US and UK that are 
even more deregulatory, as well as opposed to supranational 
initiatives that while committed to free trade, also pledge to 
protect social rights and defy a ‘race to the bottom’.
In December 2019, a former minister in German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel’s cabinet, Ursula von der Leyen, became the 
latest President of the European Commission. Despite the 
political, economic and cultural challenges outlined earlier, 
there seems to be little evidence of new initiatives that might 
create a fairer and more dynamic EU for those at the margins 
like European Roma. French President Emmanuel Macron 
has called for a ‘rebuilding’ centred on an integrated Eurozone 
with its own finance minister, parliament and a stand- alone 
budget to head off future crises. However, we argue that 
a lack of critical reflection on the inherent weaknesses of 
neoliberalism – a hollowing out of the state and concomitant 
public services, increasing inequality, and often an erosion of 
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democratic norms that leads to oligarchic power – as well as 
the bureaucratic dimension Macron envisages, may not be the 
most effective remedy; rather, his centrist ‘Third Way- like’ 
approach is unable to meet the full range of authoritarian 
populist challenges facing Europe.
The founders of the EU project envisaged diverse forms 
of economic and social solidarity safeguarding the European 
social model (Crouch, 2017). This book sheds light on how 
the EU can be reinvented and energized through a ‘New 
Social Europe’ that takes active measures to include Europe’s 
largest and youngest demographic, the Romani communities. 
To this end, we explore how the concept of Social Europe 
can offer a pathway towards achieving social and economic 
justice for Romani communities. We are thus critical scholars 
and activists challenging the status quo and seeking to fuse 
knowledge production with community mobilization in order 
to promote a transformative agenda centred around anti- racism 
and economic justice as pillars of the New Social Europe vis- 
a- vis Romani communities.
‘Social Europe’ today stresses the value of increasing labour 
market participation through active welfare state measures, 
emphasizes supply- side efforts at job creation, seeks measures 
to provide security other than lifetime job tenure and 
prioritizes efforts to combat social exclusion (Seikel, 2016). 
The Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25) is 
a pan- European movement which believes that the EU is 
disintegrating, as reflected in misanthropy, xenophobia and 
toxic nationalism, but wishes to promote solidarity in the 
EU through a European New Deal that ‘primes the pump’, 
injects state finance into the economy, stimulates economic 
activity and creates jobs and opportunities for all. It is also a 
movement that countenances ecological balance and a fossil 
fuel- free world; hence, regeneration and economic stimulus 
and growth should be based on sustainability, entailing new 
forms of production and work, including shorter working 
weeks and the redistribution of working hours. This would 
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also mean curbing the current excesses of consumerism and 
materialism.
Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2009) The Spirit Level: Why More 
Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better is relevant to our 
analysis of the profound multidimensional inequality facing 
the Roma. They posit that redistribution and fairer societies 
benefit all:  work and fairer societies reduce the cost and 
trauma of inequality, creating social and political stability. In 
this book, we highlight how greater inclusivity will benefit 
Roma and non- Roma alike. More broadly, in terms of 
how we manage our resources and economies, progressives 
are advocating the democratization of institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, as well as the 
possibility of a reconstituted global governance structure as a 
means to make a fairer and more equitable world that moves 
away from the market fundamentalism of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Jones and O’Donnell, 2018). We support such 
a reorientation.
While the debate in recent decades on Romani inclusion 
has centred on human rights, critics argue that a neoliberal 
human rights agenda only allows for tokenistic concessions, 
leaving the fundamental nature of society unchanged 
(Trehan, 2009; Law and Kovats, 2018). This view certainly 
has validity as the Roma have experienced little material 
improvement in their situation, despite being protected by 
human rights norms (even stronger within the EU), and 
targeted by initiatives by human rights agencies and NGOs. 
However, such criticism may be is too harsh. Where would 
the Roma be today without human rights protections? 
Perhaps it is a problem of the interpretation and application 
of human rights. A more radical definition of human rights 
would entail perceiving poverty as multidimensional and 
seeking to challenge it by inviting analysis of the structural 
causes of poverty (such as anti- Romani racism), as well as 
tackling its symptoms. Lister (2004) argues that laying claim 
to legal entitlements has symbolic rhetorical force, enabling 
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a re- conceptualization of poverty that moves away from 
personal shame. Such a radical conception of human rights 
identifies a dual politics of redistribution and of recognition 
and respect since the entitlements encompass both socio- 
economic rights and citizenship rights (for example, the right 
to participate fully in society irrespective of ethnicity and 
the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’) (Szeman, 2018). Thus, 
the predicament of Romani communities is reframed, and 
support is no longer seen as charity, but instead becomes a 
duty. Furthermore, instead of being bounded by xenophobic 
tropes labelling them as ‘indolent’ and ‘welfare- dependent’, 
the Roma at the margins would be perceived as victims of 
an unfair system deserving of social (and economic) justice, 
necessitating structural change (compare Chapter Two by 
Ferkovics et al on EU policy with Chapter Seven by Trehan 
and Matache on anti- racist analysis). Such a narrative has 
transformative potential in a New Social Europe, and offers 
a critical challenge to economic hegemony, explaining, in 
part, why the radical right has sought to defy and undermine 
even liberal forms of human rights today.
A radical human rights discourse committed to challenging 
multidimensional poverty and exclusion is the hallmark of 
economist Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities approach’, promoting 
an individual’s capability to achieve the kind of life they 
have reason to value. Such an approach seeks to dismantle 
multifaceted barriers to inclusion, including not only 
poverty and access and rights to resources, but also freedom 
of expression and identity, and the ability to participate in 
decision- making and to be heard. It facilitates the capability to 
make valued choices and is thus not prescriptive. It is therefore 
of relevance to the Roma in the sense that it avoids previous 
forms of assimilation and allows paths of inclusion to be framed 
that reflect the cultural, social, economic and moral aspirations 
of those at the margins. As such, it prioritizes agency, and this 
is another central theme of this book.
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In the past, conceptions of Social Europe have been too statist 
and given little thought to the agency and self- empowerment 
of oppressed groups. This book envisions a New Social Europe 
that promotes forms of community action that can facilitate 
bottom- up, inclusive community development, which focuses 
on harnessing the existing resources and skills of those at the 
margins. This also means employing customs and traditions 
as resources that can be adapted and built upon rather than 
discarded (asset- based community development). We argue that 
a vibrant and autonomous civil society for not just Roma, but 
all minority groups and interests, is a prerequisite to ensuring 
that macro- policies are relevant to and shaped and led by local 
communities, and that platforms are provided to challenge 
oppressive forms of ideology and practice.
Here, Sen’s capabilities approach has relevance, and in 
this volume, we seek to demonstrate how change  – not 
just in material conditions and access to services, but also 
in empowerment and a broad range of opportunities and 
possibilities  – can create tailored and relevant solutions to 
particular Romani communities’ needs, rather than the 
prescriptive and top- down blanket approaches of the past. 
However, the reality is that many NGOs are not sustainable 
at present given that they have become extensions of the 
neoliberal project and/ or are engaged in work that the state 
should actually be providing but, due to the prevalence 
of neoliberal policies, has abdicated/ forgone (education, 
healthcare, legal aid and so on). The current NGO map has 
few real community service organizations (CSOs) that serve 
local Romani communities and that privilege people- centred 
priorities. We argue a vibrant democracy should provide for 
the ability of members of civil society to organize and represent 
community interests, and have the resources to enable financial 
autonomy and unbridled challenges to power. This may come 
about through greater governmental financial support but 
with less prescription, through civil society becoming more 
ROMANI COMMUNITIES AND TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE
20
self- financed, through genuine co- production or through a 
combination of all three.
Critics of the strategies of the contemporary Romani 
movement contend that an emphasis on narrow identity 
politics has meant liberal reformist and cultural aims have taken 
precedence over structural change (Law and Kovats, 2018). 
This reflects the tension Fraser (1995) recognized between 
redistribution and recognition, where demands for ‘recognition 
of difference’ have fuelled struggles of groups mobilized under 
the banners of nationality, ethnicity, ‘race’, gender and sexuality. 
In such ‘post- socialist’ conflicts, group identity has supplanted 
class interest as the chief medium of political mobilization. 
Cultural domination supported by nativist ethno- nationalist 
claims and exclusionary policies supplants conventional forms 
of exploitation as the fundamental injustice, and cultural 
recognition has displaced socio- economic redistribution as 
the remedy for injustice and the goal of political struggle. 
In recognizing the interrelation between economy and 
culture, however, Fraser (2007) notes that solutions and viable 
strategies take a multitude of forms. Like Fraser, we privilege 
transformative action that is fundamental and structural 
above that which is reformist and affirmative; however, we 
do acknowledge that important change can stem from the 
latter, which can even evolve into something that becomes 
transformative. Hence, purist disputes over hierarchies of 
resistance that revolve around a debate contrasted between 
recognition and redistribution do not need to be so binary or 
polarizing. While we argue that recognition and redistribution 
can be fused, the prevailing current of public opinion appears 
to be moving against such sentiments. In an age of economic 
crisis and cultural dislocation where tradition and convention 
have been challenged through globalization, many have 
retreated into the certainties of rigid forms of national identity 
and chauvinism.
The sociologist Anthony Giddens (2014) has stated that 
the world is increasingly being divided between forms of 
INTRODUCTION
21
economic, political and/ or religious fundamentalism and 
cosmopolitanism. Liberal multiculturalism sought to eradicate 
racism through education and law, and is now increasingly 
derided. Some political elites are not only stressing the need 
for integration, but also actively orchestrating forms of nativism 
(which often leads to state- sponsored racism). The book assesses 
the relevance of the term ‘antigypsyism’ (a perception that 
a particular form of racism is directed at the Roma) in the 
context of the points Giddens raises and the cultural war that 
European society appears to be increasingly engaged in, where 
society is fractured and polarized along the lines of values, 
beliefs and practices. This cultural war has a demographic 
dimension as well, where older, less educated and rural sections 
of the population are pitted against the young, diverse and 
metropolitan. For some, the answer to these tensions rests 
in colour- blind policies centred on universal conceptions 
of citizenship (Kovats and Law, 2018). For others, targeting 
and ethnic- based policies offer tailored policy responses and 
platforms for community voices (Cortés, 2019). Still others 
believe that inclusive notions of national and European 
citizenship can offer universality while not precluding forms 
of targeting, which should be viewed as forms of piloting 
and emergency measures that can be absorbed into the 
mainstream of a New Social Europe centred on intervention 
and redistribution that can ultimately address many of the 
underlying socio- economic tensions and anxieties that fuel 
the ‘culture war’ (Ryder and Taba, 2018). Critical Romani 
voices also contend that intersectionality, solidarity with other 
marginalized groups and privileging the knowledge derived 
from lived experiences of poverty, racism, spatial exclusion, 
sexism and so on can serve to counter the reactive narratives 
spawned by the culture war, and should be part of the narrative 
of a New Social Europe.
Critical Romani voices are also evident in this book through 
critical race theory, which contends that racial inequality 
emerges from the social, economic and legal differences created 
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between dominant and hegemonic ‘races’ to maintain elite 
privileges in labour markets and politics, and consequently 
create the circumstances that give rise to marginalization. 
Postcolonial thought also informs this book, and is described 
as an attempt by those once subject to colonialism to break 
free from rigid doctrines of Eurocentrism and elite nationalism, 
and to aspire to give a standpoint and voice to the (collective) 
underprivileged subjects of the Global South, who were often 
silenced and/ or misrepresented by the very same elite European 
discourses. Here, a first parallel can be drawn with Roma, 
who have similarly been deprived of voice, agency and history 
in European narratives. Spivak (2017) asked the question of 
whether the subaltern (those at the margins) can speak for 
themselves as cultural repression and marginalization limits 
such scope. It is therefore pertinent to ask ‘Who speaks for the 
Roma?’ and ‘How can agency and voice be enhanced for the 
Roma?’ (Trehan and Kóczé, 2009; Ryder and Szilvasi, 2017).
In 2020, there was a glimmer of hope for a New Social 
Europe.  In July 2020, an EU summit was held to finalize 
the details of an economic rescue package to prevent what 
appeared to be the worst economic crisis since the great 
depression of the 1930s, a threat that loomed large as a 
consequence of the COVID- 19 pandemic. Divisions were 
evident between member states with a conservative economic 
tradition of being opposed to securing credit for economic 
stimulus, those termed ‘frugals’, as opposed to those states 
more willing to used credit during economic crisis to ‘prime 
the pump’, re- start the economy, who can be termed as 
‘the primers’ (Saxer, 2020). The finalised deal involves €750 
billion package and involves significant financial transfers 
from the richest countries to the weakest. For the first time, 
the European Commission will be allowed to borrow large 
sums on the international money markets. This fundamentally 
changes the scope of the organization. No longer will it 
depend entirely on funds transferred from member states. 
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What is also significant is that Germany, normally allied with 
the ‘frugals’, backed the ‘primers’.
Varoufakis (2020), the former Greek Finance Minister, was 
sceptical as in his opinion the recovery fund is a distraction 
from the elephant in the room: massive austerity. Furthermore, 
he was not convinced that Germany has been persuaded to 
drop its ordoliberal commitment to balanced books, and in his 
opinion, the proposed fund is ‘minuscule’, insufficient to deal 
with the impending economic tsunami. Time will tell whether 
the rescue package is effective and if there has been a paradigm 
shift in Europe. The contributors to this book support this shift 
and hope the ideas presented here can shape high level policy 
discussions with reference to the Roma.
To reiterate, our vision of a New Social Europe is based on 
redistribution and intervention as central tools in achieving 
social justice. We wish to see forms of development that 
nurture both growth and agency that are not set within 
neoliberal frameworks centred on profitability and forms of 
governmentality. A New Social Europe embodies not only 
social justice, but also freedom and agency, ideas that in recent 
decades the radical right has sought to make its own through 
laissez- faire deregulatory conceptions of what it is to be free 
(Varoufakis, 2019). Within a New Social Europe, the social 
contract is strengthened as people are provided sufficient 
resources by the state to enable and enhance their capabilities 
and access decent life chances, including Romani communities 
at the margins. A New Social Europe gives people the freedom 
to express identities and nurtures solidarity and an intersectional 
dialogue that deconstructs and challenges both cultural and 
economic hegemony. A New Social Europe gives people the 
freedom to understand and discuss through a revived public 
sphere, where a well- resourced civil society connected to the 
grass roots provides platforms, agency and critique. This is 
how we envision transformative change. Given the critical 
challenges Europe faces with COVID- 19, a new economic 
crisis and a widening social gap for groups like the Roma, the 
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concept and transformative vision of Social Europe has never 
been more relevant.
To recap, the book addresses a series of key questions:
• What should a New Social Europe mean? How can 
transformative change be achieved?
• What role can the EU, member states, civil society and the 
academy play in creating a New Social Europe?
• How can recognition and redistribution be achieved?
• How can we halt the corrosive spread of anti- Romani racism 
and authoritarian nationalism?
• How can Romani communities achieve agency and 
self- empowerment?
• How can we unite diverse marginalized groups using 
intersectional approaches within a New Social Europe? How 
can the voices of Romani women and others experiencing 
patriarchy and oppression be heard?
• What lessons can Europe and the US draw from each other 
in terms of resistance to authoritarian populism?
Outline of the book
Having set out the conceptual framework in this introductory 
chapter, the book proceeds as follows:
• In Chapter Two, Roland Ferkovics, Andrew Ryder 
and Marek Szilvasi propose a dynamic EU social policy 
encompassing redistributive and interventionist policies, 
coupled with bolder forms of empowerment.
• In Chapter Three, Marius Taba identifies how authoritarianism 
and nationalist populism are working against the Roma 
through ‘antigypsyism’, and outlines the potential for 
intersectional solidarity and transformative change.
• In Chapter Four, Bernard Rorke provides insights into how 




Orbán, is stirring anti- Romani sentiments and stoking hatred 
to bolster his power.
• In Chapter Five, key Hungarian Romani activist Jenő Setét 
is interviewed by Katalin Rostas.
• In Chapter Six, Anna Daróczi, Lisa Smith and Sarah 
Cemlyn provide important insights into the perceptions of 
Romani youth on Social Europe, transformative change 
and intersectionality.
• In Chapter Seven, Nidhi Trehan and Margareta Matache 
examine the experiences of transatlantic Romani activists 
and the implications for an inclusive political agenda and 
policy for Romani communities based on the concepts 
anti- racism, community organizing and solidarity.
• In Chapter Eight, Angéla Kóczé and Nidhi Trehan offer 
a critical theoretical contribution to re- imagine and re- 
envision Social Europe by using the language and insights of 
Romani feminists who challenge the norms of intersected 
gendered, racial and classed violence, not as accidental, but 
rather as systemic conditions of neoliberal capitalism.
The volume concludes in an Afterword with reflections by 
German Greens MEP Romeo Franz.
The Romani ‘ideas tree’ for transformative change
Some of the ideas raised in this Policy Press Short were 
discussed at a conference staged in Budapest in 2018 and 
hosted by the Corvinus University, European Roma Rights 
Centre and Roma Education Fund, among others. The 
conference, ‘The Roma and Social Europe’, was attended 
by Romani community members, activists, service providers 
and researchers. The discussion was crystallized into what we 
describe as the ‘The Romani ideas tree for transformative 
change’. This is not so much a manifesto, but rather a guide 
and catalyst for communication, debate and strategic activism. 
As with a tree, we hope it will be added to, nurtured and 
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developed, and grow deep roots and maintain an organic 
connection to the base (of Romani communities). The ‘ideas 
tree’ has shaped and guided much of the discussion in the book.
Within a New Social Europe, we wish to see the following 
in society:
 1.  New economic systems should be created that promote 
redistribution and intervention, and recognize the 
social and economic failure of the current economic 
system, securing levels of employment and support for 
entrepreneurialism, mutualism and social enterprise, 
welfare, and skills development sufficient to create a just 
society. In this sense, the conception of a renewed Social 
Europe has relevance if coupled with policies that promote 
and celebrate diversity and inclusivity.
 2.  In a changing global economy, the collectively 
available workload of a society should be more equally 
divided, creating universal basic employment in which 
(lifelong) learning is considered to be an integrated part 
of employment.
 3.  An education system should exist that is free and not 
segregated, that translates and ingrains concepts of diversity, 
tolerance and respect, and that does not indoctrinate 
nationalism and other ideas that define Roma and other 
minority groups as separate and inferior. Such an educational 
system would not only recognize that equality is important, 
but also acknowledge that positive measures need to be in 
place to close outcome gaps and achieve equity.
 4.  Roma civil society should be a key partner in decision- 
making and able to build organizations that are democratic 
and have the capacity to mobilize communities at the grass 
roots. This may necessitate greater self- funding, or donor 
funding that is more flexible and sympathetic to localized 
NGOs and activism.
 5.  While a new generation of Roma lawmakers, activists, 
researchers and artists are now taking the political 
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and cultural stage, many Roma at the margins should 
be empowered.
 6.  More interaction between rural, grass- roots Roma 
NGOs and activists and those in urban centres should 
be encouraged. This could be achieved through the 
generation of new mechanisms of knowledge production, 
communication and solidarity, so that both urban and rural 
communities are enriched.
 7.  The diversity and fluidity of Romani communities, 
both culturally and along dimensions of gender, class 
and sexuality, should be recognized as a major strength 
in generating new insights, energies and intersectional 
solidarity. This recognition may also cause some creative 
disruption to existing dominant patterns and modes of 
organizing among Romani communities.
 8.  Romani culture should be celebrated in societies where 
diversity and interculturalism are promoted, and where 
knowledge production in the community as well as the 
academy is considered to have merit.
 9.  Democracy and free speech should be safeguarded 
against authoritarianism and nationalist chauvinism, 
which are major instigators of forms of antigypsyism, 
hate speech and crime. Positive political narratives both 
within and outside of the communities need to be 
developed and used. The narrative should be potential- 
based, emphasizing the capacities of Roma in a social, 
political and economic sense. Furthermore, the narrative 
should point out the common points between Romani 
and non- Romani communities, bridging the interest 
of the two. Additionally, the narratives need to reflect 
on the very fact that challenges that Roma face are not 
solely an ethnic phenomenon, but rather affect the entire 
population, requiring coordinated joint work for the 
common good cause.
 10. The EU and member states should champion these values 
and devise a new bolder Romani strategy, with clearer 
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targets and interventions, working collaboratively with 
Romani communities.
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Mechanisms of empowerment for the 
Roma in a New Social Europe
Roland Ferkovics, Andrew Ryder and Marek Szilvasi
The context
Recent years have been turbulent for the European Union 
(EU), as evidenced by the UK’s departure (Brexit) and 
increasing levels of Euroscepticism that charge the body with 
excessive bureaucracy and centralization. However, critics 
from the progressive spectrum of politics feel that the EU 
has neglected the social dimension and has lacked the energy 
and impetus of the Delors- led European Commission (EC) 
of 1985– 95 in the realm of social policy. Indeed, it was under 
Delors that the EC established a Social Charter of the European 
Community and sought to steer the EU away from just being 
a free- trade area towards an expansive social contract- based 
market economy. Although there was a security and economic 
focus in the early manifestations of the EU (the Schuman 
Plan and the Common Market), alongside this has been a 
social dimension, in particular, after the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in 1997 strengthened EU competences in employment and 
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European politics, in particular, the European Peoples’ Party, 
the EU institutions can be characterized as cautious in the 
social sphere, and the concept of Social Europe appears to have 
gone neglected for much of the past two decades (Graziano and 
Hartlaap, 2019). In part, this results from the EU’s response to 
the financial and Eurozone crisis, and strategies within the EU 
centred on austerity, a point that is elaborated upon later in 
the chapter; however, there is also a long- standing tradition in 
many northern EU member states of exalting balanced budgets 
that deter stimulus and deficit spending.
In this context, we must assess what the EU has achieved 
for the Roma but also consider what new directions the EC 
might take under Ursula von der Leyen. This chapter seeks to 
dovetail a new Romani policy within a dynamic New Social 
Europe framework. In this respect, some ‘blue sky thinking’ – 
an envisioning of the future – will come into play. In an age of 
political and economic crisis, change and new directions often 
occur quickly and suddenly, presenting new opportunities. To 
date, it appears the Right have been the political beneficiaries of 
the crisis, and here we consider what Europe and the situation 
of the Roma might look like if progressive ideals prevail and 
a New Social Europe emerges.
Although the situation of the Roma has been on the agenda 
of EU institutions since the 1970s, the main concern of EU 
policymakers rested with the presumed itinerant way of life of 
some Romani and Traveller communities in Western Europe, 
and the Roma only received more substantive attention 
with the EU enlargement negotiations with Eastern Europe 
(Simhandl, 2006). The improvement of Romani rights became 
part of the criteria for accession. Romani civil society has also 
been instrumental in promoting this issue on the European 
stage through transnational activism; in part, it has found the 
EU more amenable to its advocacy than its more intransigent 
national governments, which, it has been hoped, the EU might 
guide, steer and, at times, prod into greater action. The most 
important European policy initiative for the Roma has been 
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the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies 
(NRIS) (hereafter referred to as the EU Roma Framework). 
The EU Roma Framework was adopted in 2011, requesting 
member states to develop NRIS or put in place an integrated 
set of policies (for countries with small Romani populations) to 
address Romani integration in core areas such as employment, 
education, health and housing. It relies on a soft form of 
governance known as the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC), where it is believed that peer pressure and persuasion 
can help to steer member states to reach common goals. The 
adoption of the EU Roma Framework can be viewed as an 
adjunct to the EU 2020 Strategy, the response to the European 
economic crisis that also relies on OMC and involves an agenda 
for job creation and growth. The new EC is reviewing the 
Roma Framework and considering what steps should be taken 
in the future, and will unveil a new policy stance at the end 
of 2020. This chapter seeks to consider potential new actions.
The EU Roma Framework and mechanisms of empowerment
In re- conceptualizing Romani policy in Europe, we reflect 
on the successes and failures of the EU Roma Framework 
using Hennink et al’s (2012) ‘mechanisms of empowerment’, 
a benchmark to measure inclusion and improve capacities.
The ‘mechanisms’ referred to include: Knowledge, in other 
words access to education, training and information from 
formal or other means such as experience and conscientisation. 
Agency, the capacity to act independently and make choices 
is another central mechanism enabling ‘Self- Identity’, the self- 
confidence to achieve goals; ‘Decision- Making’, the ability to 
make informed decisions; and ‘Effecting Change’, the belief 
in one’s own ability to take action. Another mechanism is 
Opportunity Structure, an enabling environment of social, 
economic, political, institutional and community support to 
foster community development. Capacity Building is another 
important dimension in this process referring to community 
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capacity to provide or advocate for services or self- governance. 
According to Hennink et al, Resources, access to physical and 
financial resources, are integral to develop communities and 
empower. Finally, Sustainability, the ability of communities 
to develop initiatives towards long- term sustainability, is an 
integral part of empowerment.
It is important to differentiate between ‘liberal empowerment’ 
and ‘liberating empowerment’. Liberal empowerment is often a 
feature of mainstream development agencies and organizations, 
and focuses on individual growth, though in an atomistic 
perspective, through the notion of the rational action of social 
actors based on individual interests. In contrast, liberating 
empowerment is a process where those denied the ability to 
make strategic life choices acquire such an ability in terms 
of resources, agency and achievements/ outcomes through 
a process of conscientization/ critical awareness and relying 
on collective action and structural change. Critics argue that 
the term ‘empowerment’ can be paternalistic as it implies an 
external body will grant empowerment; however, it is a term 
widely used by social justice campaigners, many of whom 
adopt a more radical interpretation. Hennink et  al’s (2012) 
‘mechanism of empowerment’ clearly belongs to the more 
radical visioning of empowerment, and it is that conception 
that guides discussion in this chapter.
Hennink et  al (2012) identify ‘agency’, as articulated 
through self- identity, decision- making and effecting change, 
as a central component in mechanisms of empowerment. 
This is one of the most serious criticisms of the EU Roma 
Framework, and actors within Romani civil society have 
consistently pointed out the lack of agency in developing 
national strategies and involvement in evaluating and 
monitoring progress (Ryder and Taba, 2018). Tokenism and 
paternalism within the EU Roma Framework have limited 
what Hennink et al (2012) describe as the ability to effect 
change, a sense of self- belief and, in turn, optimism. Romani 
civil society, especially that operating at the community and 
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grass- roots level, has found the bureaucratic regulations of 
the EU difficult to navigate and has had limited success in 
accessing resources for capacity building; in contrast, those 
fortunate enough to attain funding have found themselves 
overwhelmed by the bureaucratic demands of the EU 
and/ or to be merely ‘token partners’ in large consortia 
dominated by state institutions (ERGO, 2019). This is part 
of the continuation of ‘internal colonialism’ that Roma have 
experienced for centuries.
Disempowerment, as Hennink et al (2012) note, limits the 
opportunities to challenge power structures and venture into 
forms of meaningful co- production, as well as to enjoy forms 
of sustainability and autonomy that avoid reliance on short- 
term project funding that ties civil society to the rigid agenda 
of funders (Ryder et al, 2014). This is related to the idea of 
Gramscian ‘hegemony’, where the subject population actually 
accepts and normalizes its own disempowerment. A  long- 
standing criticism of the EU is its propensity for top- down and 
distant policymaking that fails to effectively engage with or 
involve affected EU citizens. The EU has sought to embrace 
the concept of empowerment by adopting the ‘10 Basic 
Principles of Roma Inclusion’, a tool for both policymakers 
and practitioners. The principles are centred on:  (1) 
constructive, pragmatic and non- discriminatory policies; 
(2)  explicit but not exclusive targeting; (3)  an intercultural 
approach; (4) aiming for the mainstream; (5) awareness of the 
gender dimension; (6)  transfer of evidence- based policies; 
(7) use of EU instruments; (8) involvement of regional and 
local authorities; (9)  involvement of civil society; and (10) 
active participation of the Roma.
Despite an emphasis on participation, there is clearly a 
rhetoric– reality gap. For some commentators, the logic 
and rationale of Romani policymaking has been a narrow 
form of integration that fails to give the Roma a voice and 
seeks to problematize the Roma and promote assimilation 
(Szilvasi, 2015).
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More fundamentally, there has been an absence of what 
Hennink et al (2012) describe as an ‘opportunity structure’: an 
enabling government willing to give financial support to 
inclusive community development steered by Romani 
communities. One indicator of a lack of progress is that in 
some EU countries, there are actually more unemployed Roma 
after nearly a decade of the EU Roma Framework being in 
operation – in 2019, 75 per cent of Roma were said to be 
unemployed, as opposed to 74 per cent in 2011 (Matarazzo 
and Naydenova, 2019). By contrast, in the same period, 
employment for the mainstream population has increased 
steadily in all countries surveyed. Likewise, there has been a 
deterioration in educational inclusion and housing, as well as 
expanding health inequalities for Roma. We can say that the 
Roma are the victims of ‘structural racism’: the normalization 
and legitimization of an array of dynamics – historical, cultural, 
institutional and interpersonal  – that produces cumulative 
and chronic adverse outcomes. The evaluations by the EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency featured in Chapter One, with 
their disturbing social indicators, support this assertion. Why 
has progress been so limited overall?
For a start, in addition to grappling with the aftermath of a 
major financial crisis in 2008/ 09, Europe also had to contend 
with a Eurozone crisis that prompted a series of bailouts, as 
well as strict financial regulations and penalties to encourage 
balanced budgets. Austerity, as imposed by the ‘troika’ of 
the EC, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
European Central Bank, together with economic caution, 
has placed pressure on welfare budgets in many EU member 
states that has had adverse impacts on low- income groups 
like the Roma. Moreover, these policies defied conventional 
economic wisdom by slashing welfare and socio- economic 
development budgets at a time when economies were weak 
and vulnerable, consequently exacerbating unemployment and 
recession. Governments chose to bail out the banking system 
without demanding deep structural change, transferring the 
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cost of this financial rescue onto ordinary citizens through 
spending cuts and increased regressive tax.
These economic ills have brought the EU to the precipice, 
creating a legitimacy crisis where a growing number of 
European citizens feel alienated from the EU, and it has been 
a major factor in the rise of the radical right (see Chapter 
Three by Taba). In the absence of governmental action to 
stimulate economies, some choose to accept the narratives of 
the radical right and nationalists that blame the status quo on 
actors such as the EU or migrants, and also demonize minority 
groups like the Roma, claiming that they are a financial and 
social burden on the state as a result of their alleged cultural 
dysfunctionality, often termed ‘a culture of poverty’ (Feischmidt 
et al, 2013) – a notion that taps into long- standing European 
racist tropes against the Roma termed as ‘antigypsyism’. 
Structural racism, the rise of the radical right and forms of 
nativism and xenophobia in the public sphere have made the 
dominant conservative centre of Europe, such as the national 
parties within the European Peoples’ Party (EPP), even more 
hesitant to actively promote the interests of groups like the 
Roma; hence, national action on ‘integration’ by member 
states has often failed to match the urgency and commitment 
of declarations issued by the EU.
Romani civil society has certainly raised its criticisms of the 
EU Roma Framework. Given that there is no binding nature 
to the EU Roma Framework, the design and implementation 
of the NRIS is absolutely dependent on political will, political 
priorities and the views of respective member states. Thus, 
there has been a serious lack of funding allocation, monitoring 
and proper implementation from the side of member states 
(REF, 2020). Critics of the EU Roma Framework also note 
some NRIS have a homogenized and even stereotypical view 
of the Roma and neglect the particular needs of Romani 
women, migrants and children (Rostas, 2019). Concerns 
on the lack of progress have prompted the EU to review the 
EU Roma Framework and the procedures for allocating EU 
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funds for Romani inclusion and their outcomes (EC, 2020). 
The success of any new policy framework will depend on the 
degree to which policymakers and civil society accept and act 
upon the points of criticism raised thus far.
Questioning the rationale of Romani inclusion policy
EU Romani inclusion policies from 2011 to 2020 focused 
on how to bring Roma to the labour market and adequately 
validate their human resources through the exchange value 
system of the market. Within the introductory paragraph of 
the EU Roma Framework, Roma are repositioned from liberal 
citizens whose fundamental rights are systematically violated, to 
poorly educated future labour market entrants. The design of 
EU policies as recommended by the EU Roma Framework is 
based on inclusive labour market and activation schemes, which 
often run in parallel to the official labour market. Creating 
manual jobs with low- skill requirements and allocating them 
to unqualified and often uneducated Roma appears to be a key 
element in advancing Romani inclusion, according to the EU 
Roma Framework. Policymakers seem to believe that this will 
spontaneously further expand their inclusion in social, political 
and cultural spheres. Once the majority looks at Roma as 
citizens like themselves, as employees and taxpayers, this will 
have a correcting effect on accepting their cultural specificity 
and ensuring their civil and political equality.
However, a central question is whether all areas of the social life 
of Roma should be validated through the exchange value systems 
of the market and what the effects of the introduction of the 
logic of economic efficiency, profitability and competitiveness 
in the realm of civil liberties and political participation may be 
to the Romani situation. One of the identified contradictions 
lies in the definition of the labour market as the main field of 
inclusion. If the intent is to produce inclusion policies that would 
enable Roma to become fully fledged citizens, by considering 
the labour market as the main option, policymakers paradoxically 
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chose one of the most rigid and disciplinary systems. The 
institution of the labour market is perceived as a fundamental 
organizational principle of our contemporary societies to such an 
extent that the lives of those people who are unable to become 
employed are considered futile. In the shift towards productivist 
policies at the EU level, which began with the Lisbon Agenda 
in 2000 and has been reinforced by the Europe 2020 Strategy, 
inclusion in the labour market is seen as the basic foundation 
upon which other inclusion policies can be built. Cultural, civil 
and political empowerment has been increasingly subordinated 
to market logic. This has implications for Roma and policies 
targeting them.
Roma road map
In February 2020, the EC published a ‘road map’ to facilitate 
consultation on a new Romani ‘initiative’. In this document, 
the EC appeared to recognize some of the criticism levelled 
at the previous EU Roma Framework by pledging to combat 
both socio- economic exclusion and antigypsyism, and to 
promote Romani empowerment. In the initiative, the EC 
pledges to ask member states to better reflect diversity within 
the Romani population in their strategies, in particular, the 
needs of Romani women, children, youth, mobile EU citizens 
and migrants (DG Justice, 2020).
Will the finalized Romani initiative reflect calls for bolder 
initiatives backed up with hard law and aligned to a radical 
social policy agenda? The next section first outlines current 
civil society thinking and then outlines a series of concepts 
and ideas that have received relatively little discussion within 
Romani civil society.
Towards a Romani strategy
Leading voices in Romani civil society (Matarazzo 
and  Naydenova, 2019) are calling for the development of 
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a strategy based on hard law rather than OMC, with more 
ambitious and clearly defined targets, objectives and indicators, 
and with penalties for non- compliance (in June 2020, Romeo 
Franz MEP presented a draft resolution to the European 
Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE) calling for a Romani strategy with binding 
responsibilities for member states [Franz, 2020]). Calls have 
been made for a greater focus on antigypsyism and reference 
to gender, youth, Romani migrants and the promotion of 
minority targeting.
With reference to binding legislation, it should be noted 
that the Racial Equality Directive (RED) identifies Roma 
as a vulnerable ethnic group and the EU Roma Framework 
imposes an obligation on member states to desegregate public 
services like education. In this sense, more recognition is 
needed as to how the human rights of Roma in Europe are 
being undermined. The EC launched several infringement 
cases under the RED on the discrimination of Romani 
children in education in the Czech Republic (in 2014), 
Slovakia (in 2015) and Hungary (in 2016). Infringement can 
lead to the EU Court of Justice ruling that a member state must 
take action to comply with the Court of Justice judgment; it 
is a lengthy process as it takes time to gather data and scope 
is afforded to negotiate solutions. However, it is a cause of 
concern that the aforementioned cases have not been fully 
concluded. The midterm review of the EU Roma Framework 
by the EC (2018) notes there is a consensus that infringement 
proceedings as a tool should be further used to advance Romani 
integration. However, as noted, infringement proceedings have 
proven to be slow and cumbersome, with negative verdicts 
sometimes being ignored by member states. There is scope 
for such action outside of just segregated schooling and many 
would like to see legal action taken in, for example, the fields 
of housing, eviction and employment in Western as well as 
Eastern EU member states. The infringement process needs 
to be more transparent and faster, have improved monitoring, 
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ensure compliance with basic human rights, and apply greater 
punitive sanctions.
Minority targeting
The initial development of the EU Roma Framework 
prompted an intense debate between national and European 
decision- makers and Romani civil society. Decision- makers 
asserted that any policy targeting Roma should be in line with 
the EC’s approach, meaning that no future funding allocations 
should be based on ‘ethnicity’. From the other side, civil society 
representatives countered with the argument that if there will 
be a Romani policy and, as a result, a funding allocation to 
reduce social and economic gaps without considering the 
target population as the main beneficiaries, then the risks of 
failing to reach out to the most excluded are high. Moreover, 
Romani civil society asserted that government should be 
‘explicit’ in what they were going to do and how. The 
compromise between the two sides was to consider within 
the Common Basic Principles (a joint declaration between 
decision- makers and civil society, as discussed earlier) that one 
of the agreed principles be ‘explicit but not exclusive’. The 
present experience has shown to many that governments have 
used this ambiguity to channel financial resources to places and 
localities where the Roma are demographically less evident. 
A re- evaluation of this approach is needed.
As part of the drive to achieve greater Romani inclusion, 
some lead civil society voices are calling for greater targeted 
projects and funding streams. However, some policymakers 
believe that developing specific inclusion policies for Romani 
populations runs counter to a ‘mainstreaming approach’. To 
a certain degree, the viability of and/ or support for targeting 
depends on the structure and political apparatus of the state, 
the composition of society, political history, the prevailing 
political attitude of governments, and so on. Care is needed 
with a targeted approach, in particular, to avoid the creation 
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of inferior or ghettoized services. Furthermore, since Roma 
are often scapegoated, once targeted policies are designed, 
specific attention is needed to avoid further intentional 
exclusion of Roma. It has been argued that Romani inequality 
exists, in part, because of actual Romani- specific policies 
that fail to address and often reinforce a view of the Roma as 
an ‘exceptional category’. Van Baar and Vermeersch (2017) 
suggest that measures that are aimed at ‘saving’ the Roma are 
implemented as part of a range of practices that mark Roma as 
vulnerable, leading to further essentialization and paternalism 
by the state.
A close relationship should exist between mainstream and 
targeted support so that knowledge arising from, for example, 
a local pilot project is then fed back into the daily operations 
of mainstream service providers and becomes part of their 
activities (Ryder et  al, 2014). This can lead to progressive 
change within mainstream methods and approaches as the pilot 
facilitates new directions or becomes part of established services 
as a path to empowerment. In the next section, we discuss how 
inclusive forms of ‘community development’ can form part of 
a broad strategy to avert the dangers that can materialize when 
targeted actions become paternalistic and assimilatory.
The Youth Guarantee Scheme (YGS) is a commitment by 
EU member states to ensure that all young people under the 
age of 25 years receive a good- quality offer of employment, 
continued education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within 
a period of four months of becoming unemployed or leaving 
formal education. Accordingly, member states are required 
to submit action plans as to how these goals can be achieved. 
Roma and other marginalized groups have been unable to 
access the benefits of this scheme to the same degree as more 
privileged peers; hence, greater targeting of Romani youth 
and improved outreach services should be a priority of active 
targeting. In 2021, the EC will present a Child Guarantee to 
make sure children have access to the services they need until 
adulthood (EC, 2020); again, targeted action for Romani 
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children could be highly beneficial. Greater targeting and 
flexibility could also lead to improved outreach between service 
providers and Romani communities.
Blue sky thinking: on a New Social Europe
The EC is now reflecting a rationale for Romani inclusion 
initiatives based on economic as well as anti- discrimination and 
social justice principles. According to the EC road map, such 
efforts will help Roma achieve ‘their potential to contribute to 
the economy, social protection systems and society at large … 
the marginalization of Roma represents a loss of human capital, 
results in welfare dependence and limits labour supply and tax 
revenues’ (DG Justice, 2020: 1– 2). This is a robust argument 
against those who oppose Roma- targeted measures but we 
should not forget the logic of social justice in the application 
of a New Social Europe to Romani inclusion (on the concept, 
see Chapter One). Critics may be right that, for too long, the 
EU in general and its Romani inclusion policies in particular 
have been too growth- oriented and the social dimension has 
been subservient to competition and profitability.
A New Social Europe would recalibrate the relationship 
between economic interests and communities, placing greater 
emphasis on solidarity and social protection in a new social 
contract, linking the Roma more with social/ economic rights 
discourses and processes, and mainstreaming them in EU 
institutions. It would also provide greater scope for Roma to 
shape policy.
Socio- economic rights
Most welfare systems have been closely tied with labour 
market participation (Bauman, 2005). The difference can 
be analytically cast between those policies that promote the 
right to labour as an aspect of welfare state services and those 
that promote the duty to labour as a foundation for all other 
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socio- economic (and other) entitlements. The latter approach 
relies on processes of decommodification (Esping- Andersen, 
1990), which enable decent living independent of the labour 
market. The former approach, on the contrary, relies on 
processes of re- commodification (Pierson, 2001), which 
aim to gradually tighten eligibility, roll back existing welfare 
provisions and promote the virtue of active re- engagement 
with the labour market.
The general manner of framing the debate on the just 
distribution of wealth is critical for the design of Romani 
inclusion policies. In left- wing circles, the universality of 
socio- economic rights and their primacy over other forms of 
rights is de rigueur. Socio- economic inclusion approaches do 
not accept the distribution of wealth as an entirely competitive 
or lottery- like matter, in which only the winning card gives 
an entitlement to provisions, while the gambling groups, 
which organized the game, get ever richer. They call for the 
entitlements for all citizens in some sort of egalitarian socio- 
economic (re)distribution. Building on liberal societies, in 
which civil and political rights are, at least formally, granted 
to all citizens regardless of their individual performance or 
merit, the left- wing discourse claims the same universal and 
unconditional application of socio- economic and cultural 
rights. According to Bauman (2005:  46), the welfare state 
‘rendered the right to dignified life a matter of political 
citizenship, rather than economic performance’.
The discourse on socio- economic inclusion understands 
the situation of injustice in terms of a socio- economic 
misdistribution. Different groups, sometimes delineated by 
racialized rhetoric, such as in the case of Roma, experience 
conditions of the relegated and unemployable underclass or 
exploited working class – the ‘precariat’, that is, those suffering 
from precarity (Standing, 2011). Therefore, policy solutions 
strictly favouring labour market integration might not have a 
tangible effect on the inclusion of these groups. It can be argued 
that welfare state inclusion policies are better placed to deal 
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with the fully fledged inclusion of Roma, who are represented 
in large numbers among groups considered worthless to labour 
markets. However, socio- economic inclusion policies have been 
gradually shrinking alongside the contestation of the welfare 
state in the age of ever- growing austerity and declared scarcity. 
Pierson (2001) emphasizes that since the 1970s, welfare states 
have faced a context of essentially permanent austerity due to 
changes in global economies, the sharp slowdown in economic 
growth, the maturation of governments’ commitments and 
population ageing, all factors that have generated enormous 
fiscal stress. This fiscal stress is based on the upward movement 
of surplus capital to the 1 per cent. In order to respond to 
this demographic and fiscal pressure, European welfare states 
began to initiate processes of recalibration, narrowing and 
tightening eligibility. Hence, from the beginning of the 1980s, 
according to Therborn (2008: 113), ‘suddenly, the high water 
withdrew and was followed by a neoliberal tsunami … and 
the privatization became the global order’. However, in the 
mid- 1990s, a resurrected leftist discourse emerged in the shape 
of the alter- globalization movement and World Social Forums 
opposed to neoliberalism. This new global wave of leftist 
politics has sought to return social justice and socio- economic 
inclusion discourses to the main stage of policymaking.
A conceptual analysis of poverty and socio- economic 
inequalities within a human rights framework may have 
value for Romani policy frameworks given that political, 
civil, economic, social and cultural rights are connected and 
equally important for their mutual realization. Linking poverty, 
inequality and human rights creates an opening where the 
former concept can be understood and addressed in terms of 
the deprivation of capabilities or lack of empowerment, and 
as a denial and even a violation of human rights, a conception 
influenced by the ‘capability approach’ of Amartya Sen. Hence, 
a human rights framework can involve poverty strategies, a 
concrete parameter for providing legal remedies and measuring 
state compliance with international human rights obligations 
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(Prada, 2011). Such an approach might more effectively tackle 
the multiple and complex forms of exclusion experienced by 
the Roma but also perceive action to address such exclusion as 
a moral duty on the part of society rather than pathologizing 
and blaming the excluded.
A European New Deal would be a major component 
of a New Social Europe that targets the problems of 
involuntary migration, unemployment and low investment, all 
consequences of austerity, and tackles the regional economic 
disparities within the EU (Varoufakis and Galbraith, 2016). 
The New Deal would encompass a living wage centred, 
in part, on a jobs guarantee, as well as anti- poverty, social 
housing and environmental justice programmes ensuring a 
right to basic human needs and access to high- quality public 
services in health and education. These initiatives would be 
funded and supported by common European funds and would 
entail much more ‘active’ government economic initiatives 
encompassing forms of state intervention that some argue 
have been discouraged by the stipulations of the single market 
within the EU.
Active employment measures should avoid statist solutions 
of large public works programmes, as practised in Hungary, 
which confined Roma to low- skilled and low- paid work 
(ERRC, 2015). Involving Roma in large infrastructure projects 
can be effective if coupled with genuine skills development 
and space for upward mobility. On account of the high levels 
of discrimination in the waged labour market, many Roma 
prefer or are compelled to engage in small- scale entrepreneurial 
activities. Despite the EU Roma Framework promoting 
microcredit, the success of such initiatives has been limited; 
some have been discouraged by the terms and conditions of 
loans, or have lacked the financial and technical expertise 
to start up a business. There is also the danger that when 
implemented under a neoliberal framework, microcredit can 
actually increase indebtedness and marginalization (Bateman, 
2014). There are isolated cases of civil society providing 
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financial and business start- up mentoring and guidance, a 
notable case being the Autonomia Foundation in Hungary; 
such work needs to be scaled up. There is also a need to 
promote greater awareness and understanding of development 
finance, where local communities support, encourage and 
catalyse community development and expansion through 
public and private investment, which should be premised on 
egalitarianism, self- empowerment and growth, rather than on 
neoliberal principles centred on repayment generating profit.
A New Social Europe would entail greater reinforcement 
and implementation of the principles of the European Pillar 
of Social Rights that seeks to bring ‘fairness’ into the lives 
of European citizens (EC, 2020). The European Pillar of 
Social Rights is likely to have an important impact on EU 
Roma policy. Proclaimed by all EU institutions in 2017, the 
20 principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights aim at 
improving equal opportunities and jobs for all, fair working 
conditions, social protection, access to services, and gender 
equality (EC, 2020). Part of a New Social Europe would 
also entail the European Social Union (ESU), a ‘coming- 
together’ process involving welfare states that would facilitate 
mutual adaptation based on jointly defined criteria and would 
include risk- pooling. Given the EU has its own budget 
and resources, the foundations are there for forms of social 
federalism; however, this may ultimately entail the need for 
new forms of EU tax consolidation powers. Hemerijck (2013) 
has defined the ESU as a holding environment: in other words 
a zone of resilience centred on shared values and a common 
purpose, backed up by competent institutions, ready to act in 
times of crisis and adaptation. Thus, a holding environment 
should mitigate stress and tensions and consequently uphold 
the integrity of national welfare states. The global economic 
system has become highly complex and difficult to regulate, 
in part, because of financialization; the power and dominance 
of financial investment, free market thinking centred on 
deregulation and privatization have empowered global finance 
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and helped it prosper and take over aspects of the state, such as 
welfare and social care (Citizens for Financial Justice, 2019). 
Clearly, if there is to be a meaningful ESU and a holding 
environment, these trends need to be challenged at the 
European level.
An obvious and key question is: where will the money come 
from and how will it be channelled to need? The EC relaxed 
the budgetary constraints stemming from the Maastricht 
criteria, setting a precedent for further relaxation. Soros (2013) 
has argued that if EU member states could convert their entire 
stock of government debt into Eurobonds, then indebted and 
poor member states’ budgets could move into surplus and fiscal 
stimulus would replace austerity. More recently, Soros (2020) 
has proposed that the EU should raise the money needed 
for a European Recovery Fund to deal with the economic 
consequences of COVID- 19 by selling ‘perpetual bonds’ on 
which the principal does not have to be repaid (though they 
can be repurchased or redeemed at the issuer’s discretion). As 
perpetual bonds never have to be repaid, they would impose 
a surprisingly light fiscal burden on the EU, despite the 
considerable financial firepower they would mobilize.
With reference to EU funding, there have been calls for 
respect for and compliance with the principles of equality and 
social protection to constitute an element of conditionality 
in EU funding streams (André, 2009). An element of 
conditionality has started to be introduced to EU funding but 
compliance with the European Pillar of Social Rights, with an 
impact on funding, could be a mechanism to drive up social 
convergence. Increased employment participation and the 
consequent increase in purchasing power will also raise the 
overall tax take and correspondingly reduce welfare payment 
demands. To start with, the EU should embrace progressive 
taxation and close the loopholes that enable tax avoidance. The 
measures this section has outlined are ‘pre- distributive’ forms 
of social investment that rest on the logic that it is more cost 
effective to ensure marginalization does not occur in the first 
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place than to use resources to tackle and mitigate the impact 
of poverty and exclusion. The acceptance of such a notion 
would have profound consequences for Romani communities. 
The active economic and social interventions envisaged in this 
section certainly align with Hennink et al’s (2012) vision of 
opportunity structure and enabling government.
Agency and community organizing
For some, notions of a New Social Europe, as outlined 
earlier, might conjure up fears of statism, a form of top- 
down governance that is distant and bureaucratic. For Roma, 
in the past, such regimes under communism constituted 
forms of assimilation and control. In contrast, a New Social 
Europe would need to be driven by empowered and active 
communities, including those like the Roma at the margins. In 
a New Social Europe, Romani policies need to be inherently 
flexible and, where appropriate, involve forms of minority 
targeting that can shape mainstream policy and be designed 
and implemented through negotiation and co- production 
with civil society and or staff employed in public and targeted 
initiatives. However, concerns have been expressed as to the 
degree of autonomy such initiatives afford and the tensions 
that can arise when Roma are employed by state institutions 
and services that arouse hostility and mistrust on the basis of 
past discrimination. Here, civil society could play an invaluable 
role in performing such tasks, ensuring Romani expertise helps 
shape and deliver inclusive public services in meaningful forms 
of co- production. However, as noted, Romani communities 
and civil society are perilously weak at the moment and need 
huge levels of financial support and competence to enable 
localized and organic community development but in a 
way that also allows local community groups scope to build 
capacity within Romani communities, acting in the sense 
of the writings of Paulo Freire (1972) as catalysts for critical 
awareness and community organization. Hennink et al (2012) 
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refer to such awareness as conscientization. Conscientization 
can be linked to a ‘Development Education and Awareness 
Raising’ (DEAR) approach common with non- governmental 
organization (NGO) projects in the Global South, which 
provides communities with tools to critically engage in 
development issues, and mobilizes greater public support for 
action against poverty and exclusion.
Trehan (2001) raised concerns about the funding and donor- 
driven agendas in Europe that run the danger of creating forms 
of managerialism (NGO- ization) that disempower Romani 
activists. Alinsky (1971) cautioned as to the dangers of activism 
being hijacked by a service- driven agenda. Indeed, forms 
of co- production and public– private partnerships between 
Romani civil society/ institutions and governmental agencies 
need to take care to avoid becoming an adjunct of the state 
in forwarding agendas that are assimilatory. Reflecting such 
fears, a policy briefing by the University of Manchester 
(2014) stated that interventions by third sector agencies 
entrusted with managing interaction between Roma and 
local institutions held the long- term risk of perpetuating 
the Roma’s dependency on outside mediators and support 
provisions. Instead, it was argued, intervention should take 
the form of capacity building within the Romani community, 
enabling them to develop expertise and competences beyond 
the community outreach work. This critique mirrors the 
thoughts of theorists such as Foucault (1991), who argued that 
development theory constitutes a form of control, through the 
concept of governmentality, which normalizes neoliberal and 
assimilative policy agendas, and ‘responsibilizes’, individualizes 
and pathologizes the victims.
Some of the concerns outlined earlier are theorized 
by Powell (2010), who contrasts two interpretations of 
intervention/ development. One perspective perceives social 
policy intervention as assimilationist, based on the imposition 
of civilizing values that discard Romani norms and values; in 
contrast, others see such intervention as a means to forward 
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equity and competence through emancipatory processes. 
The emancipatory perspective argues that formal education, 
for example, broadens horizons and opportunities, allowing 
Romani children to escape and reformulate the stifling 
straightjacket of tradition, and have agency. Critics argue that 
this can constitute a narrow form of integration that ultimately 
assimilates. A  danger, though, is that an unquestioning 
exaltation of ethnicity can promote static and narrow versions 
of identity that ignore the fluidity of identity and Romani 
propensity for ‘bricolage’ or cultural borrowing and innovation. 
The key point is that inclusion has to be shaped and negotiated, 
with active involvement of and leadership from the Roma 
themselves (Bogdan et al, 2015).
Social accountability
Some Romani NGOs are able to enter into forms of co- 
production and retain autonomy; by autonomy, we mean 
not only the ability to have a significant say in the design 
and delivery of policy, but also a chance to challenge and 
offer critique. However, such groups often enjoy extensive 
experience, thematic expertise and engaged communities, 
holding authorities accountable about the terms and direction 
of any service. Social accountability is an evolving umbrella 
category that includes citizen monitoring and oversight 
of public and/ or private sector performance, user- centred 
public information access and dissemination systems, public 
complaint and grievance redress mechanisms, and citizen 
participation in actual resource allocation decision- making, 
such as participatory budgeting (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012). 
The approach refers to strategies developed over the last two 
decades that employ information and participation to demand 
fairer and more effective public services (Maru, 2010). It seeks 
to improve institutional performance by bolstering collective 
citizen engagement in and monitoring of public policy systems 
and the public responsiveness and effectiveness of the state (Fox, 
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2014). It should be noted that a critique of this approach is 
that participation is based more on the ideas of ‘governance’ 
and ‘accountability’ of citizens in terms of oversight; it does 
not link back to the citizen having a claim to certain social/ 
economic rights. However, ‘social accountability’ is a term that 
governments and donors agree to use, and it can be used as a 
bridge to include wider civil society and rights- based demands 
into the framework.
To achieve such reorientation in a New Social Europe, a 
complete cultural and organizational paradigm shift would 
need to occur that would validate community as a source 
of determination and knowledge. Here, rather than the 
government using civil society as a tool to impose narrow 
inclusion/ assimilation policies, we see a situation where civil 
society is in the driving seat instead, directing governmental 
and institutional power as to what needs to be done. This 
point reiterates a central argument in this chapter that an 
effective ‘Social Europe’ approach for Romani communities 
requires greater support for the development and expansion 
of Romani civil society in a manner that extends not 
only its capacity and skills, but also its autonomy. Hence, 
support and encouragement would be given to community 
organizing, social accountability and ‘inclusive community 
development’, where allocated resources allow for independent 
manoeuvrability and bottom- up development, in which a 
premium is placed on empowerment and agency, as well as 
asset- based development, where community traditions are 
adapted and used as a foundation for development (Ryder et al, 
2014). Such inclusivity would certainly facilitate the agency and 
self- belief that Hennink et al (2012) believe is key to inclusion.
Another means of ensuring community and civil society 
voices are heard and acted on is to create a second chamber 
of the EU featuring representatives of cities, regions and 
NGOs, such as trade unions and community organizations 
(Zielonka, 2019). This body should have equal status to the 
European Parliament and include Romani civil society as the 
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Romani cause has been hampered by the low level of Romani 
representation in the European Parliament and the limitations 
of the Roma Platform – the annual meetings between Romani 
civil society and the EC.
Inclusive community development is, in part, dependent 
on knowledge production, research and data that allow an 
understanding of the issues communities face, assess the 
impact of existing policy frameworks and interventions, and 
help to formulate new policy tools. Social accountability 
and community monitoring should be an important part of 
the next EU Roma Framework and allocation of resources. 
Limited resources have impeded the scope of such work in 
measuring the impact and relevance of policy, and in some 
cases, member states refuse to collect ethnically disaggregated 
data. With EU funding, the Central European University 
Roma Civil Monitor was able to build civil society networks 
in EU member states to assess the impact of the NRIS and 
EU Roma Framework. It has conducted valuable monitoring 
and helps empower Romani activists by training them in 
monitoring processes. However, resources have been relatively 
slight and not permitted more collaborative and participatory 
forms of monitoring and research or pioneering leadership 
of Romani community members in research design, data 
collection and analysis. The EU needs to greatly extend the 
level of resources accorded to such work in the new policy 
cycle on Roma.
Intersectionality and solidarity
The Romani movement has been able to galvanize and 
mobilize sections of Romani civil society through forms 
of ‘identity politics’; critics would argue it has, at times, 
essentialized and sought to homogenize Romani identity, as 
evidenced through ‘nation- building’ efforts (Surdu and Kovats, 
2015). For example, in 2000, the fifth World Romani Congress 
in Prague appealed through its president, Emil Ščuka, for the 
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Roma to be recognized as a nation without territory; such 
nation- building constructs have enjoyed limited support or 
even awareness from Romani communities, and have tended 
to be driven by small Romani political elites (McGarry, 
2010). However, ethnicity and identity have been effective 
tools in binding forms of Romani transnational activism and 
solidarity, which has been instrumental in the relative success 
of Romani advocacy at the European level. The question has 
been raised as to whether an overt focus on identity politics 
has diverted Romani activists from the need for fundamental 
structural change. Has Romani civil society aligned itself too 
closely to tokenist policy change that offers merely cosmetic 
change? This debate has relevance for Nancy Fraser’s (1995) 
discussions on how in ‘post- socialist’ societal conflicts, group 
identity has tended to supplant class interest as the locus of 
political debate and contestation. The message of this chapter 
is that Fraser is right to contend that struggles for recognition 
have validity and can help achieve incremental change but 
the quest for redistribution is central for meaningful change 
to come about. To date, Romani civil society has conducted 
limited discussion on the centrality of redistribution and what 
a New Social Europe might mean, as well as on how issues 
related to ethnic identity would be addressed within such a 
policy framework.
However, evidence of a paradigm shift within Romani civil 
society is seen in growing support for intersectionality, where 
Roma show solidarity and form alliances with women’s, 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and queer (LGBTQ), migrants, 
and other marginalized groups. Romani empowerment could 
thus be interpreted as Roma and non- Roma finding common 
points of interest and forming alliances. Such intersectionality 
has challenged narrow notions of Romani identity that exalt 
conservative tradition and insular forms of bonding social 
capital. Such intersectionality is more apparent among the cadre 
of national/ international Romani leaders and is less apparent 
at the local level; more, though, is needed to be done to align 
MECHANISMS OF EMPOWERMENT FOR THE ROMA
57
the Romani struggle with broader social justice and anti- 
poverty campaigns directed at multidimensional poverty (such 
as poor health, lack of education, inadequate living standards, 
disempowerment, poor quality of work and so on), as well as 
support an understanding of green/ environmental issues, where 
Roma can identify common interests in the mainstream and 
give new focus to Romani issues.
Given climate change and the environmental challenges 
that society now faces, an important part of a New Social 
Europe and, indeed, Romani inclusion strategies will rest 
upon sustainability and a new ‘Green Deal’ ensuring economic 
activity seeks to not only stem, but also reverse, the harm already 
inflicted upon the planet. Romani activism should more robustly 
engage with environmental and climate justice movements, not 
only to challenge the context of environmental injustice and 
racism endured by Roma, but also to build solidarities and 
knowledge to tackle global challenges. Previous periods of 
major social investment and active economic interventions by 
the welfare state, such as that which occurred from 1945 to the 
early 1970s, witnessed rapid growth. Such a model may not be 
sustainable environmentally because of the level of resources 
that were and would be devoured to fuel such growth. In 
addition, post- war growth was also based on cheap materials and 
exploitation of low- wage labour from regions of the periphery. 
Within a New Social Europe and hopefully a corresponding 
new globalized economic order, such actions could not be 
replicated. Furthermore, technological advancements and the 
increasing automation of production and services might mean 
full employment is also an impossible goal in the sense that 
it materialized in the post- war period. Hence, a New Social 
Europe will necessitate sustainable forms of production that 
could, in fact, generate new green industries and lead to the 
redistribution of working hours as well as resources.
The proposed recalibration of the role of the EU and the 
values it should promote centred on social justice will also 
entail new conceptions of European citizenship built upon a 
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notion of ‘inclusive European citizenship’. Inclusive citizenship 
encompasses solidarity, or a belief in the capacity to act in unity 
with others in their claims for justice and recognition; thus, it 
complements well the policy agenda of a New Social Europe 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2017). Inclusive citizenship should 
articulate the terms of when it is fair for people to be treated the 
same and when it is fair that they should be treated differently. 
In this sense, it should not have the rigidity of, say, French 
conceptions of citizenship that preclude minority ethnic 
targeting and affirmative action. In addition, recognition  – 
framed in terms of the intrinsic worth of all human beings, as 
well as recognition of and respect for their differences – should 
be a core value in inclusive citizenship and power should 
act decisively where such principles are challenged. Self- 
determination should also be part of the formula of inclusive 
citizenship, allowing people the ability to exercise some degree 
of control over their lives; hence, this chapter has advocated 
radical forms of Romani empowerment.
Conclusion
Although EC President Ursula von der Leyen has affirmed a 
strong determination to present an action plan to deliver on 
the European Pillar of Social Rights, it remains to be seen 
whether radical measures are initiated as a part of a process 
of building a New Social Europe. The EC is aware that it 
faces a legitimacy crisis, as reflected by the rise of the radical 
right, and that additional mistakes could further the growth 
of political extremism and xenophobia. Furthermore, the EU 
and the current European social model is under threat from 
militant forms of neoliberalism fused with populism as the 
US with Trump and Britain through ‘Brexit’ seek to reorient 
their economic models in order to maintain an advantage over 
old and emerging competitors, and to retain hegemony in 
the core group of economic powers. To avoid a ‘race to the 
bottom’ – a downward spiral of social protections, wages and 
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workers’ rights – the EU will need to hold firm in defence of 
the European social model and initiate a bold and dynamic 
reorientation of the European project through a New Social 
Europe. The COVID- 19 pandemic and the economic crisis it 
has induced necessitate major acts of economic intervention and 
stimulus. The mood and support for transformative change are 
therefore far greater than some European leaders in recent times 
have assumed. Through Hennink et al’s (2012) ‘mechanism of 
empowerment’, we have sought to promote a vision of a New 
Social Europe that offers economic fairness with the potential 
for skills development, coupled with increased scope for agency, 
knowledge, opportunity and capacity building.
In October 2020, the EC unveiled the ‘EU Roma Strategic 
Framework for Equality, Inclusion and Participation’, which 
refers to infringement action to tackle antigypsyism, a drive to 
cut poverty and empower Roma. However, some critics felt 
it lacked binding legal obligations, and it remains to be seen 
if the bold vision of transformative change as set out in this 
chapter materializes.
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The chapter explores the rise of radical- right populism and 
authoritarianism and the implications for Roma. It critiques and 
seeks to refashion the strategies and frames used by anti- racists 
and Romani rights champions ranged against antigypsyism in a 
way that will enhance the potential for intersectional solidarity, 
dialogue and alignment with the concept of a New Social 
Europe (for a discussion of this concept, see Chapter One). 
This chapter argues for legal protections and human rights to 
be defended and upheld. However, the narrative directed by 
rights ‘champions’ at combating antigypsyism should also be 
focused on Romani potential, emphasizing the capacities of 
Roma in a social, political and economic sense, and leading to 
forms of empowerment; this is a central theme of this book. It 
is also argued that the process of tackling antigypsyism, which is 
a specific form of racism towards the Roma centred on tropes 
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transformative change (for a definition, see Chapter One) given 
the deep structural, cultural and institutional locus of racism, 
including antigypsyism, and the inflammation of such in the 
economic crises and convulsions so redolent of late capitalism.
Crisis and irrationality
The writer and philosopher George Santayana (2006:  32) 
famously said:  ‘Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it.’ The wonderful thing about history 
is that it is sometimes a guide to the future rather than just 
a record of the past. In his path- breaking book The Great 
Transformation, Karl Polanyi (1944: 236) reflected on the rise 
of European fascism in the 1930s and noted: ‘[T] he moment 
would come when both the economic and the political 
systems were threatened by complete paralysis. Fear would 
grip the people, and leadership would be thrust upon those 
who offered an easy way out at whatever ultimate price. The 
time was ripe for the fascist solution.’ According to Polanyi, a 
country approaching the fascist phase showed symptoms such 
as irrational philosophies, racialist aesthetics, anti- capitalist 
demagogy, criticism of the party system and widespread 
disparagement of the status quo. Despite its revolutionary 
rhetoric, this was a sham (false) rebellion, arranged with the 
tacit approval of the authorities, where new alliances were 
formed between the fascists, the establishment and economic 
elites (Polanyi, 1944: 238).
As discussed in Chapter One, populism is an offshoot of 
nationalism; some present- day observers fear that authoritarian 
populism in Europe may be the precursor to new forms of 
fascism and may normalize the politics of the extreme right 
(Ryder, 2020). Mudde (2018b), with reference to the growth 
of populism, notes:
The great recession that followed the 2008 financial 
crash freed populism from the (radical) right. The rise of 
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Syriza in Greece, and to a lesser extent Podemos in Spain, 
showed clear similarities with, but also fundamental 
differences from, the populist radical right. They shared 
a pro- people and anti- elite politics, but Podemos and 
Syriza were clearly part of the radical left, both in terms 
of ideology and subculture.
The dominant European forms of populism that have 
emerged have been associated with the radical right. Fascism 
and contemporary radical- right populism share some similar 
traits. Both present a homogenizing view of ‘the people’ and 
conceive of political opponents as ‘the anti- people’ (Mudde 
and Kaltwasser, 2017). In general, populism follows an ideology 
that considers society to be separated into two homogeneous 
and antagonistic groups, often centred on the ‘the pure people’ 
versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and the need to follow the ‘will’ of 
the people. The homogenizing views of populism are grounded 
in nationalist thinking and symbolism. In considering such 
polarization, it is worth discussing the ideas of the controversial 
theorist Carl Schmitt, a key thinker active during and 
sympathetic towards National Socialism in Germany; despite 
his sympathies with the regime, his influence extended into 
the post- war period. Schmitt envisaged a ‘pure difference’ 
between the ‘self ’ and ‘other’ developing through what can be 
described as an ‘agonism’ that had nation- building potential 
by marking the boundaries between insiders and outsiders 
(Roskamm, 2015). Agonism is the intense contestation by rival 
camps of their adversaries’ values and identities; it fragments 
social cohesion, deepening and reifying the identities of the 
besieged adversaries (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2006). Agonism 
is a phenomenon that deploys binary speech acts, irrationalism 
and manipulation. For Schmitt (1996), a national identity 
could only be constituted by the suppression of the adversary. 
Schmitt’s concept of ‘us and them’ (friend and foe)  – the 
marker between those classified as belonging to the national 
group and those outside the boundary – was nationalistic and 
ROMANI COMMUNITIES AND TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE
68
sympathetic to fascist ideals. The Schmittian form of agonism 
creates a public enemy who ultimately cannot be engaged 
with in partnership, but only be vanquished (Edwards, 2013).
Mudde (2007) has described ethno- nationalist radical- right 
parties as largely overlapping with the populist radical right. 
They have at their core a strong ‘charismatic’ leader, a ‘warrior’ 
who can lead the people into binary, Manichaean contests 
against internal and external enemies. Mudde (2018a: 254) 
claims that ethnic or racial types of civil wars and pogroms 
are most evident in Eastern Europe but there are examples 
where Roma have become victims of radicalism in Western 
Europe too. There is increasing evidence of the Roma being 
cast by the radical populist and nationalist right as an internal 
enemy and external threat located outside of the boundary of 
the national group (see Chapter Four by Rorke).
As noted in Chapter One, the response to the COVID- 19 
pandemic has highlighted the nature and reach of antigypsyism 
in Europe, as well as how the state and a broad spectrum of 
political actors can orchestrate anti- Romani sentiments. In 
addition to general measures to prevent the spread of COVID- 
19, authorities in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria introduced 
additional restrictions to put Romani communities under 
strict quarantine, sometimes resorting to the use of police and 
military force. Amnesty International (2020) reports that in 
Bulgaria and Slovakia, the state authorities have argued that 
such measures are necessary for the protection of public health 
and safety. State intervention during the pandemic crisis has 
demonstrated how Romani identities have been securitized and 
problematized in such a way to make anti- Romani discourses 
seem ‘reasonable’ rather than offensive (Van Baar, 2011b). 
These actions were shaped by age- old racist perceptions of 
the Roma as carriers of disease.
Manifestations of antigypsyism by the radical right and state 
are not just to be found in Central and Eastern Europe. Prior 
to the pandemic, forced evictions in countries such as Italy 
and France raised considerable concern from the Romani 
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rights movement. For instance, in France, a secret government 
circular was leaked in 2010 and revealed a targeted policy to 
prioritize the deportation of Romani migrants, among other 
groups (Parker, 2012). The Conservative government of Boris 
Johnson pledged in the general election of 2019 to enforce a 
crackdown on nomadism, an action that was seen by some to 
be a cynical attempt to instrumentalize antigypsyism (Monbiot, 
2019). Antigypsyism is to be found within mainstream 
governments as well as on the part of the radical right; however, 
the rise of the radical right encourages forms of shadowing 
and mimicry by a mainstream eager to conserve power and 
pander to anti- Romani sentiments.
Authoritarian and radical- right populism is a political force 
that downplays the separation of powers, the independence 
and legitimacy of a free press, and the rule of law. With 
authoritarian populism, though, unlike with fascism, democracy 
is challenged and undermined but not destroyed, which can 
potentially normalize extreme- right politics and prepare the 
ground for its wider acceptance (Mudde, 2018a). In discussing 
radical- right populism, it is worth reappraising Adorno’s (1948) 
comments on the study he participated in: ‘The authoritarian 
personality’ (Adorno et al, 1950). The study sought to identify 
key personality traits inclined towards authoritarianism that 
might make some susceptible to embracing fascism in a crisis. 
For Adorno (1948: 129), fascism is a form of irrationalism as its 
consequences are contrary to the interests of those mobilized to 
support it. Commenting on the modern age and the emergence 
of a mass media, Adorno believed that the modern public 
sphere of film, radio and, in particular, television enforces 
conformity, quiets dissent and mutes thought. Negative media 
representation has been a major factor in shaping anti- Romani 
sentiments and has been notable in orchestrating forms of 
‘moral panic’ against the Roma – basically, a form of hysteria 
fuelled by misleading tropes and inaccurate reporting (Kroon 
et  al, 2016). Such reporting is, in part, a product of the 
increase in antigypsyism being coordinated and orchestrated by 
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unscrupulous politicians, but as authoritarian regimes and their 
allies take control of media outlets, this interplay in stoking 
moral panics has become more intense.
Anti- Romani sentiments also have an economic dynamic. 
Thomas Piketty (2020) argues that the growing accumulation 
of wealth by the top 1 per cent has led to neoliberal 
globalization and populism increasingly working together and/ 
or reflecting shared xenophobic narratives in the scapegoating 
of immigrants and minority ethnic groups as undermining 
the position of a previously incorporated (white) working 
class, who are now the ‘left behind’ as an underclass. This has 
been most evident in the UK referendum vote to leave the 
European Union (EU) in 2016 and in the election of Donald 
Trump as President of the US in the same year, where we can 
see a fusion of neoliberal competition and populist nativism. 
Sensationalist media reporting of mobile (migrant) EU Roma 
from the ‘new’ EU member states begging on the streets of 
major Western European cities and setting up camps on the 
outskirts were vilified by the media, and politicians used those 
images for political gain and as evidence of the problems 
brought about by uncontrolled immigration, namely, crime 
and abuse of social welfare.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the strengthening and growth 
of the radical right and nationalist regimes in countries such 
as Poland and Hungary, and more generally the anti- migrant 
hysteria that was generated by the 2015 migration of large 
numbers of Syrian refugees into Europe, demonstrate the 
growing strength of radical- right movements across Europe. 
The economic and financial crisis of 2008 acted as a catalyst to 
the rise of radical- right populism (Mudde, 2018b). A difficult 
economic situation, coupled with an increasingly reactive 
and emotive political environment, has made the position 
of the Roma more precarious through increased economic 
exclusion, scapegoating and racism (see Chapter One). Filcak 
and Skobla (2012) suggest that the experiences of Roma are 
like the ‘canary in the mine shaft’, that is, the harbinger of 
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future crises. In other words, the Roma are a group that has 
experienced the impact of transition more harshly than others; 
this was very true as parts of Europe turned to fascism in 
the 1930s, then to communism in the post- war era, then to 
neoliberalism in the 1990s, and now to austerity, ordoliberalism 
and more entrenched forms of neoliberalism. During all these 
transitions, the Roma have been cast as a threat, a danger and 
a problem. By weakening the social contract, neoliberalism 
creates an ‘underclass’ of the unemployed and disadvantaged, 
a group where many Roma are to be found, and this pool 
also serves neoliberal interests by creating downward pressure 
on wages and rights in the workforce, with those in work 
fearing the risk of joining the ranks of the unemployed. The 
‘underclass’ also serves as a scapegoat for those dissatisfied with 
the status quo to blame for their misfortunes, distracting blame 
from those in control. The Roma are thus cast as a socio- 
economic burden, a dysfunctional group prone to dependency 
and welfarism, committing benefit fraud, and embodying a 
‘culture of poverty’.
The linkages between politics, policy and practice are 
continually being renegotiated, and authoritarian neoliberalism 
certainly foregrounds welfare as socio- political governmentality 
through discipline, compliance and control, combined with 
austerity, by blaming Roma for abusing the system. Such a 
stance can be described as ‘welfare chauvinism’, an explicit 
and systematic marginalization of subordinate Roma (Bruff 
and Tansel, 2019) and/ or a rationale for imposing additional 
conditions on Roma (Vidra, 2018).
To help illustrate such processes in context, we can look 
at the case of Hungary. Szombati (2018) seeks to understand 
the rise of antigypsyism by using Polányi’s conceptualization 
of the ‘double movement’, that is, the expectation that 
economic shocks generated within a ‘disembedded economy’ 
will generate ‘countermovements’ in the political sphere if the 
state fails to protect society from the advance of the free market 
and/ or from instability. For Szombati, the 2008– 09 crisis was 
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paired with the ideological orientation and political strategizing 
of some racist movements in Hungary (the Jobbik Party and 
the Magyar Garda, a radical- right paramilitary organization), 
developing a ‘political antigypsyism’ that transferred generally 
prevalent racist sensibilities from the social sphere into the arena 
of political struggle. It is worth noting the traction the Jobbik 
Party and the Magyar Garda generated through their ‘Gypsy 
crime’ propaganda and agitation, which claimed the Roma 
were predisposed to criminality and that there was a need for 
greater sanctioning and control of this minority. This narrative 
thrust the Jobbik Party forth from the political margins to 
becoming the largest single opposition party in the Parliament 
(Szombati, 2018). The various forms of demonization of 
Romani communities outlined here so far form the locus of a 
series of ‘moral panics’, what Cohen (2002) defines as collective 
hysteria (see Chapter One), and this labelling and vilification 
can be described as constituting antigypsyism.
Understanding antigypsyism
Having charted the causes and forms of radical- right populism 
and nationalism, and their impact on the Roma, this chapter 
proceeds to explore the response of Romani civil society to 
this circumstance. A major reference point of Romani civil 
society’s counter- narrative is the concept of antigypsyism – but 
what is it?
One of the most prominent champions of the use of the 
term ‘antigypsyism’ is the Romanian Romani activist Valeriu 
Nicolae (2006: 1), who perceives antigypsyism as a distinct 
form of racism against Roma that is both similar to, different 
from and ‘intertwined with many other types of racism’. It is a 
term that is now part of mainstream discourse about Roma and 
has even entered the lexicon of institutional power in Europe. 
The term has received growing support within the EU; in 
2019, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for 
the EU and its member states to adopt strong Romani inclusion 
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plans post- 2020 and to step up the fight against antigypsyism 
(ERGO, 2019).
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI) of the Council of Europe (CoE) defines antigypsyism 
as ‘a specific form of racism, an ideology founded on racial 
superiority, a form of dehumanization and institutional racism 
nurtured by historical discrimination, which is expressed, among 
others, by violence, hate speech, exploitation, stigmatization 
and the most blatant kind of discrimination’ (ECRI, 2011: 3). 
That definition was included in ECRI’s ‘General Policy 
Recommendation No.13 on combating anti- Gypsyism and 
discrimination against Roma’ (ECRI, 2011). Similarities can 
be found between antigypsyism and antisemitism: both are 
persistent historically and geographically; both are systematic; 
and both are manifested by acts of violence. The international 
civil society group Alliance against Antigypsyism (2017) also 
argues that antigypsyism essentializes and creates discriminating 
social structures and violent practices that reproduce structural 
disadvantages.
It should be noted that there is an ongoing debate as to the 
appropriateness of ‘antigypsyism’ as a term, with Oprea and 
Matache (2019) arguing that it is wrong to use a term based 
on the word ‘Gypsy’, which has pejorative connotations, and 
that the identification of this phenomenon should instead 
be based on the more inclusive term ‘Roma’ to frame the 
concept of anti- Romani racism. Others use a capital ‘G’ in 
the spelling of ‘anti- Gypsyism’. Reflecting on such concerns, 
some authors are trying to define Romani- specific forms 
of racism by producing new vocabularies (Albert, 2012). 
McGarry (2017) has employed the term ‘Romaphobia’ as 
‘the last acceptable form of racism’. I disagree with the term 
as ‘phobia’ per se relates to an ‘extreme or irrational fear or 
aversion to something’, in this case, the Roma. I contend in 
this chapter that antigypsyism has ideological, political and 
economic features that are instrumentalized through concrete 
policies towards Roma. Antigypsyism can be traced to 
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historically different social, economic and political realities; it 
has a multifaceted character but it cannot be reduced to simply 
being an emotional fear on the part of the non- Roma. The 
term ‘antigypsyism’ is connected with social stereotypes, cliches 
and prejudices that are rather enrooted in dehumanization and 
the view that Roma are incompatible with ‘civilized’ society 
and fundamentally subhuman. This chapter employs the term 
‘antigypsyism’ because, at present, it is the term accepted by 
most civil society stakeholders. We do not wish to enter the 
debate on terminology and the relevance of umbrella terms, but 
want to discuss the definition and application of the currently 
prevailing term.
It is claimed that the term ‘antigypsyism’ first appeared in 
the late 1920s in Russia, was evident in academic debates in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and started to feature in the narratives 
and ‘frames’ of Romani rights campaigners from the 21st 
century (Cortés and End, 2019). According to Goffman 
(1974), ‘framing’ offers a conceptual structure that organizes 
interpretation through which people understand and construct 
social events. Goffman’s concept has provided an important 
source of inspiration for scholars who have studied social 
movements and how frames can mobilize and steer social 
movements. The term ‘antigypsyism’ has formed an important 
frame in the armoury of the Romani social movement. 
For example, it has been promoted by the Alliance against 
Antigypsyism (2017)  – an ad hoc alliance of Romani and 
pro- Romani civil society organizations and individuals calling 
upon the EU and other power structures, such as local and 
national governments, to place a greater emphasis on tackling 
antigypsyism – and has become a prominent feature of Romani 
rights campaign rhetoric.
How does antigypsyism manifest itself? The expressed 
rhetoric of hate speech against Roma results in tacit forms 
of their exclusion from public services, such as access to 
electricity, water, sanitation and so on. Such hate speech is 
not just orchestrated by elites, but enters everyday language 
ANTIGyPSyISM IN A TIME OF NEOLIBERALISM
75
and becomes casual and accepted on social media, creating 
what have been described as ‘micro- aggressions’, namely, 
unthinking remarks that betray underlying assumptions and 
make the people targeted feel uncomfortable or violated (End, 
2014). In addition, we should consider the actions taken by 
those in power that negatively affect Romani communities 
and contravene the protective function of the state towards 
members of the public, such as forced evictions, allowing 
Roma to reside only at the margins of localities, police brutality 
and school segregation. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning 
the institutional antigypsyism that has recently been 
recognized by the EU as one of the main barriers to Romani 
integration (Carrera et al, 2017). Institutional manifestations 
of antigypsyism have profound repercussions for the effective 
socio- economic inclusion of Romani communities in different 
life spheres, such as access to housing, health and education 
(FRA, 2018). What makes antigypsyism a special form of 
racism in Europe today is the involvement of the state in the 
production and co- production of these discriminatory norms, 
knowledge and politics in relation to Romani communities.
Racism can be defined as an ideology and a practice that 
produces a society in which some people systematically 
have less access to resources, power, security and well- being 
than others. Such systemic inequalities reflect hierarchical 
differences between people originally created by colonialism, 
which produced patterns of historical inequality, making 
it difficult for certain people to access opportunities and 
resources. If we accept this definition, and antigypsyism as a 
special form of racism, then antigypsyism clearly plays a central 
role in maintaining Romani marginalization in a broad socio- 
economic and cultural sense.
The term ‘antigypsyism’ could be perceived as having 
parallels with antisemitism, implying that specific forms of 
racism might exist. Anthias and Yuval Davies (1992) argue that 
there are ‘racisms|’ rather than ‘racism’, in other words, the 
experiences of racism are specific to particular groups and are 
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historically grounded. In this sense, the term ‘antigypsyism’ 
has relevance. Mac An Ghaill (1999) has drawn attention 
to the plight of Gypsies, Roma and Travellers (GRT), who 
receive much negative media and political attention in the 
UK, and notes that there is a long history of neglect, both by 
the state and by anti- racist movements, of the material and 
cultural experiences of GRT communities. Thus, combating 
antigypsyism could become a valuable tool to challenge the 
marginalization of these groups through affirmative, targeted 
measures and mobilizations.
Transformative change and combating antigypsyism
A review of the calls for reform and change made by those who 
espouse the term ‘antigypsyism’ finds that these calls include 
references to improving the cultural and political representation 
of Roma and corresponding calls for stronger legal measures to 
tackle this specific form of racism. In reflecting on the value of 
such aspirations, it might be useful to review the conceptual 
debates that have taken place between the proponents of liberal 
multiculturalism, anti- racism and critical multiculturalism.
Liberal multiculturalism embodies a version of liberal 
‘tolerance’ based on the assumption that there is a dominant 
cultural identity to which minority ethnic groups have to adapt 
but that concessions could be made for members of minority 
ethnic groups. An important aspect of liberal multiculturalism 
has been the belief that education and cultural promotion 
can dispel the ignorance that allegedly fuels racist beliefs; 
basically, it rests on the assumption that we can educate people 
not to be racist. However, critics of liberal multiculturalism 
claim it caricatures culture in a simplistic manner, reducing 
the presentation of minority cultures so as to render them 
homogeneous, static and internally conflict- free. Moreover, it is 
argued that such an approach fails to challenge the institutional 
dimension of racism and offers minority ethnic groups mere 
tokenism. Some would argue liberal multiculturalism enables 
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forms of tokenism to act simultaneously with overt acts of 
institutional racism. For example, governments that include 
references to Roma in the school curriculum or that sponsor 
some form of celebration of Romani culture do so as a form 
of cover to enable them to profess a commitment to Romani 
inclusion when, in reality, they are complicit in maintaining 
Romani exclusion. For example, the Hungarian government 
has some measures to promote Romani culture in the school 
curriculum but is actively building an apparatus to maintain 
and extend school segregation (see Chapter Four by Rorke).
Proponents of anti- racism seek to challenge and dismantle 
the institutional components of racism in terms of the strategic 
direction and management of institutions, as well as the ethos 
and messages conveyed by them, and by promoting diversity 
of membership and participation in institutions. Rigid 
conceptions of anti- racism in the 1970s and 1980s have been 
criticized for relying on superficial generalizations and an over- 
focusing on institutional factors to the neglect of gender and 
class issues. Furthermore, it has been argued that anti- racism has 
been dependent upon rigid conceptions of racial identity that 
assume actors are the passive agents of homogeneous cultural 
identities. Proponents of the term ‘antigypsyism’ need to be 
attentive to the danger that some of the initiatives resulting 
from their endeavours could succumb to the deficiencies 
associated with liberal multiculturalism and anti- racism. The 
importance of the discourse, representation and epistemology 
of anti- racism suggests that these notions are unable to explain 
the complexities of the racialization process operating as part 
of assemblages that are impacting the Roma in everyday life 
(for a general overview, see Colombo, 2015).
A review of the campaign literature by the supporters of 
the term ‘antigypsyism’ indicates they do express some desire 
for structural change. Romani civil society has called for a 
strengthened rights- based approach, guided by an official 
working definition of antigypsyism, and has stressed the need 
for more ambitious targets and concrete social inclusion goals, 
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with measurable EU and national indicators and robust annual 
monitoring. Within such petitions for change are demands to 
eradicate segregation and drive out discriminatory recruitment 
practices that marginalize the Roma. It is interesting to note, 
though, that these activists do not acknowledge the impact 
of the financial crisis in Europe or how neoliberalism has 
accentuated Romani exclusion (for further discussion, see 
Chapter One). This failure has clearly been a consequence 
of agenda- setting not only by philanthropic foundations, but 
by bodies like USAID, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and so on, which are champions of 
the prevailing bias for free markets and open societies centred 
on neoliberalism, a state of affairs that has neglected the 
importance of social and economic rights. Old debates have re- 
emerged as to whether to privilege socio- economic inclusion 
over combating racism and discrimination; at this juncture, it 
makes sense to review Nancy Fraser’s views on the politics of 
recognition and redistribution.
The marginalization, exclusion and demonization that ethnic 
groups like the Roma are subject to is based on racism, othering 
and the projection of stereotypes that constitutes cultural 
‘misrecognition’, and this is compounded by ‘misdistribution’, 
or what can be termed a lack of services and resources, which 
further marginalizes groups like the Roma. Nancy Fraser 
(1995) has argued that redistribution and recognition must be 
united in attempts to understand and challenge social injustice. 
However, such a course of action may require political and 
transformative approaches favouring the deconstruction and 
destabilization of existing identities, codes and symbolic 
orders; in place of assimilatory (or narrow liberal multicultural) 
inclusion policies, new, bolder strategies may be required 
that empower, intervene and correct where the markets and 
institutions of the state hinder and impede social justice for 
Romani communities.
In terms of the process of mediating what social justice 
is and how it can be delivered, we need to consider the 
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importance and value of representation. Fraser has noted how 
status hierarchies map onto class differentials to block groups 
like the Roma from participation in mainstream arenas of 
social interaction. In other words, economic, political and 
cultural structures work together to deny participation. This 
chapter argues, therefore, that definitions of antigypsyism 
and calls for programmes of action that stem from the term 
need to incorporate a more transformative agenda that offers 
the potential to bring about fundamental socio- economic 
and cultural change. Such change should be seen as a sharp 
contrast to remedies centred on liberal multiculturalism and the 
narrow social inclusion policies that have formed the mainstay 
of national and EU policy towards the Roma.
In forwarding transformative change as an aim of the Romani 
social movement, proponents of the term ‘antigypsyism’ 
may need to be sensitive to the potential insularity among 
Roma that can arise from using the term. In this respect, 
it is worthwhile reviewing some of the critique of the 
concept of antisemitism, where some observers feel there is a 
disconnection between racism and antisemitism, as reflected 
in the intellectual specialization and separate development of 
postcolonial and Holocaust studies that, while having nurtured 
fruitful research in their respective fields, may have constructed 
disconnected frames of analysis, and even antagonism, between 
Black minority groups and Jewish social actors. Such fissures 
are evident in contemporary academic discourses, such as those 
on ‘critical race theories’ and ‘new antisemitism’ theories. 
Both of these conceptual frames seek to recognize and resist 
‘new’ forms of racism and antisemitism, and have drawn 
attention to covert and subtle forms of prejudice; conversely, 
it is said they have a tendency to see racism and antisemitism 
as exclusive and ubiquitous (Cousin and Fine, 2012). It could 
be argued, though, that the proponents of antigypsyism may 
be able to escape charges of insularity through the growing 
commitment of young leaders in the Romani social movement 
to intersectionality, to the value of alliances between different 
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minority groups and to the exploration of shared experiences 
of exclusion and marginality across groups. Such alliances, it 
is argued, can help create a patchwork quilt of a broad social 
movement based on strategic alliances between a range of 
minority groups.
Intersectionality is an important component of critical 
multiculturalism, which seeks to explore the interplay between 
race, gender, class, sexual identity and oppressive behaviours 
and practices (Farrar, 2012). It encompasses anti- racist 
education, critical race theory and critical pedagogy, which 
challenge the social, economic and cultural drivers of exclusion 
and xenophobia. It is a more intercultural and deliberative 
form of identity management which recognizes that identity 
is neither rigid nor static, and that change and innovation are 
both possible and to be welcomed. It can be described as a 
more dialogic and negotiable form of multiculturalism that 
challenges oppressive outlooks in both majority and minority 
society. In such discussion, reference can be made to Parekh’s 
(2000) notion of cultivating a ‘sense of common belonging’ 
among citizens that requires no flattening of diversity and 
allows for plurality.
Perhaps most importantly with reference to antigypsyism, 
critical multiculturalism has the potential to understand and 
challenge white privilege and thus the structural factors 
that divide ethnic groups and the cultural perceptions that 
reinforce and justify such divides. Such a form of challenge 
would give antigypsyism, as a transformative tool, the scope 
and conceptual power to more effectively offer resistance to 
the cultural and socio- economic hegemony that marginalizes 
Romani communities. The Roma have clearly not been passive 
victims and are offering creative responses to the dilemma they 
face; in part, this is attributable to what can be termed ‘social 
resilience’:  the ability to cope with and overcome adversity 
through adaptation learnt from past experiences, and to 
adjust themselves to future challenges. This has transformative 
potential in devising counter- strategies and solutions. A key 
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factor in forming resistance to marginalization has been a 
sense of pride in Romani ethnicity (McGarry, 2017). The 
value of pride cannot be underestimated; Nicolae (2006) notes 
that antigypsyist messages can and are absorbed and accepted 
by Roma in the form of false consciousness, leading to the 
desire to assimilate and to self- stigmatization, depression and 
demoralization. In the past, though, pride in Romani identity, 
while socially bonding, could also create insularity and isolation. 
New forms of Romani pride that encompass intersectional and 
critical forms of multiculturalism will be invaluable in promoting 
intercultural dialogue and new strategic alliances with other 
oppressed communities. Such fluidity and the reinvention and 
adaptation of identity mirrors what the renowned sociologist 
Stuart Hall (1980) has explained, namely, how ethnic identity 
could enable a new cultural politics to emerge, one that engages 
rather than suppresses difference and is capable of challenging 
Western white cultural hegemony.
An attempt to challenge stereotypical representations of the 
Roma and give expression to new articulations of Romani 
identity is evidenced by the establishment of the European 
Roma Institute for Arts and Culture (ERIAC), based in 
Berlin and funded jointly by the Council of Europe and EU, 
with support from the philanthropist George Soros. ERIAC 
has given a platform to a range of avant- garde Romani artists 
and musicians positing new, dynamic conceptions of Romani 
identity that challenge tradition and reification. Critics of 
ERIAC, however, argue that there is a danger of such a project 
tokenizing the language of critical challenge and empowerment 
while actually being ‘highbrow’ and focused on a small 
intellectual elite among European Roma (Ryder, 2019). Time 
will tell whether this initiative is capable of energizing Romani 
arts and culture initiatives within local Romani communities 
and society more widely in a way that challenges long- standing 
tropes and prejudices.
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) support grass- roots politics, 
building on the ideas of Gramsci and the frames of new social 
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movements centred on intersectional notions of gender, 
sexuality, ethnicity and economic justice. In this sense, 
the notion of ‘Social Europe’ and a greater emphasis on 
redistribution, coupled with recognition, could strengthen 
Romani civil society in making alliances not just with other 
minority groups, but with social movements dedicated to 
raising social justice, such as the trade union movement when 
in a transformative form. Some of the more liberal, rights- 
focused Romani activists might feel apprehensive about such 
alliances and a transformative agenda, fearing this might 
alienate some elements of establishment support and might 
overtly politicize the Romani issue. Policy positions, though, 
are relative; positions and stances that might seem radical and 
utopian today were part of the political mainstream in many 
countries five decades ago.
What the French economist Jean Fourastié (1979) termed 
‘Les trente glorieuses’ (‘the 30 glorious years’), in retrospect is 
seen as a gilded age where living standards rose dramatically 
from 1945 to 1975. The ‘glorious thirty’ saw large parts of the 
developed world commit to strong forms of social contract, 
with the development of universal and comprehensive welfare 
systems and a commitment to full employment guided by 
Keynesian economics. Post- war society learnt from the failure 
of laissez- faire economics during the deeply troubled 1930s, 
and from the rise of fascism, that the best antidote to extremism 
was economic stability, fairness and a human rights framework, 
principles that advocates of a New Social Europe believe we 
need to relearn.
The advent of neoliberalism unbalanced this consensus and 
the gradualist trajectory of reform and social progression. 
Nationalism and authoritarian populism have sought to fill 
the emerging vacuum with pledges to upend the status quo 
in the name of fairness. Parties of the centre- left have been 
ill- equipped to harness growing popular frustrations given 
their alignment with the neoliberal order through ‘Third Way’ 
politics. However, proponents of a Social Europe agenda are 
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not advocating the return to post- war statism, for despite their 
commitments to social justice, such regimes were hierarchical, 
bureaucratic and paternalistic. A New Social Europe would 
be guided by civil society (for a definition of civil society, see 
Chapter One).
In the present day, some hold the fear that civil society 
is being increasingly tamed and subverted by the state and 
donors. To use a term of the new right, ‘pulling back the 
state’ has been accompanied by a series of governmental 
strategies and technologies (governmentality) that, through 
top- down stipulations being attached to funding and overt 
promotion of the donor’s agenda, weaken the autonomy 
of civil society (van Baar, 2011a). Policies that invoke the 
language of social inclusion rest upon narrow, assimilative 
interpretations of what it is to ‘civilize’ and integrate others. 
Vibrant grass- roots activism among Romani communities 
and other communities could create a new policy regime 
predicated upon radical conceptions of inclusion. In effect, 
rather than civil society being a puppet of the state, it would 
be transformed into a key partner and a guide for government. 
Inclusive community development that builds on and develops 
existing skills and cultural practices, and that is community- 
driven, can be an important dynamic in creating an inclusive 
policy framework. In a process of ‘reverse governmentality’, 
rather than government using civil society as a tool to impose 
narrow inclusion/ assimilation policies, we would instead 
see a situation where civil society takes leadership, demands 
proportional representation in politics and increases the public 
space for self- determination to give concrete expression to the 
emancipatory potential within Romani communities (Ryder 
and Taba, 2018). This point reiterates a central argument of 
this volume, namely, that an effective Social Europe approach 
for Romani communities requires greater support for the 
development and expansion of Romani civil society in a 
manner that extends not just its capacity and skills, but also 
its autonomy.
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In this sense, Romani civil society could constitute part 
of what Fraser (1992) described as a subaltern public sphere, 
where, through forms of collectivity and social enterprise, 
mini- public forums would be created that would be useful 
in the formulation of counter- narratives, especially for 
marginalized groups who are poorly represented in the formal 
world of politics. In this sense, civil society has the potential 
to offer what Laclau and Mouffe (2001) describe as ‘chains of 
equivalence’, where marginalized groups can ally themselves 
behind their common opposition to forms of oppression 
but each retain a different logic and their own particular 
political identities and strategies. In this sense, if definitions 
of antigypsyism place greater emphasis on giving the Roma 
agency and a voice, it could do much to challenge the image 
of Roma as incapable of leadership in the body politic through 
their lack of skills or alleged cultural inclinations, and instead 
could emphasize the potential of Romani capabilities and the 
emancipatory potential within Romani communities.
With the rise of radical- right populism, we should not forget 
that there is, as noted earlier, a form of leftist populism, also 
steered by agonism and its own conception of the ‘will of the 
people’ and ‘us and them’, centred on economic elites. The 
French anthropologist and sociologist Fassin has criticized 
leftist populism, claiming it is fuelled by resentment, which 
ultimately, as with nationalist populism, cannot be immune to 
reaction and scapegoating (Hamburger, 2018).
The German philosopher Habermas has sought to revive 
notions of consensus based on deliberation within liberal 
politics; his writings also contain a corresponding commitment 
to social justice through his calls to challenge capitalism. 
Deliberative politics, it could be argued, has an important 
advantage over agonism in an age when politics seems to be 
increasingly characterized by fissure and dissension as it does 
not provoke and mobilize the support base of the adversary 
through dogmatic polemic. Instead, through dialogue, 
reinterpretation and reorientation, deliberative politics seeks 
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to dilute the views of its adversaries and convert them. The 
challenge, though, is to achieve such a state of affairs without 
recourse to the anodyne politics of the neoliberal Washington 
Consensus, the period that preceded the ‘glorious thirty’ or 
other such appeasement (Ryder, 2020).
A New Social Europe could offer solutions that would 
also appeal to the constituencies of opinion that have 
mobilized in support of radical- right populism, especially 
in deindustrialized and ‘left behind’ communities. Such 
communities might be persuaded to reorient their political 
aspirations if promised a version of the ‘good society’ that 
would entail transformative, interventionist, redistributive 
policies with the ability to create work and rebuild 
communities. This could be part of a counter- narrative 
to the politics of nativism, xenophobia and nationalism. 
A Habermasian vision of deliberative politics could entail 
accommodations in matters that eschew violence and hostility, 
and defuse tension. However, there will always be moments 
of antagonism, and irreconcilable claims will always surface, 
especially from those who wield unaccountable power, wealth 
and undemocratic influence. In between elections, the mass of 
the citizenry should be voluntarily engaged, through a vibrant 
civil society, to participate, to get involved and to feel they 
really belong to the demos, a bounded political community of 
fate, in ways that are consistent with cosmopolitan obligation 
and do not exclude others from meaningful participation and 
representation on any spurious grounds of ethnicity, gender, 
ability, faith and so on.
The Habermasian tradition of deliberation and dialogue 
would not shy away from forms of conflict resolution, even 
when negotiating with adversaries aligned to the Right, so long 
as core principles and values are not compromised. To gain 
insights into the application of such strategies in the Romani 
sphere, we could refer to the work of the greatly acclaimed 
Nicolae Gheorghe, who, while leader of the Romani NGO 
Roma Centre for Social Intervention and Studies (Romani 
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CRISS) in Romania, was active in conflict resolution. 
Gheorghe’s work centred on dialogue and negotiation in 
communities where extreme ethnic tensions and pogroms 
had flared up, which sometimes entailed dialogue with 
those holding deeply ingrained anti- Romani sentiments. 
It is interesting to note that lead proponents of the term 
‘antigypsyism’, such as the former MEP Soraya Post, who is 
of Romani origin, have called for a truth and reconciliation 
process about the history of the Roma in Europe, noting 
such initiatives in South Africa, Canada and Australia with 
indigenous groups, and, most recently, in Sweden, which 
led to Roma being recognized as a national minority there 
(LIBE, 2019). Such initiatives, it could be argued, have more 
to do with Habermasian deliberative politics than with leftist 
agonism, and it is useful that a framework for antigypsyism 
as a political tool incorporates and sanctions such dialogue. 
What this chapter has striven to emphasize, though, is that 
deliberation, reconciliation and cultural promotion will have 
limited value as stand- alone policies if not coupled with the 
transformative change promised through a New Social Europe.
Habermas provides another point of inspiration for Romani 
civil society in his discussion of the public sphere. Habermas 
(1989) defines the public sphere as a public network that 
shapes opinion through frames (viewpoints). Under advanced 
capitalism, Habermas posits that the discursive power of the 
public sphere has been emasculated through its colonization 
by the state and the market, where standardized mass media 
has erased the capacity for critical thought and manipulated it 
to create a notion of consensus geared to the interests of elites. 
Thus, the populace is swayed by the communicative techniques 
of advertising and marketing, creating unthinking citizens, 
a form of ‘re- feudalization’ that limits the public’s capacity 
for critical thinking. As noted earlier, the media has been a 
powerful force in the politics of securitization and anxiety, and 
in the instigation of moral panics against the Roma. Hence, the 
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Romani rights defenders ranged against antigypsyism should 
incorporate more detailed proposals to reform the media 
into their calls for action, such as stronger ethical codes for 
journalism, stronger fines and penalties, and a right to reply in 
the event of distorted reporting, as well as limitations on the 
number of media outlets any individual can own. In terms of 
wider legal protections for the Roma, maintaining the rule of 
law is paramount – a notion that is invariably undermined and 
challenged by the radical right; in this sense, the proposal for a 
rule of law mechanism to scrutinize EU member state practices 
and violations has great merit (LIBE, 2019). However, austerity 
has greatly eroded legal aid schemes in many EU member 
states, so improved funding in this area and more community- 
based paralegals could be invaluable in giving Roma greater 
legal redress to challenge antigypsyism. More generally, greater 
resources and access to the machinery of justice is needed to 
ensure Romani rights are protected.
Conclusion
We live in an age of crisis and turmoil, as evidenced by the rise 
of authoritarian populism and nationalism. Nonetheless, this 
chapter has argued that transformative notions of antigypsyism 
could have value at this time. The term ‘antigypsyism’ could 
have utility and relevance if aligned with critical thinking, with 
radical forms of empowerment that reach the margins, 
with challenges to white hegemony and the neoliberal order, 
with the promotion of fluid conceptions of identity, and with 
a commitment to a radical deliberative politics and alliance 
building centred on intersectionality and social justice. Romani 
civil society should be vigilant, for there is a danger that 
institutional power might merely accept the softer forms of 
action associated with the term ‘antigypsyism’ and neglect the 
more structural, transformative change required to address the 
marginalization of the Roma.
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In the ten years since Viktor Orbán’s ‘revolution in the 
polling booths’ delivered Fidesz an unprecedented two-thirds 
majority, and established a ‘new regime of national unity’ 
(Dunai and Than, 2010), Hungary’s Romani community 
has found itself constantly targeted by a broad constituency 
of far- right politicians and pundits. One consequence of the 
consolidation of authoritarian nativist rule in Hungary and 
the regime’s constant aggressive xenophobia has been the 
effective mainstreaming of antigypsyism. Nonetheless, the 
prime minister’s intervention in the recent Gyöngyöspata 
case marked an unprecedented escalation. Chapter Three in 
this volume by Marius Taba charted the rise of the radical 
right in Europe, and how nativist demagogues seem to have 
taken their cue from the Carl Schmitt playbook by peddling 
an antagonistic friend– enemy concept of the political, and 
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deploys anti- Romani racism. This short chapter provides 
insights into one such process.
I argue that in its perpetual Schmittian search for an enemy 
in a state of exception, the Orbán regime in Hungary made a 
calculated decision to turn its fire on the Roma. Stung by its 
partial defeat in the 2019 municipal elections (Kovács, 2019), 
especially the loss of Budapest, which deflated the illusion of 
regime invincibility, Fidesz lurched even further to the right. 
The diminishing returns from demonizing Muslims, migrants 
and refugees prompted Orbán and his propagandists to revive 
an older hatred and weaponize antigypsyism.
The pretext was a four- month- old court ruling by the 
Debrecen Court of Appeal in favour of Romani families in 
the town of Gyöngyöspata whose children were forced to 
learn in segregated settings between 2004 and 2014. On 18 
September 2019, the Debrecen Court of Appeal upheld the 
first instance judgment of Eger Regional Court and concluded 
that the Hungarian state was required to pay HUF80 million 
(£205,382) in compensation to Romani children who had 
been segregated for a decade from their peers in school. 
Seemingly out of the blue, Orbán described this decision as 
having violated ‘the people’s sense of justice’. Before recounting 
what occurred after this first prime ministerial intervention 
into the Gyöngyöspata case, the next section provides some 
context concerning the school segregation and desegregation 
of Romani pupils in Hungary over the past decade.
A brief history of school segregation
Immediately prior to the launch of the Decade of Roma 
Inclusion in 2005, the European Roma Rights Centre 
(ERRC) reported to the European Commission that the 
‘recent legal and policy amendments aiming to combat racial 
segregation in schooling in Hungary’ were ‘among the most 





However, by late 2010, some months after Fidesz came 
to power, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union reported 
that efforts to integrate Romani children and introduce 
innovative pedagogic methods into the educational system 
had come to a halt, and that the government had started to 
question ‘the hegemony of an integrated system’ (Rorke, 
2015). What followed was that a national commitment to 
school desegregation came to be displaced by a cynical policy 
of ‘separate but equal’- style segregation, repackaged as ‘social 
catching up’.
In 2013, in the case of Horváth and Kiss v.  Hungary, the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the two 
Romani applicants who were diagnosed as having mild mental 
disabilities as children and were placed in remedial school 
suffered indirect ethnic discrimination. Furthermore, the Court 
insisted that the state has a substantive positive obligation to 
‘undo a history of racial segregation’ (Timmer, 2013).
November 2014 saw Minister for Human Resources Zoltán 
Balog file a Bill to amend Hungary’s Public Education Act 2011 
to effectively legalize school segregation (Tóth, 2014) following 
a court decision in a case filed by the Chance for Children 
Foundation (CFCF), which ordered the closure of a segregated 
school in Nyíregyháza run by the Greek Catholic Church. The 
amendment circumvented legal verdicts by exempting some 
schools from the requirements of the Equal Opportunities Act. 
Opposition MP Tímea Szabó called the modification of the 
law a disgrace and declared that Balog’s idea of ‘benevolent 
segregation’ was contrary to both the statutes of Hungary and 
the European Union (EU) (Rorke, 2015).
The amendment would prove unnecessary following the 
subsequent decision of Hungary’s Supreme Court (the Kuria) 
in April 2015 to overturn the earlier ruling and exempt the 
Greek Catholic Church from anti- discrimination provisions 
in law. This judgment effectively declared the segregation 
of Romani pupils legal in religious- run schools, and was 
memorably described by CFCF board member Gábor Daróczi 
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as ‘apartheid under the aegis of religious freedom’ (Hungarian 
Spectrum, 2015).
In its June 2015 communication on the implementation of 
the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies, 
the European Commission (2015) called for an end to school 
segregation and noted that Hungary counts 45 per cent of 
Romani children being placed in segregated schools or classes, 
one of the highest percentages among EU member states. 
On 26 May 2016, the European Commission launched an 
infringement procedure into systemic discrimination against 
Romani children in Hungary. In response, the government 
accused the EU of ‘getting revenge’ because Hungary had 
earlier contested the EU decision on mandatory refugee quotas, 
and described the procedure as ‘absurd’.
The EU’s Education and Training Monitor 2018:  Hungary 
(European Commission, 2018) revealed a system that had 
become even more segregated and more unequal. The report 
found that early school leaving was more than six times higher 
(59.9 per cent) among Roma than among non- Roma (8.9 per 
cent), and that segregation had ‘accelerated’ in the last decade to 
the extent that ‘most Roma children still attend schools where 
all or most children are Roma’ (European Commission, 2018).
In short, evidence, research and court judgments over the past 
decade show that there was nothing incidental or accidental about 
the practices that have perpetuated segregation and inequality. 
Denying Hungarian Romani children equal access to integrated 
quality education is a deliberate, knowing and systemic practice.
‘The people’s sense of justice has been wounded’: undermining the 
rule of law
Four months after the Debrecen Court of Appeal reached its 
decision that the state should compensate the Gyöngyöspata 
Romani families, Orbán suddenly picked up on the issue. In 
a succession of provocative broadcasts to the nation, he stated 




stigmatized the local Roma as workshy and their children as 
violent, unruly and uneducable, and asserted that what went 
on in Gyöngyöspata was not segregation, but ‘catching up’ 
(MTI- Hungary Today, 2020).
For their part, the Romani children testified that: they rarely 
met their non- Romani peers as they were educated in separate 
classes on a separate floor; they were not allowed to take part 
in the carnival ball; they were not taken on class trips; and 
they were denied information technology (IT) and swimming 
lessons. The reality of segregation was that many children were 
unable to graduate, and so poor was the quality of education 
that many barely learned to read or write (Szurovecz, 2020).
In a move favoured by white supremacists worldwide, Orbán 
(Miniszterelnöki Kabinetiroda, 2020) portrayed the majority 
ethnic group as the victims:  ‘Non- Roma in Gyöngyöspáta 
began to feel that they had to back down and apologize, 
despite being the majority. They feel like they are in a hostile 
environment in their own homeland.’ The Prime Minister 
further opined:
I am not from Gyöngyöspáta, but if I were to live there, 
I  would be asking how it is that, for some reason, 
members of an ethnically determined group living in a 
community with me, in a village, can receive significant 
sums of money without doing any work, while I work 
my butt off every day. (Bayer, 2020)
Dismissing ‘the whole thing as a provocation’, fomented by Soros 
organizations, Orbán (Cseresnyés, 2020) stated that ‘there is a 
boundary that a Hungarian will never cross, or believes cannot 
be crossed. That boundary is giving people money for nothing.’
Forging a robust social mandate for racism
Pro- government media further polarized opinion, with 
anchors, columnists and other assorted hacks queuing up to 
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back the leader and stigmatize the Gyöngyöspata Roma. The 
far- right Hír TV reported that 97 per cent of viewers who 
responded to a poll backed Orbán on the issue (Rorke, 2020). 
The question Hír TV asked in the ad hoc poll was predictably 
loaded: ‘Do you agree with Viktor Orbán, who says it is unjust 
that some people be paid millions without any work or with 
the Soros- backed organization which advocates for Roma 
people in Gyöngyöspata to receive a 100  million [forints] 
in compensation for segregation?’ (Hungarian Spectrum, 
2020a). Orbán then announced a new ‘national consultation’ 
on the Gyöngyöspata case, and declared ‘we take the side of 
the 80  percent who are decent, working Hungarians who 
demand a suitable education for their child’ (Gulyás, 2020). 
The national consultation is nothing more than a blatant 
manoeuvre to invoke the will of the people to influence the 
deliberations and decision of the Supreme Court on this issue. 
The issue is further skewed by being sandwiched between two 
other questions on ‘the rights of violent criminals’ and judicial 
corruption. Over the last ten years, the regime has repeatedly 
resorted to national consultations as part of propaganda 
campaigns against imagined enemies of the nation. Orbán 
characterizes the consultations, with their leading and loaded 
questions, as ‘demonstrating the power of national consensus’ 
(Gulyás, 2020). As to the outcome, the government stated that 
it already has clear answers to questions that have provoked 
social debates; ‘however, it needs a robust social mandate in 
order to represent them in the international arena as well as 
within Hungary’ (Gulyás, 2020).
Intimidating and stigmatizing the Roma of Gyöngyöspata
This is not the first time that the Roma of Gyöngyöspata 
have been targeted by the far- right. Back in 2011, uniformed 
neo- fascist paramilitaries, backed up by skinhead auxiliaries 
with whips, axes and fighting dogs, set up checkpoints and 




as policemen stood by, in a siege that lasted almost two months. 
As The Guardian reported, militiamen ‘roamed the streets 
day and night, singing, hammering on doors and calling the 
inhabitants “dirty fucking Gypsies” ’ (Pidd, 2012). Back then, 
Orbán stood accused of failing to protect Romani citizens 
from arbitrary force and intimidation.
Now, in 2020, it is the Prime Minister who is the direct 
source of racially motivated intimidation. On orders from 
Budapest, local Fidesz MP László Horváth began campaigning 
against the verdict and ‘the Soros network’s goal to obtain 
money’. In language that amounts to incitement, Horváth 
(Hungarian Spectrum, 2020b) predicted that the discord in 
the village ‘will lead to a nationwide storm’ and declared that 
‘Every time strangers come to Gyöngyöspata from far- away 
places to fight for justice, war follows.’
‘Schmittian shenanigans’ would be a pithy characterization 
of what has unfolded here, and even more apt in light of 
subsequent developments. The whole package is there:  the 
plainly daft evocation of war; a concept of the political that 
rests on a friend– enemy distinction, brooking no dissent 
when it comes to collective will- formation; and a sovereign 
who decides on the exception. Orbán’s constant invocation 
of ‘the authentic people’, decent fair- minded Hungarians, is 
textbook nativism, especially when he presents them as pitted 
against the ‘ethnically determined group’, the feckless work- shy 
Roma, aided and abetted by foreign- funded, money- grubbing, 
shyster lawyers.
Orbán has further posited that there is no cultural identity 
in a population without a stable ethnic composition, and 
that economic prosperity depends on preserving ethnic 
homogeneity ‘as life has proven that too much mixing causes 
trouble’ (EURACTIV, 2017). Little wonder that the authors 
of a recent United Nations (UN) report (UNCERD, 2019), 
which expressed ‘high concern’ at the persistence of structural 
discrimination against, segregation of and extreme poverty 
faced by Roma, were ‘deeply alarmed’ at the prevalence 
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of hate speech against Roma, migrants, refugees and other 
minority groups, as well as ‘reports that public figures in 
the State party, including at the highest levels have made 
statements that may promote racial hatred’. In reaction to 
what he described as Orbán’s ‘increasingly delusional’ racist 
rhetoric, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
was moved to declare that ‘the increasingly authoritarian – 
though democratically elected – Viktor Orbán is a racist and 
xenophobe’ (Al- Hussein, 2018).
The ‘Gyöngyöspata case’ marked the moment when the 
Prime Minister turned his fire from migrants onto Roma. 
Orbán’s assertion that ‘the people’s sense of justice has 
been wounded’, and that ‘we need to give justice to the 
Gyöngyöspata people’, clearly excludes the Roma from 
the body of ‘the people’. This message was not lost on the 
thousands of Roma who turned out to protest against the 
proposed national consultation.
Then, just as opposition momentum was gathering, the 
pandemic hit and lockdowns kicked in all over the world. Under 
cover of COVID- 19, the Hungarian Parliament approved a 
so- called enabling act on 30 March, which let Orban rule by 
decree without any time limit, and included a ban on elections 
and referenda. Regime claims that these extraordinary measures 
were somehow unexceptional in the time of the virus were 
met with incredulity and condemnation abroad; the European 
Parliament issued a statement describing the new measures as 
‘incompatible with European values’ (Radio Free Europe/ 
Radio Liberty, 2020).
In an attempt to wrongfoot its critics, at the end of May, 
the government announced its intent to revoke the state of 
emergency decree; but as Human Rights Watch and many legal 
scholars have pointed out, the Revocation Bill is yet another 
political sleight- of- hand, for it does not revoke anything, ‘but 
rather double- downs on Orban’s power grab’ (Gall, 2020).
In the midst of all these shenanigans around the state of 
exception, on 17 May, the Supreme Court delivered its ruling 
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in favour of the children and parents of Gyöngyöspata, much 
to the fury of Orbán, who described the judgment as unfair. 
He said the government would decide how to honour the 
court ruling and was preparing new legislation to prevent any 
future such decisions. On national radio, Orbán launched into 
a chilling tirade against minorities, asking whether Hungarians 
can feel at home in their own country:
It cannot happen that in order for a minority to feel at 
home, the majority must feel like strangers in their own 
towns, villages, or homeland. This is not acceptable. And 
as long as I am the prime minister, nothing of the sort 
will happen. Because this is the country of the natives, 
our country, and I see that this whole [Roma court] case 
was initiated by the Soros organizations. (Mák, 2020)
This nativist rhetoric resonates with right- wing extremists, 
whose squadristi have already recently massed on the streets 
in anti- Roma rallies. Observers are acutely aware that the 
new powers assumed by Orbán provide scope aplenty for 
this vengeful autocrat to settle scores, and it’s only a matter of 
time before Roma find themselves once again in the regime’s 
crosshairs.
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The Romani movement: a love and 
vocation – Jenő Setét’s reflections on a 
life of activism
Interviewed and translated by Katalin Rostas
Editor’s introduction
Jenő Setét is one of the most prominent and experienced 
Romani civil rights activists in contemporary Hungary. In 
this edited piece, Jenő reflects on why and how he became 
an activist, and his hopes and aspirations for the Romani 
movement and people in Hungary and Europe in these 
challenging and troubled times.
Starting out
I have been working in this field since my youth, and it was 
a conscious choice after finishing high school to become an 
activist. So, after initially working as a decorator, I embarked 
upon a course for social workers at Tündérhegy, which 
I graduated from in 1992. Today, the programme I attended 
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in Budapest. Becoming part of a social movement is like 
love: we do not think why it happens, it just does. My whole 
life is wrapped up around Romani emancipation. Why? I do 
not really know, but this is the aim of my life, my vocation.
Through the Romani movement, I  discovered another 
world; for instance, in the movement, I became aware of my 
identity. At the summer camps of the Romani movement, 
I became familiar with the Romani language and culture.1 
A notable influence was Aladár Horváth. Aladár played a huge 
role in establishing the entire Hungarian Romani movement, 
defining a clear set of values centred on social justice and 
community action. A  decade ago, my fellow campaigners 
and I established a non- formal movement, and in 2017, we 
became an association, Ide tartozunk (‘We Belong Here’2). Its 
mission is to build a new type of leadership in the Romani 
human rights and emancipation movement. We are involved 
in advocacy and cultural promotion (we organize Roma 
Pride, a peaceful march and public demonstration around the 
richness of Romani culture), we provide capacity building for 
the community, we participate in research to investigate and 
understand Romani exclusion, we conduct monitoring, and 
we also undertake casework.
To me, Romani emancipation means ensuring equality of 
opportunities and social acceptance in terms of community 
relations and institutional practices towards Roma. So, 
Romani emancipation is not just an abstract sociological 
construct, but rather an indispensable ingredient to achieve 
a better life for communities. Emancipation is multifaceted 
and it is needed to happen in many spheres of Romani 
life, such as political, cultural and economic representation 
of the Roma.
Emancipation is measurable not only in sociological terms, 
but also in the presence or absence of a political, cultural and 






We Belong Here association
Our association disproved many stereotypes, such as, for 
example, that the Roma are unable to self- organize or act 
without donor support. For more than a decade, we were an 
informal movement; we could prioritize our community ideas 
and interests, and value our own aims and plans. We did not 
care about tenders, indicators and accounting deadlines, which 
can often endanger creativity and stifle the community voice. 
However, in recent years, we became a formal organization, 
and this granted us the levers for change and more legitimacy 
for entering into negotiations with the authorities. However, 
all this was at the expense of flexibility and innovation in 
community action.
The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is where my work 
is based, which is a non- profit organization founded by the 
US State Department to promote democracy and develop civil 
society; the Open Society Foundation (OSF), the organization 
of George Soros, provided a support framework for start- up 
organizations and we got a small grant from them that was 
enough to create a tiny basic infrastructure, meaning we 
have an office, laptops and so on. One thing everyone needs 
to know:  we remain guided by healthy principles and we 
prioritize the ideas and demands of our community centred 
on social justice and respect for Romani culture. If someone 
does not agree with our ethics, they should not fund us.
Activism and ethnicity
I think the pro- Romani organizations (non- Roma- led 
organizations) that help Roma are in a stronger position than 
Roma- led non- governmental organizations (NGOs). They 
have stronger economic power and ability to exert pressure, 
and their lobbying power is much more effective as well. The 
empowerment of the Roma- led NGOs is needed because, 
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otherwise, Romani emancipation cannot be achieved, but 
there is no way that an equal opportunity movement can be 
created without a more professional, stronger representation 
of the community itself. It is not normal that the interests of 
Roma are not represented by Roma- led organizations.
On the other hand, we do have Roma- led structures 
that need to be reformed. I  would talk about the current 
‘minority self- government’ system, which, in our view, is 
incapable of representing the interests of the community as 
it is functioning in practice more as a ‘governmental branch 
organization’ disconnected from community realities and part 
of political games.
In order to change the quality of Romani self- organization, 
the participants need to be more honest, more resilient and 
better prepared, breaking with the previous political practices. 
Second, instead of the current paternalistic system, Romani 
self- organization needs to be able to attract resources without 
state supervision and control. Otherwise, if you pay me, I owe 
you a debt. If you do not pay me, but instead I raised the money, 
then you cannot control me. So, the Romani movement 
must break with the habit of expecting all resources from the 
state, while, at the same time, formulating its criticism of the 
government that runs the state. The Romani movement must 
create its own resources in order to have that autonomy in 
formulating and representing the interests of the community.
We need more social allies working alongside us. Sometimes, 
we Romani activists put on an ethnic robe but we also need 
to find common ground that connects us to non- Romani 
people. A social coalition and broad- based collaboration can 
be formed, and we need to move forward in this.
Gyöngyöspata protest
Hungary is going through difficult times as the government 
under Viktor Orbán has become increasingly authoritarian and 




Orbán’s system is twofold; there is a ‘showcase’ part, whereby its 
allied Romani organizations and actors benefit, namely, those 
in control of the local and national Romani self- government, 
they are his puppets!3 One of the Hungarian Roma supporting 
Orbán and the FIDESZ is the MEP Lívia Járóka, now Vice- 
President of the European Parliament. At first, we welcomed 
this as no Romani person has held such a high position since 
the existence of the European Union (EU). We were happy 
and wished her a lot of success. However, we have also seen 
with regret in recent years that party loyalty is stronger to her 
than her Romani identity. I find it terrible when instead of 
meaningful speeches or statements, she prefers party propaganda 
and is an apologist for what is happening in Hungary.
Since the point of Orbán’s political agenda is to extract 
revenues from the poor and distribute it to the classes above 
them, the reality is that the system as a whole tends to push 
Romani communities downwards on an ethnic or social basis. 
However, it does even more damage in that they have made 
hatred part of the daily political routine to increase prejudice 
against Roma, and to create and maintain a stigmatizing and 
intimidating social climate against Roma as a whole, which 
I believe is extremely conscious political behaviour. We Belong 
Here organized a national protest in Budapest in February 
2020 for solidarity with the Romani children of Gyöngyöspata 
(who have been scarred by segregation) and for the protection 
of an independent judiciary in Hungary. The Gyöngyöspata 
case relates to a Romani settlement in a rural village that 
attracted international attention when it suffered from far- right 
paramilitaries in 2011. The village has also suffered forms of 
segregation, leading to a court ruling that the community 
should receive compensation on account of school segregation. 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that the ruling violated 
the nation’s ‘sense of justice’ and added:
[O]f course, if someone is ethnically ranked in a class, 
it is obviously segregation. But let’s say that classifying 
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someone on the basis of their capacity for education, 
their capacity to absorb knowledge – where there are 
obviously more Gypsy children in such a village – this is 
not segregation but catching up. (Rorke, 2020)
This was an attempt to justify segregation before the final 
decision of the Supreme Court had finalized its position; 
fortunately, despite this meddling in the legal process, the 
Supreme Court upheld the decision in May 2020. (For a 
fuller discussion of Gyöngyöspata and the state of democracy 
in Hungary, see Chapter Four by Rorke.)
I am old but I have never seen any movement by Roma 
for Roma in such huge numbers. Since the regime change in 
1989, this was one of the largest civil actions made by Roma. 
According to media estimates, the mass protest had around 
4,000– 5,000 people; this is unprecedented in Hungary. We are 
very proud of it – that we were the ones who could achieve 
it – moreover, with Roma and non- Roma together.
Let us clarify what a demonstration is for. A demonstration is 
not a solution, but an expression of the position of a particular 
community’s will in a given situation. We must decide whether 
to remain silent and thus passively assist in such an offence to 
human dignity and the rule of law, or we assume that we will 
speak out and even become a target. We Belong Here decided 
to take action; we wanted to express the view that a politician, 
neither of the Left nor of the Right, should have the right to 
intervene in an ongoing lawsuit. Judicial independence is such 
a fundamental value for us that we are determined to defend 
it against anyone.
The impact of the COVID- 19 pandemic
We have been living in a transformed world for weeks now with 
the COVID- 19 pandemic (time of interview, March 2020). 
We do not know what impact the epidemiological situation 




the political world. We do not know what we are up against. 
If the country’s economy and political structure collapse, it 
will be similar to the post- Second World War period. I cannot 
estimate what impact this unprecedented situation will have; 
people are absorbed in their own fears and dreads, and not 
the question of political and social justice. Should we forget 
about these? No! We should not, but we need to sense that the 
priorities are shifting. I say this because I may have protested 
against the government in February but, today, I say that in 
this epidemiological emergency, we can do nothing but follow 
the government’s instructions with reference to measures to 
save lives – however, in the long term, we must ensure our 
democracy is not a victim to the pandemic.4
I will support this government when it comes to disaster 
relief  – be it a flood or an epidemic. However, it is also a 
certainty that the government cannot be disciplined by me or 
social movements, but the social majority can curb and shape 
the government and will have its chance in the 2022 election. 
This is something the present government should reflect upon.
The EU
There are three levels of government:  local, national and 
international. I do not think we can ignore any of them. Given 
that Hungary is an EU member state, the EU has a decisive 
role in determining what values, what goals, it represents and 
how it shapes its policy.
The 2004 accession of Hungary to the EU brought with it 
the chance and the hope that the social exclusion, injustices and 
disadvantages of the Roma would be alleviated or eliminated. 
Sadly, the EU has proved to be weak in asserting its own 
democratic political and social values in the member states, and 
has even become a major financier of existing social inequalities 
by providing EU funds without human rights conditionalities 
and/ or proper oversight of the correct use of funds, and has 
proven to be weak in countering state- supported racism, 
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pogroms or hate policies. It is incredible that despite explicitly 
‘anti- Brussels’ rhetoric, Hungary still has unhindered access 
to the EU’s billions. It is an astonishing sin that the resources 
ostensibly directed at eradicating inequality are, in reality, being 
used to strengthen segregation and racism.
For example, in Hungary today, schools that segregate 
Romani children can easily and do receive EU financial 
support via the Hungarian government’s distribution of EU 
funding. If the EU, even though its values uphold equality, 
provides financial support to schools that segregate on the basis 
of ethnicity, something needs to change as there seems to be 
a mismatch between actions and values.5 The role of the EU 
cannot be left out, neither on the basis of democratic values, 
nor in the system of resource allocation.
Europe does not exist without nationalities, and we cannot 
accept a politics that does not address the Romani community. 
We are European, Hungarian and Roma. If you recognize only 
one of our three identities, we take it as a serious offence. The 
EU must also address the specificities of Romani communities 
and not cover up our existence and our problems under the 
authority of some kind of generalized EU ‘colour- blind’ social 
strategy because, for example, when Romani people suffer 
discrimination, they suffer on account of being Roma, even if 
they are otherwise EU citizens and if it conflicts with the EU’s 
own directive on equal treatment. The Romani movement and 
the Roma have a constructive attitude towards the EU but, at 
the same time, we must defend our own interests very strongly 
vis- à- vis the EU and a New Social Europe.
Editor’s conclusion
The interview with Jenő Setét demonstrates the passion and 
dynamism at the Romani grass roots but also support for 
the concepts and principles promoted in this book, namely, 





marginalized citizens and solidarity in these challenging and 
turbulent times.
Notes
 1 The modern Romani movement in Hungary was started in 1957 by Mária 
László, who sought to fight against racial discrimination and for equal 
rights through cultural means. Between 1978 and 2008, János Bársony 
and Ágnes Daróczi, respected activists working for Romani rights, as well 
as several others, organized cultural camps for the Romani community, 
which aimed to strengthen Romani identity.
 2 See: https:// idetartozunk.org/ we- belong- here- association/ 
 3 In Hungary, there is a system of local Romani minority self- governments 
and a national one that was established in 1993 and funded by the state. 
These give largely advisory platforms to the Roma. It is dominated by a 
pro- Orbán faction called Lungo Drom. Critics have complained about 
state interference and a lack of capacity building and internal democracy 
(Kovats, 2000).
 4 The Orbán administration assumed unprecedented powers in the midst 
of the COVID- 19 crisis, allowing the current FIDESZ government to rule 
by decree and the possibility of being imprisoned for up to five years for 
spreading disinformation, a measure tantamount to an attack on free 
speech and independent journalism.
 5 The Central European Roma Civil Monitor reported in its 2020 synthesis 
report that EU funding has been given to schools that uphold segregation 
in Hungary.
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Romani young people’s activism and 
transformative change
Anna Daróczi, Lisa Smith and Sarah Cemlyn
Introduction
This chapter arose from conversations between two Romani 
women activists working with young people (Daróczi and 
Smith) and a non- Romani woman researcher (Cemlyn). It 
considers lessons for transformative change from empowerment 
work with young Roma. Daróczi and Smith led the direction 
through their knowledge, ideas and direct experience, and 
Cemlyn framed the content. Broader personal reflections are 
indicated through direct quotations from Daróczi and Smith.
We outline four underpinning approaches: terminological 
issues relating to the groups we focus on; discrimination and 
inequality affecting Romani young people; the conceptual 
framework informing the discussion; and the current policy 
framework for empowerment work by and with Romani 
youth. We describe selected areas of work in national and 
international contexts through the organizations with 
which Daróczi and Smith are involved. We then analyse 
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themes of: empowerment; identity and diversity in Romani 
movements; Roma/ non- Roma solidar ity; and policy 
implications. The conclusion focuses on new and inspirational 
directions for Romani young people’s activism.
Note on terminology
We take a cross- national perspective through the work of 
a European organization, Phiren Amenca, working in ten 
countries, and a group of UK organizations, including Travellers’ 
Times (TT) youth section and Roma Rights Defenders. 
The umbrella term ‘Roma’ has increasingly been used by 
the European Commission and other institutions to include 
groups in both Eastern and Western Europe. Simhandl (2006) 
refers to inherent silences and unspoken assumptions about 
boundaries around essentialist categories concerning these 
groups in European Union (EU) political discourse. There are 
numerous groups from Western Europe to the Balkans who do 
not identify as ‘Roma’; however, as an endonym, it has been 
widely adopted (see Chapter One).
‘Roma’ is used inside Phiren Amenca, and often across 
Europe in relation to pan- European policy development and 
civil society networking. Within the UK, however, it has been 
common to refer to ‘Gypsies, Roma and Travellers’ (GRT), of 
which Gypsies and Travellers have a tradition of commercial 
nomadism, whereas ‘Roma’ signifies largely sedentary groups 
entering the UK from Eastern and Central Europe over three 
decades but with strong connections to some UK Romani 
Gypsy groups. An alternative umbrella term adopted by the 
Council of Europe (CoE) Commissioner for Human Rights 
(2012) is ‘Roma and Travellers’, which includes the wide 
variety of groups its work covers. The dynamic between 
self- definition/ representation and externally applied terms 
and boundaries is inherent to the political process of self- 
empowerment and activism (McGarry, 2014). With reference 
to terminology, we refer to racism directed at Roma/ Gypsies 
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and Travellers as ‘antigypsyism’ (for wider discussion, see 
Chapter Three by Taba) but retain ‘anti- Gypsyism’ in quotes.
Inequality and discrimination
Inequality and antigypsyism have intensified in recent decades 
despite policy measures such as the National Roma Integration 
Strategies (NRIS). The Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 
has reported stark statistics on the exclusion experienced by 
Roma (see Chapter One).
The European Youth Forum (2014) explored young people’s 
experiences of discrimination across multiple domains and 
dimensions, including gender, ethnicity, lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and trans (LGBT), and refugee status. Being 18– 24 years old 
was itself considered grounds for discrimination, magnified 
by intersectional experiences. A  total of 55.7 per cent 
saw Roma as discriminated against generally, as the most 
discriminated group in terms of education, qualifications and 
renting accommodation, and as highly discriminated against 
in health and other services. The multifaceted denial of rights, 
opportunities and affirmation means that Romani young 
people are ‘denied the right to be young’ (Phiren Amenca, 
2016: 6) because they lack space to explore freely and develop 
their own identities, characters and aspirations.
The FRA’s (2013) analysis of 2008 and 2012 surveys reveals 
the compounding of discrimination by gender, reporting lower 
levels of literacy (77 per cent, compared to 85 per cent), post- 16 
education (37 per cent, as against 50 per cent) and employment 
(21 per cent, compared to 85 per cent) for Romani women 
than for men. Jovanović et al (2015: 3), discussing the diversity 
and complexity of the Romani Women’s Movement, relate 
how intersectionality theory has helped make sense of the 
‘hybrid structures of inequalities Romani women face’, 
identified lacunae and challenged the general (white/ non- 
Romani) discourse of the feminist movement, the general 
(often patriarchal) discourse of the Romani movement and 
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the broader patriarchy. Jovanović and Daróczi (2015) highlight 
how much more work is needed to develop the strengths 
of a truly intersectional Romani movement. Jovanović et al 
(2015) also refer to tensions between older and younger Roma, 
possibly related to the latter moving away from conservative 
and restrictive discourses concerning women’s roles. LGBT 
Roma/ Gypsies have explored how these identities can lead 
to exclusion or invisibility within both Romani and LGBT 
communities, and the struggle to assert and celebrate these 
identities (Baker, 2015).
Educational opportunities to open doors to future active 
citizenship are systematically denied to Roma in many 
European countries (Cemlyn and Ryder, 2016). Segregation 
in separate classes/ schools and misclassification as pupils 
with special educational needs remain key obstacles in many 
countries (see Chapter One). Infringement proceedings were 
launched by the European Commission against the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in 2014, 2015 and 2016, 
respectively; however, so far they have resulted in cosmetic 
rather than meaningful change (ERRC, 2017).
In England, ineffective mainstreaming policy approaches, 
coupled with austerity – as seen in the demise of nationwide 
local authority Traveller education support services by 
2018 – have left youth with no targeted education support or 
information, and a loss of knowledge on identity and inclusion 
within educational institutions. The UK ‘Race disparity audit’ 
(Gov.UK, 2017) highlighted stark inequality of educational 
and health outcomes. In 2018, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Racism noted that Gypsies and Travellers had 
the highest rates of fixed and permanent exclusions, alongside 
informal exclusions, arising from negative teacher stereotypes, 
low teacher expectations and the absence of ethnic and cultural 
representations in the curriculum (United Nations, 2018). In 
the first national survey of prejudice in Britain for over ten 
years, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2018) 
showed that more people openly expressed negative feelings 
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towards GRT (44 per cent) than any other group of people in 
society. Rising antigypsyism continues to be fuelled by media 
depictions of Gypsies and Travellers as threatening ‘invaders’ 
of local communities, and has manifested in local and national 
politics, with recent government proposals to criminalize a 
nomadic existence further (Gov.UK, 2020).
Conceptual framework
This chapter is based on the key concepts of human rights, 
interculturalism, empowerment and antigypsyism. The 
international and European human rights framework, 
incorporating civil- political, socio- economic and 
representational rights (Cemlyn, 2008), underpins Romani 
youth campaigns, like other movements for social justice 
(Donnelly, 2007). There is a dynamic between top- down 
convention- framed human rights work and grass- roots, 
bottom- up struggles (Ife and Fiske, 2006).
While human rights can be flouted by regressive regimes and 
right- wing movements, and perceived divisively by majority 
groups in relation to minority groups (Bell and Cemlyn, 2014), 
there are also left- wing critiques. These include: their assumed 
universality; postcolonial arguments concerning imperialist 
imposition on non- Western countries (Gosavi, 2016); and 
anti- capitalist arguments of its co- option by neoliberalism, 
consumerization and privatization, with human rights, free 
markets and democracy being a widely accepted triad, despite 
exacerbation of poverty and human rights violations (Evans and 
Ayers, 2006). The EU has focused on economic inclusion of 
Roma within neoliberalism but continuing social and political 
marginalization undermines this aim from within.
Therefore ‘the notion of human rights … [is] subject to both 
historical and social contexts’ (Gosavi, 2016: 63) and there are 
‘many defensible implementations’ (Donnelly, 2007: 299). The 
notion of ‘human security’ (Yuval- Davis, 2014), drawing on 
development and capabilities studies (Sen, 1999), also incorporates 
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emotional dimensions, the need for belonging and safety from 
violence, alongside recognition and redistribution. The Romani 
rights movement and Romani feminist, LGBTIQ and youth 
movements negotiate these complexities but the human rights 
framework remains a strong foundation for all campaigns.
Postcolonial theory links to interculturalism, a core 
approach for activist projects, alongside intersectionality. 
While ‘multiculturalism’ mainly celebrates difference and 
can essentialize and exclude (Cantle, 2012), interculturalism 
refers to constant and equal dialogue between different groups 
mutually influencing and modifying each other, and seeks to 
transform unequal power relationships between minority and 
majority groups, and enable mutual adaptation rather than 
one- way integration into a flawed dominant system. Although 
even multiculturalism is currently seen as dangerous to national 
identity in state policies and programmes in Hungary, a few 
small civil society projects do adopt an intercultural approach, 
mostly educational and sensitizing events where organizers 
bring together Roma and non- Roma for building dialogue 
and cooperation between them, while utilizing the experiences 
and knowledge of the Romani participants/ facilitators as 
expert input.
Intersectionality developed from critical race feminism and 
postcolonial theory as a challenge to essentialist identity politics 
in the Black movement (Anthias and Yuval- Davis, 1983), and 
is a tool in understanding multiple identities and generating a 
‘transversal politics’ that facilitates reflexive dialogue between 
people of different positionalities (Yuval- Davis, 1999). 
However, there remains a role, albeit contested, for strategic 
essentialism in the struggle of marginalized identities for social 
justice (Brubaker, 2004). In the state socialist era, cultural 
preservation was the only flag under which Roma could 
officially gather in Hungary; today, for many national and 
international organizations, a cultural focus also still seems 
to be the only politically viable way to advocate for Roma’s 
own institutions.
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Dynamic change also informs notions of empowerment. It 
can focus on individual development of skills, awareness and 
confidence in taking control of one’s own life (for example, 
Zimmerman, 1990) but also be co- opted by state systems as a 
regulatory or oppressive rather than emancipatory tool (Baistow, 
1994). Here, we focus on collective empowerment and analysis 
encompassing individual self- empowerment, reflecting also 
Freire’s (1972) critical pedagogy and development of critical 
consciousness. Empowerment of Roma has become part of 
European policymaking goals but reality has not matched 
rhetoric in incorporating Romani voices in policies and 
programmes (Acton et al, 2014).
There are related critiques of how Romani civil society has 
become distorted by ‘NGO- ization’, dominated by donor 
agendas, remote from the Romani grass roots and preoccupied 
by specific interventions (Trehan, 2009). Those organizations 
that are closer to their constituencies have struggled, reduced 
services or closed because of austerity cuts ‘at a time when 
demand for these services is increasing considerably’ (EWL, 
2012: 14).
The barriers faced by Roma are magnified in the broader 
context of antigypsyism. End (2012) explores its role 
historically and currently as a majority society mechanism to 
stabilize itself through projecting uncertainty onto a minority 
population, framing a notion of Roma  – unconnected to 
reality – as having unstable identities and lifestyles or a ‘non- 
identity’, being ‘parasitic’ in the sense of non- productive, and 
having an absence of discipline.
youth empowerment policy
The definition of youth empowerment of the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF, 2018) refers to young people’s 
leadership, mutual connectivity and support. The CoE 
(2015a: 13) more clearly asserts a human rights framework, 
claiming a pioneering role in mainstreaming human rights 
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education in youth policy and practice generally, and that this 
‘provides the optimal educational approach and content to 
understanding human rights as a common asset of all humanity 
and, conversely, to understanding the violations of the human 
rights of anyone as a violation of the human rights of all’.
Human rights education and combating antigypsyism 
are at the core of the CoE’s (2011) Roma Youth Action Plan, 
developed from recognition that Romani youth had no specific 
support channels, either in mainstream youth councils or 
within Romani forums (Phiren Amenca, 2016). Thus, the 
goal has been ‘double mainstreaming … [to] ensure, on the 
one hand, the inclusion of youth issues in Roma policies and 
programmes and, on the other, that of Roma youth issues into 
youth policies’ (CoE, 2011: 2). The plan is elaborated around 
six themes, ‘strengthening Roma youth identity; addressing 
multiple discrimination and recognising multiple identities; 
building a stronger Roma youth movement; increasing the 
capacity of Roma youth organisations to participate in policy 
making; human rights and human rights education; combating 
discrimination and antigypsyism’ (CoE, 2015b:  10). It 
references the need to help young people identify and challenge 
structural discrimination, combat racist attitudes, build self- 
esteem, and increase human rights awareness and support to 
remove obstacles (CoE, 2015a), but it is an uphill task.
One of the principles outlined in guidelines for the Roma 
Youth Action Plan (2016– 20) is ‘Participation and consultation 
of Roma youth and Roma youth organisations, from the local 
to the European level, including their involvement in policy 
advocacy’ (CoE, 2016: 4). However, until 2019, the Hungarian 
Youth Council had no Romani lead member. Similarly, the 
first Romani member of the European Youth Forum joined 
in January 2020. Meanwhile, the EU Youth Guarantee is 
economically focused, namely, that all young people under 
25 receive a good- quality offer of employment, continued 
education, apprenticeship or traineeship within four months of 
becoming unemployed or leaving formal education (European 
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Commission, 2018), but there is only limited evidence of these 
objectives being fulfilled for Roma.
Case studies: youth empowerment work internationally and 
within the UK
The main mission of Phiren Amenca is to build dialogue and 
engagement between Romani and non- Romani youth and 
organizations as a tool for youth participation in public and 
political life, to advocate for double mainstreaming, and to 
challenge stereotypes, racism and antigypsyism. Funded by 
the European Commission and the CoE, it is an international 
network of Romani and non- Romani volunteers and 
voluntary service organizations, with members in ten countries 
(within and outside the EU) and partner organizations beyond. 
‘Phiren Amenca’ is a Romani expression meaning ‘come and 
share a journey with us’. This journey is personal, its space 
and length are different, but the final aim is the respect that 
develops between Roma and non- Roma.
Phiren Amenca’s work rests on three pillars:  voluntary 
service, non- formal education methods and advocacy. 
Voluntary service coordinates nine to 12 months of exchange 
of Romani and non- Romani volunteers between Romani 
and mainstream non- governmental organizations (NGOs). 
The educational programme involves seminars, training and 
conferences for volunteers, activists, youth workers, educators, 
and professionals about:  racism and antigypsyism; human 
rights; intersectionality; challenging stereotypes; and Romani 
history – Remembrance and the Roma Genocide. In advocacy, 
Phiren Amenca trains, supports and empowers young people, 
and builds the advocacy capacities of organizations on local, 
regional and European levels. Connections are built with 
decision- making bodies, advocacy groups and organizations, 
though Phiren Amenca lacks capacity for steady, strategic work 
in this field. Together with the youth, it conducts research and 
drafts policy recommendations for intergovernmental bodies 
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(for example, CoE and EU) and for national decision- making 
structures through its member organizations. As Daróczi notes:
‘Our vision is totally in line with the concept of a 
Social Europe. Our work with Roma youth is self- 
empowerment at its best: through our seminars, local 
activities and international events, we give them tools 
and knowledge they can use in order to participate, 
represent their own interests, advocate for their needs 
and their rights. Given the diversity of needs and 
interest among Roma youth, the main issue is the lack 
of access to decision- making processes where Roma 
youth could vocalize their needs, whatever they may 
be. Through voluntary service, Roma young people 
can get to know and practise how NGOs work, what 
the structures of local or EU policymaking are, and 
how local communities can be organized around social 
justice causes. Personal contact is essential, to trust 
and support young people in moving on with their 
own ideas.… This … entails sharing and transferring 
power as we would like the young people to take our 
place. There is a need to be more courageous, enable 
young people’s contributions, listen to young people 
when shaping our methods, facilitate young Roma 
being in the lead.… We also promote an attitude with 
non- Roma volunteers and seminar participants which 
does not position them as “the saviours” of Roma, but 
as partners, where Roma are the ones knowing what 
they need and the agents of their actions. White folks 
are not there to teach or help them, but to assist and 
accompany them on the way.’
Daróczi also reflects on the constraints of a neoliberal and 
antigypsyist economic context, EU policy structures, and 
limited staff resources:
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‘The EU volunteer programme’s main goal is to provide 
skills and knowledge to the youngsters which they can 
later use in the job market, and as a side goal, they also 
acquire intercultural skills, learn to be tolerant, etc. It 
would be nice if tolerance were a job- market skill too. 
Our projects have to prepare youth for the job market 
but … many of them will have no chance to get a job 
because of hate and antigypsyism … we prepare them 
for a labour market which is not prepared for them … 
when the young people go back home, they can rarely 
stay optimistic as their realities do not provide them with 
high hopes.’
Equally:
‘We organize international seminars … to give them 
advocacy tools and opportunities to participate in 
decision- making processes, for which one needs a 
mindset of goals, dreams, visions and practical skills. We 
try to increase their involvement … but we are very 
limited because the space for citizenship participation 
is shrinking, let  alone for Roma youth.… With the 
authoritarianization of states, the number of democratic 
tools and the number of people brave enough to use them 
are decreasing.… It is still not evident to invite Roma 
youth advocates or organizations to forums where Roma 
and/ or youth policies are discussed and decisions made. 
When invited … we do not always have the resources 
to participate meaningfully [or] keep the young people 
we prepared in the loop.’
TT (Travellers’ Times, 2018a) is a national media and 
communications project. TT produces a biannual print 
magazine and daily website. It is a long- standing project 
of Rural Media, a charitable production company creating 
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issue- driven films and heritage and digital arts projects that 
support people to acquire practical digital skills, participate in 
cultural production and influence change. Funded by the Big 
Lottery, it was set up to challenge negative representations of 
GRT in mainstream media and is designed, predominantly 
written by and features GRT communities, giving a platform 
to promote positive imagery, challenge stereotypes and provide 
support, tools and opportunity for self- advocacy.
A consultation with beneficiaries identified a demand by 
older Roma and Travellers that young people were the ‘future 
generation’ and resources should be put into supporting them 
to get their voices heard. In response, Youth at Travellers’ 
Times (YTT) was also developed as a website platform for 
youth journalism and media production for young people to 
develop media skills, news- writing courses and events to train 
young people to tell their stories. A national youth advisory 
group was established to ensure the youth section was led by 
beneficiaries. This attracted a pool of young, proactive Roma 
and Traveller activists, from varying backgrounds, with some 
from activist families and others finding out later about the 
network of organizations supporting GRT communities. 
A small network of activists emerged and TT created a space 
for peer- to- peer support and mentoring to develop, alongside 
training in youth journalism and digital safety, and for self- 
advocacy and access to information about European training 
and study sessions. However, the project’s media focus sets 
limits on how TT can support their activism and there is 
disconnection from the European opportunities that TT 
promotes. As Smith comments:
‘Often, funding priorities can act as a barrier to 
supporting young activists’ ambitions, so we work hard to 
find creative ways to establish new spin- off projects that 
are community- driven and youth- led. To my knowledge, 
there is no youth organization specifically targeted 
at Roma and Travellers in the UK that equips youth 
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with tools in strategic advocacy, promotion of political 
engagement and its relevance to their lived context, 
challenging and recognizing antigypsyism, building 
knowledge on how the NGO sector operates for youth 
to develop their own project ideas and access funding 
mechanisms. I see this type of work being essential to 
the development of the Romani movement in the UK; 
otherwise, we have young activists being pulled into 
all different sorts of projects but with no guidance on 
a coordinated approach to their advocacy, or focus on 
how their own personal aspirations and ambitions can 
be supported and harnessed.
Youth rarely take the opportunity [of training sessions 
in Europe], though we have had a few individual cases 
where young people have gone to study sessions in 
Budapest through promotion of events via TT and it 
has been “life- changing”. My perception is that there is 
minimal knowledge about the existence of the Council of 
Europe and the Roma Youth Action Plan and the benefits 
it can present amongst youth in the UK. I question if 
the terminology of “Roma” when advertising prevents 
participation of young people who identify as “Gypsy” 
or “Traveller”.… Either they don’t understand how it can 
relate to their lived context or the promotion of events 
is simply not reaching them. My concern is that Brexit 
will result in further isolation and reduced capacity for 
Roma and Traveller youth to develop European networks 
of solidarity and support.’
The 2019 It’s Kushti to Rokker project was designed to raise 
awareness about how high levels of social and educational 
exclusion and antigypsyism impact young people’s mental 
health and wellbeing. After consulting with young people in 
2018, the YTT Advisory Group recognized that there was a 
clear lack of video- based informative content that accurately 
reflected young Gypsies’ and Travellers’ own perspectives on 
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their lived experiences. In the project, young people worked 
with writers and filmmakers to create a series of five short films 
based on their experiences, addressing education, bereavement, 
online hate and double layers of discrimination. The impact of 
racial discrimination on well- being, feelings of self- perception 
and self- worth was an overarching theme.
An accompanying information pack provided advice 
and signposting to support for young people and families. 
Furthermore, a ten- minute documentary for policymakers 
and education and health professionals aimed to raise 
awareness of the inequalities and antigypsyism Romani 
and Traveller youth experience, and the impact on mental 
health risks. Also, a downloadable toolkit supported the 
facilitation of discussions on mental well- being, and offered 
resources promoting Romani and Traveller history, language 
and culture.
Romani and Traveller youth involved in the project were 
supported to lead a series of screenings across the UK attended 
by policymakers and health and education providers. The 
youth- led production process enabled the viewer to see the 
subject through young people’s eyes, facilitated discussions 
about mental health, combatted feelings of isolation and offered 
a creative approach to addressing challenging issues.
The YTT Advisory Group also engaged in wider European 
organizing. An activist from the European Roma Rights 
Centre (ERRC) was invited by Smith to talk with the other 
young activists about his experiences working in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the situation for Roma. They joined forces 
in July 2018 at Appleby Horse Fair to support the ERRC 
in launching Roma Rights Defenders (2018) in the UK, a 
pan- European activist network of Roma and non- Roma 
(Travellers’ Times, 2018b), through which ‘we can share and 
receive information, collaborate, and mobilise strategically 
against Roma rights violations’. Smith commented that “To 
my knowledge, this is the first international network of this 
kind established in the UK.”
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A small group of Romani activist Labour Party members 
formed alliances through political advocacy and engagement 
with parliamentary allies. The 2017 Labour manifesto stated 
that ‘We will end racism and discrimination against Gypsy, 
Roma and Traveller communities, and protect the right to 
lead a nomadic way of life’ (Labour Party, 2017: 112), and 
many were prompted to vote for the first time. Progress was 
slow but a Labour ‘friends of ’ group developed to provide 
official representation and knowledge, and crucially to 
create spaces for community activism within the party. As 
Smith comments:  “This type of independent advocacy is 
important for the Romani movement as a whole … the term 
‘antigypsyism’ has not been recognized or adopted by the UK 
government and is a fundamental step towards acknowledging 
the situation of its Gypsy, Roma and Traveller populations.”
Discussion
Human rights and Roma empowerment in a European context
The account of Phiren Amenca’s work illustrates implementation 
of several principles of the CoE’s (2011) Roma Youth Action 
Plan: addressing and combatting multiple discrimination and 
antigypsyism; human rights education; strengthening Romani 
youth identity; building a stronger Romani youth movement; 
and increasing the capacity of Romani youth organizations 
to participate in policymaking. Together with opportunities 
offered for intercultural dialogue, educational engagement 
in civil society organizations and support to develop their 
own initiatives, this kind of inspiring empowerment work, 
if multiplied and well resourced across Europe, could make 
a noticeable difference to the resources, strengths and skills 
of Romani youth, and consequently their ability to promote 
transformative change. Moreover, the advocacy and networking 
opportunities offered by larger, donor- funded NGOs such as 
the ERRC (albeit that NGOs are sometimes found to distort 
grass- roots momentum), as well as educational seminars for 
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Roma like those at the Central European University (CEU), 
enhance the apparent benefits of European connectedness and 
cooperation, and can be ‘life- changing’ for individuals.
For Smith, in the UK, “We are lacking training in policy 
advocacy that guides Romani and Traveller activists in a 
structured approach to tackling systemic issues surrounding 
education and health that would enhance their grass- roots 
activism.” Therefore, the European examples of processes and 
structures represent a possible new model:
‘for improving the life chances of Roma and Traveller 
communities across Europe. Shall we also start investing 
in more advanced forms of youth empowerment and 
mobilization and learn from organizations like ERGO, 
Ternype (which provides in- depth reflections on 
antigypsyism through a Roma Genocide education lens) 
and Phiren Amenca in their approaches and relationships?’
However, Daróczi’s experience also illustrates the current 
limits of this model because of constraints on Phiren Amenca 
and similar organizations, through insufficient resources and 
staffing, to follow through on higher- level opportunities for 
young people to influence policy, lack of support for them 
after involvement in the project, and the antigypsyist context 
limiting access to jobs, with reality not providing “high hopes”. 
Moreover, there are wider dangers in the rise of right- wing 
politics and increasing racism. At the same time, smaller and 
independent activist initiatives, as in the UK, suggest sources 
of energy and determination to enable the Romani voice 
regardless of lack of support.
Barriers, tensions and challenges to empowerment within civil society
These discussions evidenced a number of challenges for 
civil society and the work of NGOs, including funding and 
firefighting pressures, organizational objectives, and internal 
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tensions, together with pointers towards more powerful 
activism. Civil society can be conceptualized as radical 
and transformative, but in the context of austerity and 
antigypsyism, it may primarily be dealing with immediate 
issues of health, employment, accommodation and violence, 
without opportunities for strategic work and with declining 
funding. Activists can sometimes shape organizational 
opportunities to promote change, though within limits. TT 
is a media rather than a human rights organization, so despite 
the youth group stretching its brief, it is unsuited to sustaining 
direct activism.
However, even with relatively secure, albeit circumscribed, 
funding and empowerment objectives, as at Phiren Amenca, 
conflicts can arise with workers’ own activist values. Despite 
the overall balance of positives that many on the Left (not all) 
would ascribe to EU membership, it remains a neoliberal, 
capitalist project. For workers like Daróczi who envision 
a more equitable non- capitalist system, this can create a 
contradiction:  “Personally, sometimes it is hard to operate 
from EU funds while being anti- capitalist. The EU is first and 
foremost a [capitalist] economic union, and we keep trying 
to decorate this base with some values of human rights and 
tolerance and justice.” Alternative fundraising approaches raise 
similar dilemmas:  “One could go for other ways of raising 
funds but we cannot afford a professional fundraiser; plus, 
I don’t know how I feel about approaching companies, such as 
Coca Cola or the like.” The project- based system undermines 
fundamental change:
‘Civil society organizations should play a key role in 
transformative change but the project- based operation 
makes it almost impossible. You either have to set aside 
your strategic goals or not comply with the grant’s 
objectives. So, you either define your goals, as an 
organization, in line with those of the donors, or your 
work is considered not needed.’
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The UK experienced a rapid withdrawal of the state from 
service provision, especially in the years 2010 to 2020, 
through increased privatization and drastic budget cuts to local 
authorities and other bodies. Civil society has a crucial role in 
picking up on deficits in government services but NGOs do 
not have the capacity or resources for such a role, which would 
also further divert them into firefighting and away from wider 
change. Moreover, there are systemic barriers for Romani 
young people’s involvement in these organizations. A no- deal 
Brexit might result in even deeper cuts.
Autonomous Roma- led groups across Europe are supporting 
communities and exposing antigypsyism and historical wrongs. 
In the UK, a small but growing population of educated and 
politically engaged young Roma and Travellers are challenging 
the status quo and want to take an active role in building up 
their communities. They are bypassing NGOs and creating 
their own advocacy structures and relationships with politicians, 
supported by non- GRT allies, but can meet some resistance 
from the NGO sector. Projects built and sustained by well- 
meaning gadje can be less than empowering and sometimes 
instead promote a culture of dependence. Young activists 
face a gap of organizations offering tools of agency and self- 
advocacy that place knowledge into the hands of the individuals 
themselves. As Audre Lorde (1984: 110) said, ‘the master’s tools 
will never dismantle the master’s house’. For Smith:
‘It feels like we are at a significant time in the movement 
… many NGOs are being challenged on how they are 
supporting the development of Romani and Traveller 
youth to eventually move into positions of leadership and 
employ more community members. In order to allow the 
Romani and Traveller movement in the UK to develop 
further we must acknowledge some parts of the sector are 
outdated, and space and support must be given for new 
community- led initiatives and ideas to thrive, with young 
leaders at the forefront who nurture and strengthen Roma 
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and Traveller youth activism and identity, building on and 
developing links with the Council of Europe, Roma Youth 
Action Plan and European Roma youth organizations.’
Therefore, while NGOs can relieve hardship, help people to 
negotiate within the parameters set by the system and stretch 
those limits a little, they may fail to transcend barriers to 
empowerment such as inaccessible labour markets, be more 
individually based than collectively transformative, or fail to 
adapt and empower Romani leadership. They fit into a broader 
oppressive system in contradictory ways, helping to sustain it by 
alleviating some pressure (Daróczi et al, 2018). Yet, civil society 
more broadly is crucial both to protecting basic rights and to 
radical democratic and transformative change, with grass- roots 
autonomous initiatives breaking through boundaries.
Romani movements, identity, diversity, intersectionality and 
intercultural solidarity
The experience of different organizations illustrates fruitful 
cross- currents, as well as challenges in relation to identity, 
diversity, intersectional and intercultural exchange, and 
the development of Romani movements. Phiren Amenca 
celebrates culture but focuses away from identity politics 
to common human rights across differences. This is partly 
practical since young people sometimes come from more than 
ten countries with different traditions, values and identity 
constructions, but also because their mission is empowerment, 
activism and dialogue- building. Their educational events 
demonstrate that Roma have culturally and geographically 
diverse identities but should cooperate and fight together for 
recognition. Politically, identity politics and movements have 
also taken various directions, with Romani (youth) activism 
more focused on nation- building in some countries and on 
universal human rights in others. This causes tensions and 
the organization’s goal is the opposite: to create dialogue and 
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community – for that, the common denominator is human 
rights, even though universalist values might discourage certain 
types of activism.
In its external relationships, Phiren Amenca builds alliances 
with other groups, ethnic, national and religious minorities, 
LGBTIQ communities, feminist organizations, and so on. This 
can be difficult, especially if they focus on specific identities 
rather than common themes, because other groups are not 
necessarily favourable to Roma, so the common aims of human 
rights – the right to recognition and redistribution – are more 
helpful when creating cooperative spaces and alliances, though 
the continuing emphasis on multiculturalism and identity 
politics in the global arena of minority groups makes this 
harder. At the organizational level too, despite a highly diverse 
membership of the international network, differences become 
an asset, and the human rights culture mediates any conflicts.
Similarly, at YTT, self- representation promotes non- 
homogeneous views of diverse ethnic groups and is a means 
to highlight diversity and intersectionality. Roma Rights 
Defenders and other groups include diverse ethnicities, as 
encompassed in the term ‘Gypsies, Roma, Travellers’.
However, there is a persistent threat to a nomadic existence, 
including:  the UK government’s tighter creation of ‘gypsy 
status’ for planning purposes, which many saw as a direct 
attempt to ‘define Gypsy and Traveller communities out 
of existence’ (Travellers’ Times, 2016); measures restricting 
travelling and Traveller self- employment; and, more recently, 
current proposals to criminalize trespass (Gov.UK, 2020). 
Therefore, identity can be used as a mechanism for cultural 
perseverance related to nomadic heritage, which becomes a 
shield for some against a society that views them as ‘out of date’.
Although ‘Romani movement’ is not a frequent term in the 
UK, and might suggest NGOs often not led by community 
members, there have been advances since the 1990s. Across 
the UK and Europe, technology and social media have 
furnished opportunities to gather and tell varied, intersectional 
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experiences and provide collective support, increasing 
awareness and networking. When it can move away from front- 
line work and public awareness campaigns, this movement may 
develop a more complex approach, providing opportunities for 
Romani and Traveller youth to reflect on issues around human 
rights and equip them with tools for collective mobilization 
and the self- empowerment that comes through being part of 
a collective battle.
GRT civil society has played a critical role in nurturing and 
developing a prominent feature of the growing Romani and 
Traveller movement, namely, the predominant number of 
GRT women working and volunteering within civil society, 
including at TT. These activists vary on how they self- define 
as feminist but are increasingly coming together across different 
groups. However, Smith notes how “funding constraints 
and the need just to get the job done mean many voices are 
silenced, or dominated within the sector by non- GRT allies 
who are not conscious of power imbalances and dominate 
meetings, unintentionally disempowering GRT women by 
speaking on their behalf ”.
Some advances in raising awareness of LGBTIQ experiences 
in the UK include Gypsy- authored research among Gypsy gay 
men (Baker, 2015). More recently, Traveller Pride was founded 
in 2019 as a self- organized network collective of Roma and 
Travellers to provide a platform for community intersectionality 
and ‘advice, guidance, support and information to make life 
easier for LGBT+ Travellers’ (Traveller Pride, 2019). On 6 
July 2019, Traveller Pride marched at Pride London, the first 
official representation of Travellers in the UK at a Pride march. 
The 2019 Its Kushti to Rokker project captured the historic 
occasion through a short film, ‘Hard Road to Travel’, based on 
the lived experiences of those involved and aimed at promoting 
visibility of intersectional identities.
In Hungary and elsewhere in Europe, many successful 
Romani NGOs are led by women but it is an underpaid sector. 
In Daróczi’s experience, male leaders are more numerous 
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where NGOs have more secure funding and higher pay. In 
parts of Europe, there is a clearer identification of Romani 
feminism than currently in the UK, and this balance is 
reflected in the staff composition of Phiren Amenca. Four 
women manage the network who either identify as or 
effectively operate as feminists. Being led by women has a 
high impact on their work as they always keep in mind, and 
talk/ train about gender equality, feminisms in their various 
forms and intersectionality. This includes conscious decisions 
about supporting Romani girls’ and women’s participation, 
for example, including a male relative in activities in cases 
where traditional families will not allow a girl to travel alone, 
and making efforts to secure the representation of LGBTIQ 
Romani individuals or groups at events, which might not 
happen with Hungarian male staff.
Yuval- Davis (2014) has argued that part of the oppression 
of women is that they are constructed ‘as embodiments of 
collectivity boundaries’ but that this ‘might make it easier 
for women to transcend and cross boundaries and engage in 
dialogical transversal politics’. This dynamic – the opportunity 
to experiment, challenge and form new connections across 
boundaries that comes with marginalized status  – is often 
evident in the Romani women’s and youth movements, though 
less so as yet in the developing LGBTIQ movement.
Alongside the complexity of exchanges across different 
Romani ethnicities and intersectional positionalities lies the 
question of solidarity with non- Romani allies, which can be 
problematic where non- Roma are unaware of dominating, but 
alternatively supportive and respectful of Romani leadership, as 
in the independent advocacy examples, the structured approach 
of Phiren Amenca and elsewhere (Daróczi et al, 2018). This 
returns to questions of transformative change. The examples 
of powerful Romani activism point to more fundamental 
challenges to systemic oppression that reverse rather than 
mitigate it. In Daróczi’s words:
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‘It is time for white people, men, straight folks to 
integrate to the society which is non- white, non- 
male, etc in majority. As long as we think of ourselves 
who need to be integrated to messed- up societies and 
systems, we cannot talk about empowerment. If we want 
transformative change, we cannot seek the one- sided 
integration of the oppressed into a system which was 
built to create and maintain inequalities.’
Policy implications
In most countries, the policy environment is not favourable 
to the needs and interests of Romani youth. Phiren Amenca 
has been advocating with others for the representation 
of Romani youth in policymaking and decision- making 
structures. National youth councils, the European Youth 
Forum and all mainstream youth organizations should reflect 
on how their structures contribute to strengthening Romani 
youth participation, as well as the internal barriers. Advocacy 
work by Romani youth organizations locally, nationally and 
internationally requires recognition.
Since the European Commission launched the EU 
Framework for NRIS in 2011, institutional racism has 
continued to manifest itself through policies and practices. 
The NRIS after 2020 should have a clear focus on Romani 
youth, participation structures, non- formal education, mobility 
and support for Romani youth organizations. The NRIS in 
some countries, for example, Slovenia and Croatia, started 
to develop this focus. Organizations such as Phiren Amenca 
and TernYpe indicate tested methods for developing critical 
awareness, participation, dialogue and activism.
Intersectional identities and issues for young Roma need 
to have dedicated space in policy discussions. While attention 
to gender has proved crucial in mobilization, LGBTIQ 
Roma face violence and ostracism by families/ Romani 
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community members, discrimination from majority society, 
as well as exclusion from mainstream LGBTIQ organizations 
(Tišer, 2015).
Conclusion
A step change is needed to support young people’s involvement 
in transformative change based on the premise of ‘nothing 
about us without us’. A wider concept of Social Europe that 
moves away from the shackles of neoliberalism to foreground 
equality, dialogue, redistribution and respectful recognition of 
all minority perspectives is needed to underpin greater progress.
The energy and dynamism for such change is ready in a range 
of social movement and civil society initiatives highlighting 
the potential of Romani young people and movements 
to be in the vanguard. There are continuing dangers from 
antigypsyism, and increased threats from racist populist and 
nationalist political movements, while a hard Brexit may lead 
to more regressive and unregulated UK policy and add further 
challenges to solidarity networks for transformative change. It 
is vital to keep these channels and networks flourishing that 
enable Romani young people to learn from and with each 
other, resist the disempowering messages of their social and 
political environment, and hope and act for change that will 
break out of the current system. While young activists need 
support to maximize their activism, the changes they create 
must be in their hands.
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Transatlantic dialogues and 
the solidarity of the oppressed: critical 
race activism in the US and Canada
Nidhi Trehan and Margareta Matache
Introduction
As a growing number of Central and East European Roma 
progressively became European Union (EU) citizens, Romani 
people, activists, scholars and their allies nurtured a hope that 
the systemic inequalities that haunted Romani communities 
for centuries would finally be dismantled. However, although 
progress can be observed in European policies (at least on paper), 
national strategies vis- à- vis Roma or even enrolment rates in 
primary education, the complex and intertwined problems of 
unaddressed historical injustice, economic injustice, exclusion 
and anti- Romani racism continue to this day.
Few gains have been achieved, even in relation to ensuring 
the basic right of Romani children to access quality education 
as segregation in schools remains a shameful reality in many 
EU member states. Indeed, a recent EU report indicates that 
the school segregation rate for Romani children across Europe 
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2016 (FRA, 2018). For Romani children, school enrolment 
clearly does not equal access to quality, non- discriminatory 
education. Moreover, in countries such as Hungary and Poland, 
the neoliberal politics of the post- transition decades have been 
replaced by a corrosive politics of populism and resurgent 
ethno- nationalism (see Chapter One).
Although Romani self- organizing dates back to the early 
1900s in Europe, activism in the US has long held great 
relevance for the Romani movement. The US civil rights 
movement and strategic litigation were models for the fledgling 
post- socialist Romani movement in Europe as it began to 
revive, expand and strengthen in the early 1990s. Euro- Atlantic 
integration, via institutions such as the Council of Europe, 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU, 
reinforced liberal conceptions of rights, and a neoliberal view 
of the role of civil society increasingly took hold. In response, 
disillusioned by weak and biased ‘integration’ processes 
(including National Roma Integration Strategies) that did 
little to address socio- economic exclusion, some Romani 
activists and scholars have turned to calling on governments to 
focus on structural anti- Romani racism. Moreover, Romani 
activists were influenced by critical North American debates 
on effective community organizing and mobilization, including 
how movements can be derailed through donor- driven agendas 
(Trehan, 2001).
This chapter explores the relationship between European and 
North American Romani activism through the experiences 
and reflections of Margareta ‘Magda’ Matache, a Romanian 
Romani activist and scholar who is Director of the Roma 
Program at Harvard University’s FXB Center, and Nidhi 
Trehan, a political sociologist engaged in the movement for 
the rights of Romani peoples since the mid- 1990s. We also 
incorporate the Roma- related advocacy work of Serbian- 
Canadian Roma based in Montreal, Quebec, primarily that of 
Dafina Savić, a human rights activist and founder of the non- 
governmental organization Romanipe, and the journalist Lela 
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Savić, as well as activists within Voice of Roma, a Roma- led 
organization based in San Francisco.
The first section of this chapter is based on a dialogic 
interview between us that offers a window into contemporary 
Romani activism, which increasingly employs an anti- racist, 
intersectional approach that seeks to highlight voices and 
approaches hitherto neglected. The second section provides 
case studies of transatlantic Romani activism today in the US 
and Canada, and draws lessons learned on recognition battles, 
anti- racist work and its reparatory potential on the frayed social 
contract between the state and the (Romani) citizen.
Throughout these discussions, it became clear to us that 
contemporary transatlantic Romani activists – those who have 
crossed over from Europe to North America – have a distinct 
perspective on these critical issues, and that Reverend King’s 
‘fierce urgency of now’ continues apace for the global Romani 
justice movement.
Reflections on Romania and the work of Romani CRISS
With a long history in Romani activism and advocacy work 
with the Roma Centre for Social Intervention and Studies 
(Romani CRISS [RC]), Magda has engaged with the 
European Romani movement and EU policy since the late 
1990s, and is active in advocacy work with the US Congress 
on Roma recognition as well. Thus, we discuss her insights 
into the pitfalls, gains and enduring lessons within Romani 
organizing, strategy and anti- racist work.
This section is semi- biographical, and through Magda’s 
journey in Romani activism, we see resonances with the 
narratives of many Romani activists who grew up in the 
time of profound transition in Central and Eastern Europe 
when countries in the region challenged communism from 
the late 1980s onwards, setting a course to becoming liberal 
democracies and joining the EU and NATO. However, the 
transition in the 1990s also meant absorption into neoliberal 
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economies, where austerity measures and ‘restructuring’ led to 
growing unemployment, social insecurity and rising violence 
against Romani people unleashed by acute ethno- nationalist 
forces. Magda recalls growing up in the shadow of the terrible 
anti- Romani pogroms in Hadareni and Kogalniceanu in early 
1990s’ Romania, when mobs burnt down the homes of Roma 
(ERRC, 1996:  6– 7). At one point, her father mediated a 
potentially violent attack against Roma in her hometown in 
Ilfov County with the help of leaders from Bucharest, and 
she recalls being frightened for her father’s safety and by the 
palpable threat of the attack.
In 1999, as a social work student at the University of 
Bucharest, Magda began working with RC, a leading Romani 
rights organization, to help obtain documents and birth 
certificates for families in the Romani neighbourhood of 
Zabrauti (Bucharest), enabling them to access their rights as 
citizens (a common challenge for many Roma). Then, in 2001, 
Nicoleta Bitu became Magda’s mentor at RC: “I owe a lot to 
Nicoleta … she introduced me to the world of tactics on how 
to create resources and power within Romani communities, 
especially with Romani women and youth.” From this point 
on, she also worked with the late Nicolae Gheorghe, a 
sociologist and the founder of RC, and a pioneering Romani 
activist, policymaker and institution builder in Romania and 
internationally. At the end of 2005, she became the Executive 
Director of RC, continuing in this role until 2012. Here, she 
reflects on some of her successes:
‘Our work focused primarily on documenting cases 
of discrimination and abuse of Roma. We looked at 
violations of human rights against Roma and brought 
cases to court, and employed test case litigation to 
eventually render change in legislation and policy. So, 
it was a very straightforward path, partially inspired 
by American struggles on public school segregation 
and the use of case law. We also focused on creating 
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Romani leadership and power in communities, including 
health mediators and human rights monitors. And it  
partially worked!’
In 2005, RC urged the Ministry of Education (MoE) to adopt 
a law on recognizing education segregation as a discriminatory 
phenomenon based on a pattern of discrimination that 
Romani children faced in Romania. RC then worked 
to build a strong coalition with Amare Romentza, and 
two gadje- led organizations  – The Intercultural Centre in 
Timisoara and OvidiuRo – to join forces on desegregation 
and intercultural learning. The coalition received Office of 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) support as 
Nicolae Gheorghe was Head of the Contact Point for Sinti 
& Roma at the time. Ultimately, a partnership was formed 
between the NGO coalition and the MoE, who agreed on 
a memorandum for working jointly on segregation in state 
schools and intercultural education. In 2007, the MoE adopted 
an ordinance that prohibited segregation in education, and 
another one promoting intercultural education and diversity.
RC staff felt that although the drafting of policy, the 
partnership with other NGOs, the tactics employed and the 
advocacy work were all successful, regrettably, there was little 
change on the ground. Magda adds:
‘Another moment of hope on desegregation and equal 
access to education came in 2011 when our Parliament 
amended the Education Act to prohibit placement in 
special schools on ethnic grounds. To implement the 
amendment, RC collaborated with MPs along with 
Romani leaders, such as Petre- Florin Manole (now an 
MP with the Social Democratic Party), Amare Romentza 
and allies. We personally approached the Parliamentary 
committee drafting this law. Still, the only point which 
the committee adopted was recognizing the abuse 
of school placements on ethnic grounds of children 
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in special schools, as one of the parliamentarians was 
especially sensitive to this issue, and the other points were 
left out of the national Education Act.’
As seen earlier, these desegregation initiatives, as in other parts 
of Europe, had limited success as they were unable to overcome 
institutional racism (see also Matache and Barbu, 2018). 
Another observation of Roma policymakers and activists – 
both during the time of transition and the present day – is that 
they only have a limited say as they are often silenced or not 
heard. Racist behaviour, paternalism and, at best, tokenism, 
as well as a corrosive one- upmanship, are far too common. 
Magda reflects on how this has prompted her own anti- racist 
work rooted in Romani representation, and weaves it into a 
broader conversation on the role of Romani people in spaces 
and places of power:
‘Perhaps in the past few years, we have seen some seeds of 
hope in the representation of Roma in a few governments, 
parliaments and intergovernmental organizations. But, as 
a people, I would say we are still lagging behind in terms of 
representation, leadership and power. We must be vocal in 
demanding our place at the table. In the case of other 
marginalized groups … their leaders and scholars would 
certainly not stay silent if someone organizes public fora 
on their oppression, and there isn’t enough representation 
from their particular group. I think in the case of Roma, 
gadje continue to discount us. We continue to see non- 
Roma represent us and speak on behalf of, or about, us, 
and even though it may not be the same as the 1990s, 
this power differential is still there. Often, we don’t see 
a conscious and intentional effort to rectify this.’
Moreover, within the movement, the quest for power and 
visibility often results in corrosive competition, rather than 
collaboration based on mutual trust, and we have seen this 
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in the history of Romani and pro- Romani organizations. As 
Magda acknowledges, RC had a complex relationship with 
the ERRC:
‘Sometimes, we worked well together; other times, 
we felt they used our work without proper credit and 
equal partnership. During my mandate at RC, I  tried 
to reconcile our relationship with the ERRC several 
times but it didn’t turn out very well, and I  felt that 
it was because I  encountered backlash from a white 
male Romanian “saviour”. It’s really hard to have such 
conversations because it just looks like two organizations 
fighting for credit and/ or visibility when Romani people 
are struggling with oppression. Thus, how do we critique this 
and dismantle the power imbalance? How do we ensure that we 
practice justice when we promote justice? It’s a work in progress, 
and it’s complicated indeed … and we lost our chance to 
experience the power of true partnership and solidarity.’
Despite some progress, a continuing issue is the lack of 
representation within the staff of many pro- Romani or human 
rights organizations, and Nidhi shares her insights:
‘As an Indian- American, I felt like I had a very different 
perspective on working within the ERRC in 1996. I had 
already been to Shuto Orizari (one of the largest Romani 
settlements in the world), and met Bulgarian Roma 
communities and activists before coming to Budapest. 
It was my first full- time job after my master’s degree in 
public policy, and I was very passionate about our mission 
at the ERRC. I was the only person of colour there at the 
time and, often, I would ask in staff meetings, “When are 
we going to hire Roma? When?” And after some time, 
we had some Romani interns … but it’s not the same 
thing. Nicolae Gheorghe was on our board (and, later, 
Hristo Kyuchukov and Rudko Kawcyznski) but having 
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Romani staff persons who work in operations and who 
set the priorities was very important to me – indeed, all 
the knowledge was within the Romani communities themselves. 
But it also seemed that Nicolae couldn’t push the power 
structure to hire Roma fast enough. This was my main 
problem with the European Roma Rights Centre, where 
are the Roma I would ask? It was frustrating and I left 
after only two years there. Afterwards, the ERRC 
gradually hired Roma full- time staff (first Angela Kóczé, 
and then others). So, the criticisms I raised back then 
began to be addressed little by little.’
Today, the ERRC, with a Romani leadership and staff 
representation, continues to be a lead civil society actor in the 
arena of Romani rights.
Differences in ideas, philosophies and solutions on human 
rights work among Romani activists are contentious issues 
that Magda has long grappled with. Coming to the US was 
transformative for her thinking, and she elaborates on the 
journey from RC to Harvard:
‘When I led Romani CRISS, sometimes, certain leaders 
around us felt that we were too “inclusive”. Once, 
when RC joined the LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
trans] Pride March in Bucharest, I faced some adverse 
reactions from a well- known leader in the movement. 
And there were many moments when I made particular 
choices against the stream, and I  faced backlash from 
other Romani leaders … which was fine. Sometimes, my 
political choices upset others. Often, I made mistakes; and 
other times, I got things right. But my heart was always 
in the right place for Romani people.
Also, while Nicolae Gheorghe had a strong influence 
on my growth through his ideas on human rights and 
movement building, we also had disagreements. When 
I became the Director of RC, one issue we disagreed 
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on was the fact that Nicolae was trying to question and 
conceptualize if and when Romani activists needed to 
recognize the role of some Romani communities in the 
predicament of their destitution. For instance, he wanted 
RC to get involved in work on begging – to denounce it, 
to speak out against begging as a practice amongst some 
Roma communities – as he was wondering whether it 
was our duty as Roma to do this for Roma.
But I had a different opinion. Back then, I thought 
that “No, it’s not for us to deal with the failures of the 
state; it’s the role of the state to repair the harm and 
the exploitation of Roma dating back to slavery and 
to support Roma pushed into begging, not to blame 
them.” The media too presented begging as a Romani 
cultural issue, as if begging was somehow part of 
“Romani culture”. Thus, I was not willing to contribute 
to the growth of that racist idea. I didn’t entertain it 
then, and I don’t entertain it now; but now I understand 
that it’s because I embrace more of an anti- racist school 
of thought. So, Nicolae and us, the team at RC, we 
fought over these issues, and our paths diverged. Some 
activists portray our separation as a fight for power 
but it was mostly based on philosophical differences, 
although we continued to share the same goal and hope 
for Roma justice.’
Magda also relates a contemporary schism within the movement 
arising from the responses to the COVID- 19 pandemic:
‘In April 2020, a few communities in Romania became 
visible in the national media due to police violence 
perpetrated against them, as well as a conflict between 
two rival families. The first thing some Romani activists 
did back home was to apologize on social media and 
television for the alleged “misconduct of Roma”. To me, 
that felt like an “assimilationist” mindset by definition 
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[Kendi, 2016]. More importantly, I felt that they should 
have spoken to the people beaten up by the police 
before they blamed and mocked them. And I  do think 
that we have to break out of these patterns, which show how 
we Roma, too, internalize white supremacist ideas. It was 
only when I came to Harvard that I began to articulate 
and verbalize my critical race perspective, for example, 
my take on “racecraft” [Fields and Fields, 2014] or the 
ideology of criminality that pathologizes and demonizes 
Romani people to justify oppression. I have embraced 
ideas of anti- racism, justice and reparation as solutions 
for Roma, and these are beyond the individual human 
rights framework.
I have been influenced by the work of African- 
American thinkers, in particular, Kendi, a theorist on the 
racial state and racial disparities in the US. In Stamped 
from the Beginning [Kendi, 2016], he suggests there are 
three different perspectives on racial disparities, each 
embodied by people with distinct attitudes. The first 
are the anti- racists, those who talk about racial disparities 
in an anti- racist framework that focuses on dismantling 
racism. I believe I now belong to this school of thought. 
The second are the assimilationists, and they see racial 
disparities, on the one hand, as related to discrimination 
but they also partially blame or question oppressed people 
themselves. So, for example, if a policeman kills a Black 
or Romani person, they would say that “it’s bad, but, see, 
that man was stealing”, and so on. The third category 
Kendi terms segregationists, and these are racist people 
who put the whole blame for racism on the victims of 
racial disparities themselves. When I read his books, it 
created more clarity in my mind around the nature of the 
conflicting ideas we experience in our movement. But 
back in Romania, it wasn’t the reasoning that informed 
my point of view, but it was just me thinking instinctively 
“this is not fair. The police can’t abuse and kill a human 
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being, regardless of their criminal background. Everyone 
has a fundamental right to life.”
Nevertheless, I  still believe that strategic litigation, 
human rights work and policy advocacy are mandatory 
for our democracies and Romani individuals and families. 
So, I  believe that the work of RC and other human 
rights NGOs has been, still is and will remain essential, 
especially in these times shaken by far- right groups, 
populists and racists. But I’d say that my work and vision 
today are focused more on identifying paths to dismantle 
collective injustices against Roma, anti- racist work and 
reparations, and an emphasis on the states, societies 
and the systems of oppression, rather than on “Roma 
integration”. So, while violations of human rights require 
remedies rooted in individual human rights frameworks, 
collective injustices require collective remedies. But this 
is a different moment in our history, in our movement 
and in my growth as a Romani scholar and activist.’
In her transatlantic work as an activist- scholar based in 
the US, Magda gains further inspiration from scholars and 
writers such as Ida B. Wells, W.E.B. Dubois, James Baldwin, 
Patricia Hill Collins, Cornel West, Barbara Fields, Khalil 
Gibran Muhammad and many others. These influences have 
been important in debates on knowledge production and 
the marginalization of the Romani voice in depictions of 
Romani life worlds (see Chapter Eight by Kóczé and Trehan). 
Magda elucidates:
‘It was through the work of African- American scholars 
that I’ve been emboldened to own my scholarship, 
and to ignore and not fight against the labels that gadje 
[non- Romani] scholars stamp Roma scholars with (for 
example, “activist”). To many of them, we are not scholarly 
enough, we are not objective enough and, most importantly, 
we should have stayed where we were 20 years ago – helping 
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them gaining access to our communities. But I am not going 
to stop because some want us to stop, or because they 
feel uncomfortable, or because they feel they are the 
experts and we are the subjects of their research. There 
is also a lot to unpack about “gadjo objectivity” – and the 
power of their collective subjectivity – in Roma- related 
research given that they, too, carry on their shoulders the 
experiences and legacies of their ancestors – in this case, 
oppression, enslavement, Holocaust, forced sterilization 
and so on. And we can all learn from the lessons and 
struggles of other oppressed people. As you know, the 
critics of early Black scholarship also called Dubois and 
others “subjective”, “not scholarly enough”. And at the 
same time, we should aspire to gain the courage of Ida 
B.  Wells, whose instrumental work on lynching and 
dismantling the ideology of criminality paved the way for 
so many other scholars engaged in the study of racism.’
Reflecting upon her expansive knowledge of human rights 
work in Romania and other Balkan countries, Magda shares 
valuable insights on Romani organizing and what skills she 
built upon in her transatlantic work:
‘One thing to note is that whatever we were doing 
in Romania and with RC, it was not community 
organizing per se. It was policy advocacy, strategic litigation, 
health mediation, human rights work, but it wasn’t community 
organizing. In a way, strategic litigation has been at the core 
of many advocacy initiatives of RC and others, inspired 
as it was, somehow, by the US civil rights movement and 
the judgment of Oliver Brown vs. the Board of Education 
of Topeka, Kansas and others in 1954.
However, the Roma movement has yet to make demands 
for reparations, to work towards economic or environmental 
justice, and to build power through community organizing 
and mobilization, protest, and mass action. Up to this day, 
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I cannot point to many genuine instances of community 
organizing as such in Romani communities. There are 
some initiatives in Romania and other parts of Europe 
but they are far from fitting into the framework of real 
organizing. But there is some hope as seeds of community 
organizing have recently been sown in North Macedonia.’
For Magda, à la Ganz (2013/ 14), community organizing means the 
creation of power within communities. In fact, community leadership 
can greatly strengthen the work of NGOs. She hastens to add 
that the ‘NGO advocacy’ model that is now seen in Europe is 
not wrong; it is just one approach among a diversity of tactics 
within human rights work. Creating NGOs and establishing 
goals towards policy advocacy or case law continues to be 
valuable. She suggests some new pathways for organizing:
‘Successful social movements in Europe, such as Serbia 
on the Move,[1] are making an effort to build leadership 
and the power of the people within local communities, 
be they parents, patients or, broadly, citizens. Yet, Roma 
and pro- Roma NGOs in Europe have focused primarily 
on litigation, service provision projects and advocacy 
work. And while their efforts have shown some results, 
organizing Romani parents, youths and adults with 
lived experiences of segregation in special schools has 
been tried in only a few places. Miroslav Klempar and 
the Awen Amenca team in Czech Republic are using 
this approach [Prague Monitor, 2020]. I argue that most 
“organizing efforts” have not invested in, and therefore have 
not created, the power and organizing skills of the people. 
Meanwhile, human rights NGOs are losing their efficacy due 
to lack of funding and pressure from governments, so there is 
currently a serious void in advocacy and desegregation tactics.’
As mentioned earlier, Magda cites the influence of the strategic 
organizing philosophy of scholar- activist Marshall Ganz of 
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Harvard’s Kennedy School. In his youth, Ganz had been a 
volunteer with the 1964 Mississippi Summer Project, and 
then an organizer for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), a youth- focused civil rights group 
working in the South. In the autumn of 1965, he joined Cesar 
Chavez and Dolores Huerta in an effort to unionize California’s 
farm workers, and later, through his academic research, was 
able to fuse activism with knowledge production and generate 
a novel approach to organizing. Magda explains:
‘Let me be clear, in the Roma movement, we’ve seen some 
NGOs trying to implement community organizing projects but, 
unfortunately, the tactics did not lead to a shift in power towards 
the people and, thus, sustainable constituencies were never built. 
And when I say “constituency”, I use Ganz’s [2013/ 14] 
definition, namely, “A community organized to use its 
resources to act on behalf of their own interests.” We are 
all accustomed to a model in which mostly national- 
level activists and NGOs voice the Roma- related 
concerns of local communities. A power over as opposed 
to a power with model, as Ganz would say. This is not to 
say that there aren’t any challenges in organizing actual 
constituencies, nor that community organizing is the 
panacea in dismantling anti- Romani racism, but it is to 
say that there is power in building strong constituencies 
with a base at the local level. And organizing could be 
an effective tool.’
Magda offers her perspectives on the critical importance of 
local organizing as a bulwark against the vagaries of top- down 
government policies:
‘Based on my own mistakes and experiences, I think it 
is essential. It gives more power to people because then 
they don’t depend on donors, and can’t be put down by 
the government easily. I experienced first- hand how the 
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government put down Romani CRISS, in a moment when 
we were at a crossroads: either implement desegregation 
together with state schools ourselves or let the harmful 
phenomenon persist. We decided to partner with the MoE 
and one hundred schools on desegregation. And though 
these were state schools (under the MoE) implementing 
the desegregation activities, the MoE decided not to 
reimburse the costs for materials, which were considerable 
over two to three years. And although they initially 
approved 90 per cent of our work and expenses, later the 
state bureaucracy blocked us. Their decision was based 
on an unfounded “suspicion” of key activities not being 
implemented, although they were conducted by their own 
local bodies, that is, the state schools. This problem hasn’t 
been resolved since 2012, and RC is still fighting them 
in court and even after several recent positive decisions 
from the courts in Romania, as thousands of reports and 
pictures from the schools implementing the project prove 
the MoE wrong. We received a lot of political pressure 
and mistreatment from the MoE.
Community organizing has a better chance to be 
sustainable in the long run because it doesn’t depend on 
a call for proposals from a donor, but on the needs of 
local people and the power they generate for themselves. 
I  also think that for Roma, it’s not just a matter of 
violations of individual rights. So, if we are to go into 
“Western thinking” [liberal human rights framework] 
about imagining rights, it’s a very “white framework” 
because it was built on the idea that violations are 
perpetrated predominantly against individuals. But in 
the case of racialized minorities, such as Roma, it is also about 
structural racism, patterns of collective injustice, not just about 
violations of individual rights. The problems we racialized 
groups face are structural, so working on an anti- racist agenda 
is essential for communities of colour since we need to dismantle 
structural racism.
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Certainly, the individual rights framework remains 
mandatory. It’s important to be able to go to court, 
to be able to point out these patterns of structural 
discrimination. In the landmark case of education 
desegregation in Europe, D.H.  v.  the Czech Republic 
(2007), as well as in other cases, a few- dozen Romani 
children did receive remedies after the ECtHR [European 
Court of Human Rights] judgment found they had been 
unjustly placed in special schools. However, as Jacqueline 
and I wrote in our book on reparations [Bhabha and 
Matache, forthcoming], does $4000, the amount received 
by each of the 17 applicants in D.H. v. the Czech Republic, 
undo the lifelong impact of social, economic and emotional 
segregation in an educational system with an inferior curriculum? 
Moreover, how do we ensure justice and remedies for 
the large number of Romani children facing similar 
circumstances? A majority of them cannot go to court. 
The ECtHR accepted as evidence, and consequently as true, 
statistics showing the structural nature of segregation and 
demanded policy changes. But how do we ensure reparatory 
justice for collective injustice?’
Magda emphasizes the need for shifting strategy and 
making specific demands beyond a mere call for the 
acknowledgement of racism and the need for racial justice, 
suggesting the requirement for focused approaches to tackle 
structural problems:
‘I believe we need a strong advocacy movement that 
focuses on structural racism, wealth and resource 
inequalities, and on reparations. Much of our work 
at Harvard focuses on reparations, and we started 
collaborating with Romani advocates and scholars 
to emphasize the issue of reparations in knowledge 
production, advocacy and policy demands. We are also 
contributing to the strengthening of a global conversation 
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and a coalitional advocacy movement on reparations 
claims across historical and geographical spaces. Most 
importantly, we have set out several reparations strategies 
that are relevant in addressing the continuum of 
Roma collective injustices in Europe: (a) truth- telling; 
(b) memorializing resistance; (c) victim empowerment; 
(d) offender accountability; (e) restitution; (f) apology; 
(g) reparative compensation; and (h) legal measures [see 
Matache and Bhabha, 2020].’
Magda also reflects on how to build coalitions and the value 
of intersectional alliances with other marginalized groups:
‘What I learned in the US is that solidarity work takes a 
lot of effort and patience. In my work here at Harvard, 
including with Black Americans and Dalit people, first 
of all, what we are trying to do is to create friendships 
between our struggles. We are trying to understand each 
other, learn the history of the specific forms of oppression 
we face, the vocabulary we use in each movement, and 
support each other [a basis for building trust in each 
other]. It’s a slower process but sensitive to the specificities 
of each group and more sustainable in the longer term.’
Notably, Magda has developed a close collaborative relationship 
with Professor Cornel West, a renowned public intellectual 
and teacher on race and social justice at Harvard, and in a 
2018 piece in The Guardian, they discuss the historical wrongs 
perpetrated on their peoples:
The impetus to kill and chain Roma and African 
American bodies remains one of the appalling facets 
of how the criminalization and demonization of these 
peoples have historically translated into action.… From 
early on in their histories, Roma and African Americans 
crossed similar paths, as white policymakers continued 
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to employ similar tactics to maintain white normativity, 
social power, and privilege. (Matache and West, 2018)
Alongside West, Magda has been engaged in dialogue with 
Suraj Yengde, a Dalit scholar at Harvard, on solidarities between 
communities of colour and bridge- building between African- 
Americans, Dalits and Roma, and has been an interlocutor, 
along with Angela Kóczé, in Harvard debates on solidarity 
strategies, as well as the feminist of colour panel discussions 
with African- American, Dalit, Palestinian and Romani 
feminists. Here, a key goal is to forge solidarity networks with 
other oppressed minority groups, and our discussion raised the 
significance of creating an inter- community ‘safe place’ where 
you are free to contemplate on the oppression and anxiety you 
face, even in the midst of building a coalition:
‘With reference to “safe places”, often, the level of 
understanding of pain and harm in scholars belonging to 
historically oppressed groups is stronger, so I feel safer in 
having these conversations and learning from others. For 
me, it has been harder to build coalitions with some white 
feminists as it’s been frustrating the way in which some 
white feminists want to engage with Romani feminism. 
Some want to focus on intra- community issues, such as 
early marriages, while we believe their voices would have 
greater impact on issues of intersectional discrimination 
and racism, and on discrepancies in access to education, 
health and jobs between Roma and non- Romani 
women. But while that would have been more helpful 
for us, it would have been more uncomfortable for them. 
Romani scholarship and activism are not as mature as 
in other movements. For decades, we have borrowed 
and adjusted tactics from the US and other civil rights 
movements. We also adopted concepts and vocabulary 
from Black American scholarship  – and thousands of 
books have been written in this area, whereas with 
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Roma, we are still at the beginning, and much of the 
scholarship has been written by non- Roma. I believe that 
while we learn from other groups, we also need to keep in mind 
the specificities of our history and our people.’
Here, Nidhi emphasizes the importance of solidarity work 
among a diversity of groups, and reflects on racism in the US 
and her motivation for working in the field:
‘Professor Ian Hancock was a key influence upon me, and 
taking his course on “Gypsy Language and Culture” in 
1992 at the University of Texas at Austin greatly inspired 
me to learn about Roma and their human rights situation. 
Hancock, as my mentor, emphasized: “If you want to 
understand Roma, you’ll have to go to Europe.” And so 
I worked as a human rights researcher at the ERRC in the 
mid- 1990s, just as the Roma movement was becoming 
“formalized” with the emergence of “Roma rights” 
NGOs in Central Eastern Europe. Part of my desire to get 
involved stemmed from my own experiences of racism in 
the US. When my family immigrated from India to the 
US in the 1970s, the “N- word” was still a term of abuse 
used by white racists, and I experienced it myself as a 
child in Ohio. In Europe, as I began working with Roma 
and learning the Romani language, I discovered further 
connections between Romani culture and that of my 
birthplace, thereby embracing a broader understanding 
of “diaspora”.’
Magda also reflects upon the early days of the programme at 
Harvard with Professor Bhabha, the Director of Research at 
the FXB Center:
‘I first met Jackie in 2010 when she came to Romania 
and wanted to conduct participatory action research 
(PAR) with local Roma. Jackie and Arlan Fuller 
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(FXB Center’s director then) wanted to establish PAR 
initiatives with young people. At that time, RC was 
working with the International Research & Exchanges 
Board [IREX] on project development and identifying 
community needs with high school students, so it was 
a good fit with Harvard’s goals. Then, once I joined as 
a postdoctoral fellow in 2012, I suggested we organize 
the first of what was to become an “Annual Roma 
Conference” at Harvard, with the financial support 
of the OSCE (via Andrejz Mirga). In the first year of 
the conference in 2013, eminent panellists attended, 
including Nobel Prize- winning economist Amartya Sen 
and Jack Greenberg, a respected white American lawyer 
who had worked on Brown v. Board of Education, and is 
also a friend of RC.’
PAR gives those being researched a central role in the design 
of research, the collection of data and its interpretation, and 
ideally leads to change in their lives, as Magda explains: “Our 
participatory methodology challenged conventional Roma- 
related research, both in terms of structure (top- down, 
paternalistic research ‘on’ Roma) and focus, that is, the 
tendency to view obstacles to educational advancement 
particularly through the lens of economic deprivation and 
Roma ‘vulnerability’.”
Another project that Magda and Jackie are coordinating, 
along with Voice of Roma, a transatlantic Romani advocacy 
group established in 1996 by Sani Rifati that promotes 
Romani culture, is ‘The Romani Realities in the US’ study, 
which sheds light on key aspects of Romani- American life. 
It covers education, discrimination by law enforcement and 
identity issues, such as language and the ethnonyms American 
Roma prefer (that is, ‘Roma’, ‘G*psy’, ‘Romani people’). It 
promises to be path- breaking for the US because scholarship 
on American Roma written in the 1970s/ 80s was generally 
limited to anthropological works on particular communities. 
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The Harvard/ Voice of Roma study gives an overview of the 
contemporary situation of Roma across the US, raising issues 
of discrimination of Romani people based on ethnicity. One 
Romani- American entrepreneur familiar with the study 
offered us his perspective on its significance in June 2020:
‘It will have positive influences in two specific 
areas: access to education and to economic schemes for 
minority businesses. For too long, we have been labelled 
as being part of so- called criminal gangs. Some states still 
have “Gypsy Task force” police who monitor and racially 
profile us. When we go out to work as contractors (in 
construction and related trades) – and understand that 
95 per cent of us are self- employed and small business 
owners  – they often shut down our work, arrest us 
and, sometimes, we even get jail sentences for up to 
20 years. So, if the study helps to show that we are an 
ethnic minority, I’m hoping we will no longer be seen 
as “criminal gangs”, but as a genuine ethnic group in 
America, and be eligible for the government’s minority- 
owned business tax breaks in the future. And we would 
qualify for education scholarships too.’
Indeed, this could have a profound impact on how Romani 
people are perceived within US society, and plant the seed 
for rectifying centuries of mistrust and discrimination, as 
Romani- Americans would finally be part of the ‘American 
mosaic’ as a people whose culture and economic contributions 
are recognized and valued across society.
Advocacy in focus: Romani activists go to Washington and Ottawa
This section covers two parallel efforts on the recognition of 
Roma in North America. The first effort is that of the ‘DC 
Working Group’, which consists of a core group of Romani 
people and allies in the US, including: Magda; Nathan Mick, an 
 
ROMANI COMMUNITIES AND TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE
166
American Romanichal based in Kentucky who was previously 
a congressional aide and is active in Republican Party circles; 
Erika Schlager, counsellor- at- law with the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)/ Helsinki 
Commission (she has been actively following Romani affairs 
since the 1990s); Jim Goldston, a legal advocate and director of 
the Open Society Institute’s Justice Initiative; Professor Ethel 
Brooks, who, until recently, represented Roma and Sinti at the 
US Holocaust Memorial Council and is herself a transatlantic 
activist and scholar; Dr Petra Gelbart, a Czech- American 
Romani activist; Jud Nirenberg and David Meyers of the US 
State Department; and Kristin Raeesi and Professor Carol 
Silverman, activists with the Voice of Roma.2 Initially, in the 
DC Working Group, Magda proposed a resolution to recognize 
an annual ‘Roma Heritage Month’ but, ultimately, the group 
decided pragmatically on a congressional resolution for the 
recognition of Romani American heritage and International 
Roma Day (8 April), the Romani Holocaust Memorial (2 
August) and the slavery of Roma.
The next stage was the most crucial one, that of lobbying 
congressional leaders and gaining their sponsorship. American 
Rom Nathan Mick worked to enlist bipartisan support for 
the Bill, and was able to get several co- sponsors from the 
Republican Party, such as Representative Steve Watkins of 
Kansas and Senator Roger Wicker of Missouri. Representatives 
Alcee L. Hastings (D- FL), Steve Watkins (R- KS) and Andy 
Barr (R- KY) introduced H.Res.292, Celebrating the heritage 
of Romani Americans, a resolution that marks 8 April 2019 
as International Roma Day, honours the culture, history 
and heritage of the Romani people, and raises awareness of 
the widespread human rights abuses and discrimination that 
Romani people continue to face. Senator Benjamin Cardin 
(Democrat from Maryland) and Senator Roger Wicker 
(Republican from Mississippi) introduced Senate Resolution 
141, A  Resolution Celebrating the heritage of Romani 




Congressional leaders Hastings, Watkins, Wicker and Cardin 
issued the following statement:
Roma enrich the fabric of our nation. They have 
been part of every wave of European migration to 
the United States since the colonial period, tying 
our country to Europe and building the transatlantic 
bond. Through this resolution, we celebrate our shared 
history and applaud the efforts to promote transnational 
cooperation among Roma at the historic First World 
Romani Congress on April 8, 1971. (US House of 
Representatives, 2019)
Further advocacy efforts in Congress were coordinated by 
Victoria Rios, an American Romani activist from a renowned 
Flamenco music family in Spain, who spearheaded a letter- 
writing campaign supporting the adoption of the resolution. 
Activists and scholars, including from Voice of Roma, and other 
American and European Romani people, also participated. The 
resolution is yet to be adopted by the US Congress.
With respect to Canada, it is critical to point out the 
common roots of structural racism with its neighbour to the 
south. Black Canadian writer Desmond Cole elucidates:
They are both countries dominated by settler colonial 
white governments and white majority populations. 
They are both places that displaced and killed Indigenous 
people to take their land. And so the legacies of 
colonialism are the same in both countries – not identical, 
but those legacies carry on in our institutions today. And 
just like the US, our police forces were designed to do 
these things – to catch slaves who were running away, 
to push Indigenous peoples off of their territories. And 
those police functions … and the institutions are the 
same … giving us the same outcomes you would expect. 
(NPR, 2020)
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The history of modern Romani activism in Canada can be 
traced to the seminal work of Quebec- born writer, activist and 
linguist Ronald Lee. In the 1970s, he assisted Romani refugees 
and migrants from communist regimes in central and eastern 
Europe as well as Yugoslavia. Along with renowned linguist, 
scholar and activist Professor Ian Hancock (OBE), American 
Kalderash Romani leader John Tene and actor Yul Brynner, Lee 
was an integral part of the International Romani Union (IRU) 
delegation that successfully petitioned the United Nations in 
New York City in July 1978 for NGO Status Category III for 
the IRU; this was granted in 1979, and then upgraded in 1993 
to Category II status (Acton, 2017; Lee, 2018).
Then, from 1989 to 1990, he assisted Romani asylum 
seekers from eastern Europe, going on to establish the Roma 
Community and Advocacy Centre in Toronto in 1997, as well 
as the Western Canadian Romani Alliance in Vancouver the 
subsequent year, leaving behind a rich legacy for a younger 
generation of Romani- Canadian activists to build upon 
(Lee, 2018).
Similar to contemporary Romani activism in the US, key 
issues – such as raising the visibility of the rights of Romani 
asylum seekers and immigrants to Canada, and the recognition 
of the Roma Holocaust  – have been addressed by Dafina 
Savić of the NGO Romanipe and professional journalist Lena 
Savić, both of whom are involved with transatlantic anti- racist 
work from their base in Montreal, Quebec. Dafina Savić, a 
former United Nations Minority Fellow, in her testimony 
from 11 June 2019 before the Subcommittee on International 
Human Rights Committee of the Canadian Parliament, 
recounts the work of Romanipe3:
Securing rights for Romani refugees has been a priority 
for us, so the elimination of Bill C- 31 … or at least the 
revision of the criteria used to determine what does and 
does not constitute a ‘safe country’ is definitely a priority. 




at least as a first step, to speak out about the very gross 
violations that Roma are facing. When Roma are being 
killed, the world is actually silent. So, I  think Canada 
could take a lead on responsibility in this. (Government 
of Canada, 2019, testimony by D. Savić)
Here, she outlines the importance of bridge- building with 
other oppressed groups in Canada:
Seven years ago, I founded a not- for- profit organization 
… and [we] built collaborations with many different 
groups who have been victims of genocide. In the spirit 
of standing in solidarity, but also in action with those 
groups, we want to acknowledge our solidarity with 
people who have presented before this Committee, 
namely Indigenous peoples as well as the people of 
Burundi and the Rohingya in Myanmar. (Government 
of Canada, 2019, testimony by D. Savić)
Dafina Savić then offers her views on Romani persecution in 
Europe through segregation, extreme poverty and anti- Romani 
racism, problems exacerbated by the rise of the radical right in 
recent decades, and that compel many Roma to seek asylum 
in Canada:
How has the Canadian government reacted to this? 
Unfortunately, in 2012 under the previous government, a 
lot of Roma were coming to Canada to seek asylum and 
seek protection from the rise of the neo- Nazi movement. 
This was just in 2012, when the far-right reached its 
peak. Actually, in a village in Hungary, six Roma were 
killed, including a six- year- old boy, as a result of these 
attacks by the far-right. A large number of Roma came 
to Canada to seek asylum. The response of the government at 
the time was unfortunately to repeat that rhetoric of criminality, 
accusing Roma of being bogus refugees undeserving of Canadian 
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protection. (Government of Canada, 2019, testimony 
before Parliament by D. Savić. Emphases added)
To European Roma, these actions may seem modest but, 
in fact, this is path- breaking for North American Romani 
advocacy because it strengthens the official recognition of 
Romani people in a part of the world where Roma often 
survive by being ‘invisible’ and not drawing attention to 
themselves. Moreover, the earlier case studies highlight the 
efficacy of transatlantic Romani organizing and leading 
national campaigns that mobilize support from US and 
Canadian lawmakers by combining the synergies of activists 
in Europe and North America, and are a harbinger for greater 
collaboration.4
Lela Savić, as a journalist and public intellectual, who also 
leads the Quebec chapter of the Canadian Journalists of Color 
(CJC),5 has played an important role in lifting the voices of 
Romani people in Canada through her community radio 
initiative and media work. Here, Savić (2019, emphases added) 
explains the complexities of minority visibility and inclusion 
within mainstream media:
It’s not enough to have Romani people enter mainstream media, 
if you don’t change the system, nothing is going to change. 
I have an Indigenous friend who is a reporter, and she 
said, “it’s not enough that I’m an Indigenous reporter, 
because you are putting all the pressure of decolonizing 
on me, you’re putting all the pressure of racism on 
me.… I entered mainstream media, and now I’m doing 
conferences on how to decolonize the media”.
So, yes, I think it’s important that we Roma enter the 
system, but there is a price to be paid for this, as Fatima 
Khemilat (2014) suggests. And she cites the French political 
scientist Jean- Francois Bayart, who says, “dominated 
people seldom arrive at penetrating the social structures 





And she makes a distinction between ‘screen’ intellectual 
and ‘resistant intellectuals’, whereby those who enter 
the social structures that oppress them, often become a 
‘screen’ of tokenization, thereby reproducing systems of 
power, while those that resist this tokenization, challenge 
them. So, the question for Roma is “do you uphold 
white supremacy or dismantle it?” When you uphold 
white supremacy, you get rewarded, but when you try 
to dismantle it, there is a price to be paid.
So, what happens when you have the ‘Roma elite’ 
entering the system? What ends up happening is that in 
order to survive, you will end up whitening your speech … 
so that you don’t make the white person feel bad, and 
that’s white fragility actually. White fragility is the idea that 
white people feel bad all the time whenever you dare to say how 
oppressed you are, you dare to take up space. Within Romani 
studies and Romani activism, are we dismantling white 
(gadjo) supremacy?
The critical race work of Magda Matache, Lela Savić and 
Dafina Savić points to a new approach within Romani 
advocacy in North America and internationally, one that 
places a central emphasis on positionality (in terms of Romani 
‘voice’) and intersectionality within anti- racist work (see Chapter 
Eight by Kóczé and Trehan). Within their advocacy, they also 
harness community initiatives and solidarity building to foster 
the recognition of Roma at the national policy level – the 
recognition of both Roma and their struggles within North 
American political spaces – but also a transatlantic awareness 
of the struggles of Romani communities back in Europe and 
those of oppressed groups globally.
The work of anti- racism and intersectional solidarity
Through the rich exchanges between activists, scholars and 
scholar- activists, we arrive at a few insights as regards the 
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question ‘What is to be done?’ in terms of dismantling racism 
and future organizing within the Romani movement. Areas 
of action include genuine and substantive participation, 
community organizing, enhanced representation, and reducing 
the power differential with gadje, as outlined earlier.
The ideas generated from Magda’s experience with critical 
race activism and strategic solidarity development in both 
Europe and the US – with groups such as African- Americans 
and Dalits of India  – are woven into this narrative of 
transatlantic Romani activism to highlight the core potential 
of global anti- racist alliances. Transatlantic activism is enriched 
by creating diverse coalitions of Roma and other activists of 
colour to harness the power of intersectional solidarity (the 
‘together we rise’ ethos) for recognition, reparations and anti- 
racist policies. The synergy and lessons learned from initiatives 
in Europe and North America take on new significance given 
the increasingly visible presence of authoritarian (white) 
nationalist politics in the US, which is further polarizing the 
citizenry along identity lines.
Regardless of the strategy chosen by activists – organizing, 
protest, litigation or policy advocacy – they should all become 
integral parts of the anti- racist tactical repertoire of a coherent 
and strong Romani anti- racist movement that embraces not 
only individual rights, but also economic, environmental, 
social and reparatory justice. In developing a tactical repertoire, 
the global context needs to be considered. In the summer of 
2020, it is evident that President Trump has sought to exploit 
fears and tensions triggered by the COVID- 19 pandemic, the 
catastrophic economic downturn and structural racism, all in 
an effort to galvanize his base in order to win re- election in 
November 2020.
Yet, in response, a diverse and transformational anti- racist 
movement is also growing. Institutionalized racism, as reflected 
in the brutal murders of African- Americans Breonna Taylor 
and George Floyd at the hands of police, spawned a series of 
Black Lives Matter (BLM) solidarity demonstrations across 
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the globe (Younge, 2020). Roma active in civil society are 
emphasizing the direct relevance of the BLM movement as a 
model for Roma to organize against police brutality against 
Roma (including murders) over the past few years in Europe 
(Romea.cz, 2020).
Moreover, during the COVID- 19 pandemic crisis, activists 
in Europe point out that racists and nationalists have begun 
to resort to violent, supremacist tactics. As Matache, Leaning 
and Bhabha (2020) argue:
In the past two months, from Ukraine to Spain, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia and Serbia, state representatives, 
police, journalists, and public figures have propagated 
inflammatory rhetoric, labelling Roma as sources of 
coronavirus contamination. Bulgaria has instituted 
discriminatory roadblocks and police checkpoints to 
target Roma individuals; in Romania, some local stores 
are allegedly prohibiting the entry of Roma. They 
all exploit a false narrative to disseminate irrational 
fear: Roma are transmitters of the virus.
Thus, perhaps one of the most important and immediate points 
of intersection and solidarity between the US and Europe is 
the fight for anti- racist policies and against white supremacist 
nationalism. Today, a new generation of critical Romani 
activists and thinkers in Europe are exploring ideas centred 
on intersectionality and structural racism, and wonder what 
lessons may be learned from similar approaches that groups 
like BLM (established in 2013) are taking.
However, a remarkable dissonance can be found in the 
responses of some European leaders who, while pointing 
out flaws in the US system, hasten to praise Europe for its 
social inclusion. Margaritis Schinas, the Vice President of the 
European Commission, stated that Europe had better systems 
for social inclusion, protection and universal health care than 
the US (Barigazzi, 2020). He also claimed that:
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there is also a European tradition for protection of 
minorities, we have less issues than they have in the 
[United] States…. [This] doesn’t mean that we don’t have 
some way still to go in terms of fostering equality and 
inclusion, income distribution – all these are issues that 
Europe has still to address. (Barigazzi, 2020)
Such assessments of the treatment of minority groups in Europe 
are simply not true; rather, they are rather illusory (Barigazzi, 
2020). Moreover, such statements underplay or refuse to 
acknowledge the reality of structural anti- Romani racism 
in Europe as underscored earlier – particularly during these 
troubled but transformational times – raising concerns about 
Europe’s commitment to repudiate the current trajectory of 
white supremacist nationalism in the US.
Nonetheless, there are a few positive signs towards 
recognizing structural racism in Europe. In June 2020, Ursula 
von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, 
endorsed a discussion on racism within the College of the EU 
Commission, and stated: “Because each of us has a role to play. 
This starts with examining ourselves, our unconscious biases 
and the privileges that we take for granted.” In addition, the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution on the anti- racism 
protests following the death of George Floyd, indicating a 
renewed desire to tackle racism and discrimination within 
Europe itself (European Parliament, 2020).
The work of transatlantic Romani activists and interlocutors 
based in North America represents a sea change in the 
movement, with clear positions on intersectionality and 
solidarity but also an unwavering courage in challenging racist 
discourses and norms wherever they encounter them. They are 
engaging in a critique of structural racism and the responses 
to it, and this presents a far greater challenge to the status quo.
Today, Roma, minority ethnic groups and other minority 
groups, such as the LGBTQI community and the differently 
abled, as well as those who believe in democracy, are engaged 
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in an epic and monumental battle against racism. We live 
in critical times but can also seek inspiration from a new 
generation of Romani public intellectuals in the US and 
Europe who believe in anti- racist work and fight and hope 
for anti- racist societies and policies.
Notes
 1 See: http:// en.srbijaupokretu.org/ who- are- we/ 
 2 See: http:// www.voiceofroma.com/ 
 3 For more on Romanipe’s activities, see: https:// romanipe.wordpress.com/ 
 4 Indeed, recent efforts by Romani survivors, organizations and individuals 
has resulted in the official recognition of the Holocaust of the Romani 
people by the Government of Canada. August 2 will now be marked as 
an official day of remembrance, and Canada joins Germany, Hungary, 
Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic and the EU in officially recognizing 
the Romani Genocide (the US is yet to do so). August 2 commemorates 
the day in 1944 when 4,300 Roma and Sinti prisoners who remained in 
the ‘Gypsy camp’ inside Auschwitz- Birkenau were brutally murdered by 
Nazis and their collaborators. Recent estimates suggest that across Europe, 
over 500,000 Roma perished during WWII (https:// romanipe.wordpress.
com/ 2020/ 08/ 19/ a- historical- and- long- awaited- moment- the- government- 
of- canada- declares- august- 2nd- as- an- official- day- of- commemoration- of- 
the- romani- genocide/ ).
 5 See: www.cjoc.net
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‘When they enter, we all enter …’:   
envisioning a New Social Europe from a 
Romani feminist perspective
Angéla Kóczé and Nidhi Trehan
Introduction
Epistemic violence, that is, violence exerted against or 
through knowledge, is probably one of the key elements 
in any process of domination. It is not only through the 
construction of exploitative economic links or the control 
of the politico- military apparatuses that domination 
is accomplished, but also, and … most importantly 
through the construction of epistemic frameworks that 
legitimize and enshrine those practices of domination. 
(Galván- Álvarez, 2010)
Romani peoples have been constituted as political subjects 
for centuries through forms of epistemic violence, racialized 
political and economic exclusion, and cultural erasure. Roma 
and their life worlds have almost always been the objects of 
non- Romani researchers and scholars; thus, Romani people 
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themselves. Usually, they have been used exclusively as 
informants or authentic voices to legitimize non- Romani 
academic expertise. From the ‘Gypsylorist’ tradition to the 
‘benevolent scholars’ of today, knowledge of Romani peoples 
and communities was recorded and interpreted by non- Roma 
according to the prevailing ideologies and prejudices embedded 
in their world view. This was symptomatic of the uncritical, 
unequal power relationship between a people who are studied 
and those studying them (Matache, 2017).
As this body of knowledge expanded, replete with 
various stereotypes effectively reproduced over time, the 
(de- )authorization of Romani knowledge strengthened and 
contributed to the dehumanization of Roma (see Trehan, 
2009). A significant body of academic work on Roma can be 
classified as what critical race theorist Sylvia Wynter (2003) 
defines as ‘racialization’, a classifying mechanism within a 
hierarchical relationship that identifies social groups as human, 
subhuman and non- human. Gradually, the stigma attached 
to Romani identity hardened, and the labelling of Roma as 
the enduring ‘European Other’ took hold in the collective 
imaginarium (Lee, 2000).
From a critical perspective, knowledge production on Roma 
is a classifying mechanism that provides a specific lens and 
theoretical framework to understand the situation of Roma. 
One dominant approach in academic knowledge production, 
favoured by linguists, anthropologists and folklorists, narrowly 
emphasizes the language distinctiveness and the ‘immutable’ 
cultural singularity of Roma as an ethnic group, and this 
strengthens their racialization (Acton, 2016). Another dominant 
scholarly approach is the constructivist one, which challenges 
the narratives of ‘Gypsy studies’ mentioned earlier and contends 
that it racializes Roma as non- Europeans (with ‘Oriental’ 
origins based on linguistic evidence). Kóczé (2020: 3) explains 
the limitations of these hegemonic theoretical frameworks, 
suggesting that both are at some level problematic:
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While the first, [the] language and culture- centric 
approach ([whether] consciously or unconsciously), uses 
socially constructed categories that inevitably do form 
the basis of social identities, the second school of thought 
aims to eliminate any kind of ethnicized or racialized 
term at the expense of neglecting and obscuring Roma 
identity and its interplay with structural racism.
In the midst of our current ecological, economic, social 
and political upheaval, which can be understood as a crisis 
of neoliberal capitalism or ‘precarity capitalism’ (Azmanova, 
2020), Romani people have become (re- )politicized and 
(re- )instrumentalized through the constructions of ‘Gypsies’/ 
‘Gypsy criminality’ and the ‘Gypsy menace’. This has eerie 
parallels to 20th- century Europe, during the rise of eugenics 
and Nazi ‘race science’, which led to the genocidal murders and 
traumatization of Romani communities across the continent, 
culminating in the Holocaust (Friedlander, 1995). In this 
sharp escalation of the racialization of Roma, a majority of 
progressive scholars have been unable to articulate the centrality 
of race/ racialization in the production of structural violence in 
neoliberal economies. Furthermore, they have often reinforced 
the ‘colour- blind’/ universalist ideologies that masked the 
enduring structural racism and violence against Roma. All 
too often in research studies, racism is interpreted in a very 
narrow sense as an individual moral wrongdoing – as opposed 
to being structural in nature – that is generally committed by 
racist, extreme right- wing people. So, the lack of a sociological 
imagination à la C. Wright Mills, conceptualized as ‘the vivid 
awareness of the relationship between experience and the wider 
society’ (Mills, 1959:  5), contributed (perhaps unwittingly) 
to the invisible- izing and silencing of racialization that became a 
powerful weapon in the hands of ethno- nationalists and the 
extreme right, who tacitly instrumentalized anti- Romani 
racism to enhance the structurally embedded neoliberal 
racial order. Building upon the path- breaking work of Black 
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scholars, such as Oliver Cox, Cedric J. Robinson and others, 
who critiqued Marxism for failing to account for the racial 
character of capitalism (Kelley, 2017), it is suggested that 
neoliberal racial capitalism gradually unfolded in East Central 
Europe and South- Eastern Europe after 1989, imposing a 
systemic condition of crisis that rendered and normalized 
the vast majority of disenfranchised Roma as ‘subhuman’ and 
‘non- human’ (Kóczé, forthcoming). Moreover, the structural 
conditions of neoliberal capitalism forced them to live on the 
edge of societies, where social, material and environmental 
destruction escalated (Kóczé and van Baar, 2020).
Arguably, these violent epistemological, knowledge- 
making legacies led to the subaltern, racialized position that 
Roma occupy even to this day, a position that leaves Romani 
communities particularly vulnerable and emanates from the 
belief that we (the Roma) cede to the non- problematized 
‘epistemic authority’ and uncritically accept whatever is being 
done for our ‘safety’ or well- being. Despite the emergence 
of a tiny group of Romani intellectuals who had achieved 
some standing, particularly in post- socialist countries, through 
education from the 1950s onwards, many among them 
continued to be denigrated, infantilized and marginalized as a 
result of structural racism underpinned by epistemic violence, 
that is, violence rooted at the source of knowledge production on Roma 
(Spivak, 1988). Indeed, as Trehan and Matache emphasize 
in Chapter Seven of this volume, the formal adoption of 
civil and political rights that promote legal equality does 
not necessarily ameliorate structures of embedded social and 
economic oppression.
A Romani feminist perspective: the premise and promise  
of entering together
It is never just about racism, classism or sexism; it is always the 
combination of several oppressions that create intersectional 
obstacles for Romani women. Intersectionality is an analytical 
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concept introduced by Black feminists in the US in the 1970– 
80s and applied and conceptualized in East Central Europe by 
contemporary Romani feminists to address the complex reality 
of Romani women (Kóczé, 2009). In this way, Romani women 
are similar to other racialized groups whose complex problems 
are not captured by single- issue social movements. Each of 
these movements elevated one category and eliminated others. 
For instance, the Romani rights movement takes up the issue 
of ethnicity/ identity of Roma, women’s or feminist movements 
focus on the issue of gender, the LGBTQI movement focuses 
on sexuality, and union movements emphasize class. Since 
Romani women are simultaneously racialized (dehumanized 
and inferiorized) as Roma, female (with a particular sexual 
identity) and also as workers (usually underemployed and/ 
or unemployed), the singular focus on inequality does not 
therefore capture the complex, lived, racialized social reality.
Intersectionality emerged as an analytical tool to explain 
these multifaceted challenges faced by Romani women. 
Confronting multiple forms of discrimination rooted in 
gendered and racialized power, both within the community 
internally and at the societal level, often leads us to suspend 
our rights in the name of an illusory ‘scientific objectivity’ 
as victimized, racialized and passive female bodies who 
are de- authorized to produce knowledge. By employing 
intersectionality as an alternative explanation, Romani feminist 
scholars transcended the limitations of existing scholarship, 
using a conceptual language to reveal the racialized, classed and 
gendered intersected oppressions of Roma at the structural, 
discursive and biographical levels (Kóczé et al, 2018).
Furthermore, we offer the following critiques and insights:
• We need to understand why existing theoretical frameworks 
do not explain the actual lived experiences of a majority 
of Romani women (and men), which are produced by 
the structures of neoliberal racial capitalism. The ‘lived 
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experiences’ of Roma must be connected to the structures 
of the broader political economy.
• Too often, Romani people still feature as informants, 
ethnographic spectacles, NGO experts (instead of scholars) 
or activist- scholars whose work is not recognized as an 
important contribution in its own right. The way forward 
is to critically reflect on the hierarchical nature of academic 
knowledge production, as we have begun to do at the 
Central European University Romani studies programme. 
This uneasy process entails critical dialogue among Romani 
and non- Romani scholars, activist- scholars, activists, 
policymakers and those who implement policies, as well as 
those who have opportunities to create new knowledge- 
making avenues and horizons that were hitherto structurally 
and epistemologically denied to Roma (Kóczé, 2018; 
Trehan, 2018).
• Ultimately, disruptive epistemological inquiries lead us 
to diverse perspectives on Romani identity and culture, 
and Romani life worlds, with the promise of the creation 
of knowledge that liberates, emancipates and acts as a 
counter to epistemic violence. There is an urgent need to 
‘decolonize’ Romani studies, as well as to challenge the 
structural conditions of intersectional racism and sexism, 
which constantly (re)produce and perpetuate existing racial 
and gender hierarchies and inequalities. As Yarimar Bonilla, 
a scholar of post- colonial Caribbean anthropology urges, ‘we 
need to decolonize decolonization … because clearly the 
formulas that exist today … have only served to reproduce 
the inequalities of empire’ (quoted in Jobson, 2020).
• One of the central critiques raised by Romani feminist 
scholars is about the non- Romani male domination of the 
genealogy of knowledge production (Brooks, 2012).
• An ‘engaged anthropology’ encourages meaningful 
collaboration with the people who are the objects of study 
in order to generate social change that seeks to combat 
the mechanisms of oppressive hierarchization (Beck and 
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Maida, 2013). Feminist intersectional research aims to be 
non- hierarchical; however, in academic research protocols, 
there continue to be hierarchical dimensions nonetheless.
• Instead of exposing the racialization of Roma and the 
mechanism(s) of structural racism, ‘segregationists’ and 
‘assimilationists’, per Ibram X.  Kendi, attr ibute the 
oppression of Roma to their culture (see Chapter Seven by 
Trehan and Matache). This continues to have a corrosive 
effect on contemporary structures of thought, crucially, 
even among some Roma, who have internalized these 
representations (Acton, 2016).
• Focusing only on Romani culture and marginality, or internal 
dynamics, without an understanding of the broader processes 
of capitalist violent race- making and ‘othering’ in various 
spheres of society, conceals the scales and manifestations of 
racial discourses and practices, and hides or disguises the 
racialized and gendered forces of hierarchical domination 
in European societies. The gendered racialization of Roma 
is a process of ‘othering’ that has profoundly shaped and 
continues to shape the history, politics, economic structure 
and culture of European societies.
• The current ‘colour- blind’ and constructivist sociological 
approach that is centred around class at the expense of 
gendered racialization in European academic discourse 
camouflages the structural racial and gender violence against 
Roma embedded in a hidden ‘racial contract’.
• Emerging critical Romani studies, as envisioned by a fragile 
minority of Romani and non- Romani scholars, must 
critique discourses that privilege culturally loaded ethnicity 
as the only or primary paradigm that frames Romani lived 
social experiences today.
• In contrast, epistemic privilege is socially more complex and 
tied to opportunities that are structured by gender, race, class, 
sexuality, citizenship, social networks  – even institutional 
belonging – and so forth. What we mean by this concept is 
the privilege of those who produce knowledge and who are 
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assumed to have the right to do so. In other words, no one 
questions a white male in their production of knowledge 
today (even on Roma), but if a Romani woman is engaged 
in this task, then she has to prove her ‘worth’.
• A significant number of Romani activist- scholars and 
intellectuals from Central and South- Eastern Europe, who 
do not circulate in the ‘Anglosphere’, have limited access 
to English- language resources, funds and scholarships for 
higher education, and when their work is published, it often 
remains marginal or invisible (see Oprea, 2006).
• Activist scholarship provides us with a unique opportunity 
to learn from errors and to recognize the highly contextual, 
political and conditional nature of knowledge production 
within social science, as well as challenge the commodification 
and marketization of higher education (Ryder, 2018).
Yes, we scholars and activists engaged with Romani life 
worlds and producing literature in this discipline know that 
anti- Romani racism has dangerous consequences for the 
social fabric of Europe, but to what extent is our knowledge 
production, our epistemological enterprise, challenging the ideology, 
conditions and structures that do not validate the knowledge of the 
racialized community? As conducting research in this field has 
political ramifications  – and scholars in socialist countries 
during the time of Soviet hegemony were certainly aware 
of this  – it requires sensitivity to the ethical and political 
dimensions of knowledge creation on Romani life worlds 
(Kovats, 2001).
Romani studies scholars must tackle a number of 
epistemological dilemmas if the goal is to contribute to 
scholarship that would both challenge and overcome 
the inherent disciplinary ‘silos’ of the ivory tower and 
the hegemonic bias(es) of the status quo, including the gaze 
of the intrepid, but often myopic, ‘gatekeepers’ of the field 
(scholars who define the boundaries of the discipline). One 
of the most pernicious outcomes of gatekeeping, which runs 
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counter to the spirit of free inquiry and healthy academic 
debates within the field, continues to be silencing. Voices, 
insights and constructive criticism deemed to be less valuable 
are muzzled (And scholars who are women of colour are 
intimately aware of this!); often, it is the silencing of ideas and 
philosophies that run counter to the dominant ideology of 
the day. In her classic piece ‘Marginality as a site of resistance’, 
American activist and feminist author bell hooks (1990: 341– 
3) reminds us of the position of the subaltern, who is almost 
always objectified by the gatekeeper- cum- colonizer:
[There is] no need to hear your voice, when I can talk 
about you better than you can speak about yourself. 
No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your 
pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it 
back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a 
way that it has become mine, my own.… I am still [the] 
colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are now at the 
center of my talk.
Europa, carpe diem! Romani feminism, a New Social Europe and justice 
for Roma
In this troubled neoliberal capitalist era, we cannot postpone the 
recognition of the chronic racialized and gendered dispossession 
of Roma, which – generationally and even to this day – has 
taken a huge material and emotional toll on those who are 
living in the midst of a devastating situation. Europe must 
allocate resources to compensate for the historical injustices 
of Roma! Europe must change the perverse, competitive 
distribution of public goods that benefits and rewards those 
who are structurally well positioned and further disadvantages 
the most marginalized.
This piece offered a critical theoretical contribution that 
re- imagines a radically transformed Social Europe by using 
the language and insights of Romani feminists who challenge 
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the intersected gendered, racial and classed violence not 
as merely coincidental, but rather as a systemic condition of 
neoliberal racial capitalism (Kóczé, forthcoming). If we want to 
re- envision Europe, neither the feminist nor the anti- racist 
Romani movements can afford to ignore the intersectional 
lived experiences of the vast majority of Romani women who 
are in a continuous life- and- death struggle for survival and 
emancipation (Vincze, 2014). Following Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 
(1989) insights, we must centre our intersectional ‘politics of 
re- envisioning’ on those who are in the most disadvantaged 
situation. The reason is that if we start to develop a language/ 
politics that resonates with the situation of the lived experiences 
of the most disadvantaged among us, then this will provide 
the critical basis for solidarity and collective action across 
European society. As Crenshaw (1989: 167) explains, the goal 
is to ‘facilitate the inclusion of [the most] marginalized groups 
for whom it can be said: “When they enter, we all enter.” ’ 
The current political landscape in Europe is replete with 
political minefields and traps, offering rather illusory notions 
of inclusion and ambiguous answers to overcome the social 
exclusion of Roma.
We want to denounce all manifestations of historically 
accumulated structural, racialized and gendered justice that 
are not accounted for in the (current) plethora of technical, 
depoliticized policy recommendations and project- based, 
piecemeal solutions offered by the European Union and its 
member states (see Chapter Two). We want to reclaim our 
epistemic authority, our critical analysis and our theorization 
(based on the lived experiences, the situation on the ground, 
at the root level) in order to sharpen the vision of systemic 
racialized and gendered decay in Europe.
In this critical chapter, we have discussed how epistemic 
violence continues to reinforce the structural oppression of 
Roma, and we have suggested ways in which the deep- seated 
problems of epistemic violence and injustice vis- à- vis Roma 
can be disrupted by an emerging body of critical Romani 
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scholarship, which would become the basis for a radical 
redressal of one of Europe’s most pernicious wrongs. Indeed, 
there is now a nucleus of such scholars at the CEU in Budapest/ 
Vienna and at Harvard University’s FXB Center for Health and 
Human Rights, as well as in other institutions and platforms 
across the globe (museums such as the one in Brno in the Czech 
Republic, cultural centres such as European Roma Institute 
for Arts and Culture [ERIAC] in Berlin, RomArchives and 
so forth).
Black feminist epistemologies also offer us a pathway 
towards achieving emancipatory knowledge (Collins, 2006). 
As mentioned earlier and in Chapter Seven by Trehan and 
Matache, the strong parallels between Romani and African- 
American experiences of oppression are undeniable, and the 
quest for justice for Roma has been deeply influenced by the 
work of US civil rights leaders, from Ida B. Wells, to Martin 
Luther King Jr, to the Black Lives Matter movement of today.
Inspired by the poignant article of civil rights lawyer and 
legal scholar Michelle Alexander (2020), ‘America this is your 
chance’, after the brutal murder of George Floyd forced the US 
to embark upon a national reckoning, we too exhort Europe to 
seize the day and face courageously its racial history and racial 
present. European public intellectuals and politicians continue 
to deny and/ or underplay the depth of anti- Romani racism 
embedded within their societies. That is why we welcome 
the report of the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), 
‘A persisting concern’, officially recognizing, for the first time, 
that ‘anti- Gypsyism … [is] a key structural driver of Roma 
exclusion that undermines the process intended to decrease 
Roma deprivation’ (FRA, 2018:  8, emphases original). As 
Director of the FRA Michael O’Flaherty emphasizes:
the Roma population continue to struggle with 
challenges we like to believe no longer exist in the EU. 
Homes without running water or electricity, lack of 
health insurance, and even hunger continue to be realities 
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for unacceptable shares of the Roma community in one 
of the richest regions in the world. (FRA, 2018: 3)
Acknowledging that anti- Romani racism underpins Romani 
exclusion is the first step in initiating systemic transformation 
to rectify structural violence in Europe. Indeed, racial 
profiling, police abuse and violence, and the disproportionate 
incarceration of Roma are only the tip of the iceberg; all 
require urgent redressal by EU institutions and member 
states so that the long- awaited promise of justice for Roma 
is ultimately achieved.
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Afterword: solidarity and equity in a 
New Social Europe
Romeo Franz
Europe has over 12 million Roma. About six million of them 
live in the European Union (EU) and just over three quarters 
live in extreme poverty. Denying the right to a decent life, 
for at least 4.5 million EU citizens, is not just a matter of 
social rights, but also a question of how the EU treats its 
most important resource  – its people. Roma are a young 
population – indeed, 40 per cent are children and adolescents. 
If member states can ensure equal access to quality services, 
including early childhood development and education services, 
health, housing, and employment, just imagine the positive 
difference this investment could make! Not only would the 
Roma improve their lives, but it would also allow them to 
contribute fully to the future of the EU and the countries in 
which they live.
In this context, the EU and its member states must be aware, 
finally, of the potential of the Romani contribution to the 
future of the European project, to its social and economic 
development. For example, the good health of the Romani 
population and access to quality education and infrastructure 
(clean drinking water, adequate public transport to rural 
areas and information technology connectivity) are essential 
preconditions for the full participation of Roma in the social 
life and labour market of their country. Take the example of 
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Romani workers in the factories and farms of many Western 
European countries. They are playing a key role in supporting 
the economies of these counties, even if for many of them, 
the working conditions are not so friendly. Sometimes, their 
salaries are not, at all, expressing the value of the amount of 
work they do every single day. They live in overcrowded rented 
houses, two or three families, with children, struggling in a 
foreign country for a better life. They are not so visible, but 
they are some of the heroes of our day.
To make the equal treatment of Romani people a reality, 
there is a strong need for a post- 2020 EU Strategic Framework 
for the Equality, Inclusion and Participation of people with 
Romani background, with a binding character for the member 
states in terms of Romani inclusion goals to be reached. 
Political support when racism against different minority 
groups is rising sharply is a key point for the inclusion of 
Romani people. Major mobilization of key stakeholders 
in exploring the opportunities around the upcoming EU 
presidencies is needed to ensure political commitment for a 
post- 2020 potential binding policy. Following this approach, 
adequate funding would be allocated and it could lead to a 
more successful implementation of the national strategies or 
action plans, especially at regional and local levels. The EU 
must link its political and financial priorities to priorities 
regarding the inclusion of people with Romani background. 
When local and national budgets are developed, the inclusion 
of people with Romani background will be among the 
priorities. More efficient and strengthened monitoring and 
oversight mechanisms must be developed, and the European 
Commission and member states must ensure that the funds 
allocated are properly spent and not misused if the strategic 
framework is to deliver on its goals.
To achieve this in an effective way, the European Commission 
and the member states must move from the paternalistic (top 
to bottom) approach mainly used for the development of the 
current framework, to the non- paternalistic one. A bottom- up 
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approach would allow people with Romani background to 
participate more effectively in policymaking at all levels; local 
and regional stakeholders (non- governmental organizations, 
activists, experts, community members and so on) must also be 
involved in the development, implementation and monitoring 
of the post- 2020 public policies towards people with Romani 
background. Considering the non- paternalistic approach, the 
post- 2020 EU Strategic Framework for the Equality, Inclusion 
and Participation of people with Romani background could be 
developed based on more reliable quantitative and qualitative 
data; future strategies would be based on the latest available 
information since access to a larger number of communities 
and considerable sources of solutions for the improvement of 
the Romani situation would be broader than in 2011. These 
data must be the basis of detailed and realistic action plans, 
with a realistic and adequate predefined budget included 
into the national, regional and local budgets according to 
the magnitude of the social inclusion needs of people with 
Romani background.
However, COVID- 19 has shown, very clearly, the failure 
of the governments within the EU to treat Romani people 
as equal citizens. It has shown that persistent and structural 
antigypsyism continues to exist at all levels of European society, 
and manifests itself on a daily basis.
Under lockdowns, many Romani people suffer 
disproportionately. Besides the lack of access to potable 
drinking water, food or sanitation equipment to keep them 
safe from infection, Romani men, women and children were 
brutally beaten and abused by police forces, especially in 
Eastern European countries, such as Romania, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia. Moreover, they also became the targets of xenophobic 
rumours and conspiracies in countries such as Spain, singling 
them out as the transmitters of the COVID- 19 virus.
Racism is not the ‘solution’ to this crisis; we need to be 
supportive. The virus does not care about wealth, poverty 
or ethnicity; it can hit everyone. When it does, if we do not 
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make sure we protect the most vulnerable among us, it can be 
lethal, not just for those infected, but for an entire community.
This is why the EU and its member states cannot afford to lose 
more time and play with human lives by legitimizing the work 
on the inclusion of people with Romani background through 
a soft policy like the 2011– 20 EU Roma Framework. Member 
states must officially recognize antigypsyism as a specific form 
of racism against people with a Romani background, and to 
develop and implement specific and effective preventive and 
corrective measures against it on all levels where it occurs.
Unfortunately, antigypsyism is one of the oldest forms 
of racism in European history, from the time of slavery in 
Romania to the Holocaust and present day. The majority 
societies must know our history, and our traditions and culture, 
before judging us. We have been citizens of our countries for 
centuries. Many of our people fought in wars and defended the 
integrity of our countries, while many were murdered during 
the Holocaust because of their ethnicity. Yet, this part of our 
history and our contribution to our countries’ development 
is not properly acknowledged in school curricula. We need to 
raise awareness about this, and the EU and its member states 
can play an important role in this matter.
Antigypsyism has kept Roma in deep poverty. Today, this is 
still a taboo subject for the EU and many European countries. 
Antigypsyism is one of the main obstacles for equal participation 
and inclusion of people with a Romani background. Without 
a horizontal approach against antigypsyism in all domains of 
public life, we cannot speak about a real change and successful 
inclusion process.
This is why we need to urgently call on the European 
Commission to develop a proposal for a post- 2020 EU Strategic 
Framework for Equality, Inclusion and Participation of people 
with Romani background in Europe, putting the fight against 
poverty and antigypsyism at the forefront. The proposal must 
include:  clear and binding objectives, measures and targets 
for the member states; a clear timeline and clear and binding 
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progress requirements, as well as success indicators and adequate 
funding for its implementation; and a robust monitoring and 
oversight mechanism to ensure effective implementation and 
appropriate use of funds. Equal participation in all domains of 
public life, political participation and the language, arts, culture, 
history and environmental injustice of people with Romani 
background should be explicitly mentioned in the proposal 
for a post- 2020 EU public policy, with additional measures 
to the four main priority areas of education, employment, 
housing and healthcare.
However, this cannot be done in solitude. It requires a joint 
effort of people with a Romani background across Europe. 
The power of numbers speaking with the same voice towards 
the achievement of a common goal must be a priority of our 
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Drawing on Romani community 
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tool to challenge conventional 
discourses and analyses on 
Romani identity, poverty and 
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Through the transformative 
vehicle of a ‘Social Europe’, this 
edited collection presents new 
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of a new ‘Social Europe’ can offer 
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